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Abstract
This thesis sets as goal the study and development of cryptographic multi-
party protocols offering the properties of verifiability and privacy. The verifiability
property guarantees the protocols participants and/or observers that the result of
the execution of the protocol is exactly what is expected from a honest execution
of the protocol. On the other hand, the privacy property ensures the participants
that their private information is not leaked by executing the protocol. The thesis
targets real-world applications as well as any multi-party function. The first part
of the work focus on cryptographic voting systems. In this case, the function to
evaluate is rather simple -- e.g. a sum of yes/no votes -- and, we show how we
conciliate the verifiability with the privacy to obtain a cryptographic voting system
that offers a perfectly private audit trail of its execution. A perfectly private audit
trail means that it contains no information about the voters' votes whatsoever. In
addit...
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Abstract
This thesis sets as goal the study and development of cryptographic
multi-party protocols offering the properties of verifiability and privacy.
The verifiability property guarantees the protocols participants and/or
observers that the result of the execution of the protocol is exactly what
is expected from a honest execution of the protocol. On the other hand,
the privacy property ensures the participants that their private infor-
mation is not leaked by executing the protocol. The thesis targets real-
world applications as well as any multi-party function.
The first part of the work focus on cryptographic voting systems. In
this case, the function to evaluate is rather simple – e.g. a sum of yes/no
votes – and, we show how we conciliate the verifiability with the privacy
to obtain a cryptographic voting system that offers a perfectly private
audit trail of its execution. A perfectly private audit trail means that it
contains no information about the voters’ votes whatsoever. In addition,
the trail computationally guarantees the observers that the tally of the
votes is correct.
Next, we extend our study to encompass more complex functions.
We work on combinatorial problems such as graph problems. In this
part, following the traditional approach of secure multi-party compu-
tation, we investigate potential sources of privacy leakages that appear
when turning the unsecured version of an algorithm into its secure ver-
sion. We propose solutions to prevent these privacy leakages through
algorithms for securely sorting shared lists and securely computing the
shortest path and the maximum flow in shared graphs.
In the last part of the thesis, we follow a different approach than the
traditional secure multi-party computation one. In our approach, we
rely on a third party (worker) that is entrusted with the privacy of the
protocol participants’ inputs. We show that several important gains can
be made in this setting. We propose a generic protocol that can be used
to evaluate any multi-party function while offering a perfectly private
audit trail of its computation. This protocol is mainly non-interactive
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and offers the worker the possibility to use his own algorithms.
Finally, the solutions obtained in this thesis have been implemented.
The secure multi-party protocols are available in an online prototype
that can be used as such or to develop any desired new multi-party
application that offers perfect privacy and computational verifiability.
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Part I
Preliminaries

Chapter 1
Introduction
For the last 30 years and more especially since the advent of the global
net of computers, the field of cryptography has expanded at a steady
pace. The ubiquity of the technologies of information turned what was
once only considered as a military weapon to an everyday consumer good
through its manifold applications. Cryptography stands at a crosspoint
between mathematics, computer sciences, electronics and even physics.
This mixture is obviously a great opportunity for the researcher.
The directions that cryptography pursues nowadays lead to various
applications ranging from classic encryption schemes to cryptographic
voting systems via securely outsourcing computations or even playing
poker over the telephone (without being able to cheat). The most spec-
tacular progress in the next decades would probably involve the advent
(?) of quantum computers and the use of efficient and practical fully
homomorphic encryption or the combination of both.
The power of maths. Mathematics take a prominent place in the
field of cryptography since they give tools to prove the strength or the
weakness of a cryptographic scheme. Indeed, when the security proofs in
an accurate security model rely only on well-studied mathematical prob-
lems, they provide incontrovertible evidences. On the contrary, when
the security relies on physical assumptions or obfuscation (by hiding the
protocol design for example), it is difficult to obtain security guarantees
without first admitting strong hypotheses such as, for example, that a
sealed chip will remain sealed.
That being said, cryptography based on today’s mathematical prob-
lems has its downside. One of the mathematical Millennium Prize
Problems is breathtakingly holding the research community. It is the
question of proving, disproving or proving the impossibility of proving
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that P = NP. This interesting problem is of high concern in modern
cryptography due to its intricacy in the core of the security guarantees
cryptography offers. Basically, mathematical problems that are hard
to solve with known techniques but that could be easily solved if given
additional information, are building blocks for the security assumptions
from which the cryptographic primitives such as encryption schemes are
built. If P 6= NP, it means that there exists such problems for which
the linear increase in the parameters (or the statement of the problem)
results in supra polynomial increase in the efforts needed to solve them
in the worst case. Thus, proving that P = NP would turn the world
of cryptography upside down since the computational effort thought to
be supra polynomial in the parameters will unavoidably be reduced to
a polynomial which is, needless to say, much lighter in terms of com-
putations. By domino effect, the security of the current cryptographic
schemes would be strongly impaired.
Cryptography, a modern tool. A branch of modern cryptography
targets applications involving several parties and requiring security prop-
erties. For example, cryptographic voting gathers voters who want to
perform an election with some or all the following ingredients: privacy
of the votes, correctness of the tally (the tally reflects exactly the choices
of the voters), coercion-free elections (a voter cannot be forced to vote
against his wishes), universal verifiability (the whole election process can
be audited by external observers), etc. Achieving all these properties to-
gether can be challenging for the designer of the protocol since some of
them may be mutually excluding each other.
In a more general scale, coordinating several parties to perform the
computation task is also challenging. Synchronizing the actions of each
one in a dynamic framework, organizing the communication channels,
considering the different layers embedding the protocol, all this repre-
sents possible threats that we have to tackle if we want to provide an
end-to-end solution. However, this approach appears to be very demand-
ing since its implementation requires tools coming from very different
areas. Again taking cryptographic voting as an example, a complete so-
lution of electronic voting necessitates the installation of polling booth
and voting machines with authorities to manage them. But then, we
would have to make sure that these machines or the software installed
are not corrupted. This raises the question of who can verify this and
how, etc. We see that cutting down the problem into smaller pieces is
thus a necessity. In this thesis we focus on the pieces for which cryptog-
raphy has much to offer by proposing elegant and efficient solutions.
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1.1 Research project
This thesis has been elaborated around one main property, that is ver-
ifiability. Schemes, protocols or applications can feature this property
allowing designated parties, the auditors, to assert the smooth progress
of the process. The goal is two-sided. First the auditors ensure them-
selves that everything went in accordance with what was planned. Sec-
ond, the participants to the protocol are enforced to provide convincing
outcomes showing their correct participation. The fear of being caught
ensuring their honest behaviour. This objective can be achieved by pro-
viding the auditors with an irrefutable proof at the end of the process.
We call it the audit trail.
The verifiability property is sought in many applications. For ex-
ample, in cloud computing, a client outsources its computations to a
server. However, the client has to make sure that the result sent back
from the server is correct. In electronic auctions like those performed
by the stock exchange market auctioneer, verifiability would allow the
seller and the buyer of stocks to check that their offer or demand was
met under the rules of the stock exchange without having to blindly
trust the auctioneer.
One major concern of this thesis is to conciliate the verifiability prop-
erty with the privacy property. Privacy ensures that the secrets of the
participants are not leaked to other parties or eavesdroppers. Recalling
the above examples, in cloud computing, if the client is a company, it
might be critical that the cloud only access and compute on secret data.
This is because most private companies are very sensitive about their
private data due to industrial espionage. In some electronic auctions, a
privacy leakage could ruin the whole process since learning the bids of
other participants allows one to bid accordingly.
There is a difference between privacy and confidentiality (or secrecy)
which is also evoked in this thesis. Both are properties aiming at pro-
tecting the secret nature of a piece of information. However, while con-
fidentiality is absolute in the sense that every single piece of information
must remain hidden, privacy leaves some room that depends on the con-
text. To be more precise, privacy hides everything but what could be
deduced by the context. In the voting example, a ballot is only private
and not confidential since given the result of the elections, we can re-
trieve some information about the vote contained in the ballot. In the
more general case of multi-party function evaluation, we say that privacy
is guaranteed, which means that nothing about the private inputs of the
participants can be deduced except from what can be deduced from the
result of the function. In this regard, confidentiality would require that
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even the result could not be divulged to the participants.
Obtaining applications that achieve at the same time both the ver-
ifiability and the privacy property is challenging. Indeed, these two
properties tend to cancel each other off. This conflict naturally arises
from the fact that privacy aims at hiding every piece of information while
verifiability is performed by checking the validity of these exact pieces.
One objective of this thesis is thus to get around this problem and pro-
pose solutions enabling both verifiability and privacy for cryptographic
applications.
We set ourselves in the context of Secure Multi-Party Computation
(SMC). Secure multi-party computation allows setting up multi-party
functionalities in a secure way. A functionality could simply be the
evaluation of a function, but it could also be a reactive process or pro-
tocol offering various possibilities of actions for the participants. SMC
has been at the center of cryptography research for almost 30 years. A
first series of foundational works [Yao82, BOGW88, CCD88, GMW87]
demonstrated the possibility to evaluate any function in various models,
the function being described as a circuit. The attention then largely
focused on building solutions for the evaluation of functions of specific
interest, leading to secure and efficient protocols for auctions [BDJ+06],
voting [CFSY96], benchmarking [BFK+09], face recognition [SSW09] or
AES evaluation [PSSW09] to only mention a few.
The main goal of this thesis is to study and develop cryptographic
protocols with audit mechanisms as well as to provide a generic way to
obtain new ones. We also focus on finding solutions to concrete problems
such as cryptographic voting, electronic auctions or the outsourcing of
multi-party computation on private data to a third party that will pro-
duce a proof of the correctness of its computations.
1.2 Main contributions
As mentioned above, our research takes place in a general framework
which is secure multi-party computation. Different approaches to enable
security in multi-party protocols exist and we mainly consider three of
them in this thesis.
First, an SMC scenario where we exclude that any third party per-
forms computations. In this case, all the participants are set on equal
footing in the sense that none of them is designated to perform the
computations alone while the others are only sending their inputs and
waiting for the result. In this scenario, every party collaborates to the
computation of the functionality in a distributed way. We will sometimes
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refer to this scenario as “classic” SMC.
In a second scenario, we split the set of parties into two subsets. The
first one regroups the clients and the second one regroups the workers.
Here we have a different assignment of tasks. The clients will provide
the inputs while the workers compute and give the result back to the
clients.
A third scenario similar to the second one considers only one worker
in place of several. The clients still provide the inputs to the worker
which compute the result and give it back to the clients. As we will see,
this scenario offers less privacy to the clients than second one. However,
it has the advantage to reduce the computational efforts needed for the
clients to verify the correctness of the computation.
While the first scenario is often unrelenting in terms of trust and
makes sense when the parties do not want to trust anyone but them-
selves, the second and third scenarios leave some room for cases where
part of the trust can be given away to other parties. As a result, those
schemes are more flexible. For example, the first scenario can be used to
solve problems where a little number of parties (2 or 3) are involved since
then, the number of communication channels (one per pair of parties)
is manageable. However, thousands of voters organizing a vote without
relying on election authorities to perform the tally of the votes can be
challenging. In this case, two last scenarios are more suitable.
The work presented in this thesis proposes secure solutions to multi-
party protocols in each of the three scenarios. The cryptographic voting
schemes and the multi-party function evaluation proposal take respec-
tively place in the second and third scenario while the proposal on simple
combinatorial problems is set up in the first scenario.
Cryptographic voting. The first contribution of this thesis concerns
cryptographic voting. The results were presented at the ESORICS con-
ference in 2013 in [CPP13].
In this work, we introduce the first efficient cryptographic voting
system that features a perfectly-private audit trail guaranteeing at the
same time, the perfect privacy of the ballots and the computational ver-
ifiability of the elections. Perfect privacy has to be taken in the sense of
the theory of information, meaning that privacy is ensured even against
an unbounded adversary. In addition, the voting scheme ensures that
the verifiability of the elections, that is the possibility for the observers
and the voters to check that the election process and outcome, took
place properly.
We propose several implementations of our voting scheme based on a
new cryptographic primitive called Commitment Consistent Encryption.
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This primitive is not confined to cryptographic vote and we find it other
uses in unrelated applications that are also presented in this thesis.
The implementations based on our primitives are efficient compared
to na¨ıve implementations and we developed a prototype to test their
efficiency. The prototype in itself is also an achievement of this thesis and
its intrinsic value is demonstrated through the applications generically
developed to securely evaluate multi-party functions.
Multi-party function evaluation. A second contribution of this
thesis is the generic solution proposed to securely evaluate any multi-
party function in a clients-worker setting where the clients receive a
perfectly private audit trail of the function evaluation.
A preliminary version of this work was presented at the conference
SDTA in 2014 in [CP14]. The proposal extends the results obtained for
the cryptographic voting where the function to evaluate is rather simple
(in a 0/1 vote, the function is a sum). Here we consider any function and
we specifically target those needing algorithms to be evaluated. These
algorithms use arithmetic operations as additions and multiplications as
well as branchings such as if-then-else sections.
We present three test applications: solving a linear system of equa-
tions, auctions, and finding the shortest path in a graph as well as a
generic method to evaluate any circuit-based function and achieve the
perfectly private audit trail. We point out that our method has an
interesting advantage, that is, in some cases, it allows reducing the com-
plexity of the verification of the solution for the clients. Indeed, when
the classical solution to obtain verifiability often goes through (re-) com-
puting the entire algorithm, our solution proposes a short cut where the
verification process only depends on the solution and on the inputs of
the clients. For example, a sorting algorithm like Quicksort runs in
O(n log n) which is the computational cost for the clients if they run to-
gether the algorithm on their private inputs. However, if they are given
the sorted list of their inputs, the clients only need to check that the list
is sorted, which can be done in O(n) steps.
Finally, as mentioned above, we developed a prototype implementa-
tion of our applications and used it to test our results. This prototype
is meant to be reused to design other secure multi-party function eval-
uations that automatically provide a perfectly private audit trail.
Simple combinatorial problems. In this third contribution, we en-
deavour to solve simple combinatorial problems and in particular graph
problems. Part of this work was presented this work at the Financial
Cryptography and Data Security conference in 2013 [ACM+13].
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The objective of this research was to analyse and build SMC protocols
to securely solve simple combinatorial problems. Our secure solutions
tackle the sorting problem and two graph problems, namely the shortest
path and the maximum flow. Our protocols offer privacy and verifiabil-
ity in a threshold model. This means that the security properties are
guaranteed as long as a fixed number of the parties remains honest.
Our analysis uncovered interesting complexity gaps between the un-
secured and the secure versions of the classic algorithms we used as it
is, for example, the case for the Dijkstra algorithm. We designed our
solutions to alleviate the difference in the efficiency metrics that appears
in SMC. Indeed, the cost of the atomic operations does not transpose
exactly in SMC. This forces us to rethink the algorithms to avoid as
much as possible the costly operations such as comparisons. Finally, we
also discuss the different privacy leakages that might appear with na¨ıve
implementations and the precautions we have to take to avoid them.
Our secure algorithms were implemented in a Python SMC frame-
work called VIFF [VIF] which gave us qualitative timing results and
recommendations regarding the practicability of our solutions.
1.3 Organization of the thesis
The thesis is organized in three parts. In the first one, after this in-
troduction, we provide the cryptographic background. The second part
contains the various contributions of the thesis while the last part draws
our conclusions.
More specifically, in Chapter 2, we detail the cryptographic primi-
tives such as encryption, commitment schemes as well as zero-knowledge
proofs of knowledge. We build up the security of these schemes that can
be achieved through the cryptographic assumptions. We also present
secret sharing schemes that lead to classic secure multi-party computa-
tion.
In Chapter 3, we designed a new cryptographic primitive, the Com-
mitment Consistent Encryption (CCE) that is used in the next chapters.
We give the definition and the validity augmentation that enforces the
consistency of the primitive. Then we present two concrete instanti-
ations and a generic construction of the new encryption scheme. We
also provide the details of the prototype implementation performed in
Python and used to test the efficiency of our instantiations.
Then we get down to business with our first secure multi-party appli-
cation, cryptographic voting. Chapter 4 is dedicated to the new voting
schemes that we propose. It covers the security notions and properties a
10 Chapter 1. Introduction
voting scheme must possess and how we obtain those properties through
the use of CCE schemes. We prove the security of our concrete instan-
tiation and generic construction of voting schemes and we analyse their
efficiency theoretically and through our prototype implementation.
Chapter 5 extends the use of the CCE primitive by proposing a
generic construction to evaluate any multi-party function and provide a
perfectly private audit trail. We first state the functionality we wish to
achieve and then we detail the real-world protocols and the tools that
realize the functionality in the presence of adversaries described in our
threat model. We prove the security of our protocol in this model. Next,
we show how to use our protocol in three test applications and we anal-
yse their complexity as well as their efficiency thanks to our prototype
implementation.
Finally, in Chapter 6, we tackle various simple combinatorial prob-
lems within the classic SMC approach. We present different graph prob-
lems and the interest to solve them securely. We identify differences in
the efficiency metrics and complexity gaps between the secure and un-
secure versions of the classic algorithms used (Bellman-Ford, Dijkstra,
Edmonds-Karp). We explain how our secure implementations are de-
signed to avoid as much as possible the efficiency overheads and we give
qualitative time measurements for each of them.
We conclude and draw future perspectives in Chapter 7.
Chapter 2
Building Blocks
This chapter describes the different cryptographic tools that are used
throughout this thesis. As a starting point, we recall the cryptographic
assumptions and primitives such as encryption schemes, sigma-protocols
and zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge. We also overview secret shar-
ing scheme and secure multi-party computation.
For smooth reading of this chapter, we recommend the reader to be
familiar with the number theory notions of group, rings and order. In
case of need, we invite the reader to look at the memento in Appendix A.
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2.1 Public-key cryptography
The historic purpose of cryptography is to convey messages secretly
through the use of an encryption algorithm and a secret key. In mod-
ern cryptography, we distinguish symmetric cryptography from asym-
metric cryptography also called public-key cryptography. In symmet-
ric cryptography, the same key is used for encryption and decryption
whereas in public-key cryptography, a pair of keys, the public-key pk and
the secret key sk, are used for encryption and decryption respectively.
The possibility to render the encryption key public opens a range of
new applications unreachable by symmetric cryptography. For example,
the exchange between two persons of their personal public keys via an
insecure network allows them to communicate securely. Thanks to that,
electronic (e-) signatures, e-voting and e-commerce are today common
services for users connected to a global network. Public-key cryptogra-
phy finds its roots in the seminal paper of W. Diffie and M. Hellman
in 1976 entitled “New directions in cryptography” [DH76]. This work
sets the basis of the security in public-key cryptography which relies
on the computational difficulty to solve some families of mathematical
problems.
In 1978, Rivest, Shamir and Adleman [RSA78] introduced the first
public-key cryptosystem based on a hard mathematical problem: the
difficulty to factorize large integers. This system is widely used nowadays
and better known by the name RSA. Since then, other mathematical
problems have been used in public cryptography and the second most
famous is certainly the discrete logarithm problem (DLP). In the
following, we present one factorization problem related to RSA, the DLP
as well as convenient variants of the DLP used in this thesis.
2.1.1 Integer factorization based assumptions
Even though it is not used in this thesis, we mention RSA as it is one
of the most widely known encryption system. Its security relies on the
following factorization problem, informally that it is hard to decompose
the product of two large primes.
Related to factoring but not known to be identical, the decisional
composite residuosity DCR assumption states that it is hard to dis-
tinguish random elements of Z∗n2 from random elements of n-th residues
in Z∗n2 defined as Res(n
2) := {y ∈ Z∗n2 |∃x ∈ Zn2 : y = xn mod n2}.
Assumption 2.1 (DCR). Given n, a0, a1 where n = pq the product of
two large primes, a random element ab ∈ Z∗n2 and a random element
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a1−b ∈ Res(n2) where b is a random bit, it is hard to decide which of a0
or a1 belongs to Res(n
2).
This assumption studied by P. Pailier in 1999 [Pai99] leads to a useful
encryption scheme presented in Section 2.1.3.
In the same vein, the quadratic residuosity assumption states
that it is hard to distinguish random elements of a Z∗n that are chosen
among the quadratic residues (inQRn) from elements that are randomly
chosen among the non-quadratic residues (in QNRn) where n is the
product of two large primes. This problem goes back to Gauss [Gau86]
and was exploited by Goldwasser and Micali [GM84] for the so called
Goldwasser-Micali encryption scheme.
2.1.2 Discrete logarithm based assumptions
In 1985, T. ElGamal proposed a new public-key cryptosystem based on
discrete logarithm problems [ElG85]. This system enjoys a broad range
of cryptographic applications nowadays.
This family of problems is usually based on a cyclic group G = (S, .)
of large prime order q > 2k where k is a security parameter. Relatively
to a generator g, any random element h can be expressed as a power
of g: h = gx for a unique x modulo the group order. We say that the
discrete logarithm DL of h in base g is x.
Assumption 2.2 (DL). Given a cyclic group G of a large prime order
q > 2k and a generator g of G, for any random element h
rand←− G, it is
hard to compute the discrete logarithm of h in base g.
This assumption does not hold in any groups but the best known
algorithms take sub-exponential time in k to find the discrete logarithm
in prime order q subgroups of multiplicative groups Z∗p. However, on
subgroups of some elliptic curves, the best known algorithms are expo-
nential in k which allows shorter key size for the same level of security
[MVOV96, CFA+05].
Related to the DL, we now look at two variants of a problem called
Diffie-Hellman problem and introduced by Diffie and Hellman in
[DH76]. The first is the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) and
the second is the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH).
Assumption 2.3 (CDH). Given (G, g, ga, gb) where G is a large prime
order q > 2k multiplicative group, g is a generator of G, and ga, gb are
random elements of G, it is hard to compute gc where c := Dloggga ·
Dlogggb.
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Assumption 2.4 (DDH). Given (G, g, ga, gb, gc) where G is a large
prime order q > 2k multiplicative group, g is a generator of G, and
ga, gb are random elements of G and gc ∈ G, it is hard to decide whether
DLogggc = DLoggga · DLogggb or if gc is a random group element in-
dependently chosen from ga and gb.
Being able to break CDH obviously means being able to break DDH.
However the converse is not true and some groups in which DDH is
easy remain strong toward the CDH assumption. Such groups can be
highlighted when a symmetric bilinear structure such as a pairing exists.
In short, a pairing Pair is composed of three groups G1, G2, G3 and a
bilinear mapping e : G1 × G2 → G3 such that ∀(g1, g2) ∈ G1 × G2,
∀a, b ∈ Z we have that e(ga1 , gb2) = e(g1, g2)ab. We say that the pairing
is symmetric when G1 = G2 and asymmetric otherwise. Given the
bilinear property of a symmetric pairing, DDH becomes easy in G1.
Indeed, e(ga, gb) = e(g, g)ab is easily compared to e(gc, g) = e(g, g)c.
The groups where DDH is easy while CDH is still hard are called Gap-
Diffie Hellman groups. We provide a more detailed look on pairings is
provided in Appendix A.3.
When working with pairings, we have to state the security assump-
tions related to the hardness of the CDH problem. The two basics are
the Symmetric External Diffie-Hellman (SXDH) for asymmetric
pairings [ACHdM05] and the Decisional Linear Assumption (DLIN) for
symmetric pairings [BBS04].
Assumption 2.5 (SXDH). Given an asymmetric pairing Pairasym :=
(G1, G2, G3, e), the DDH problem is hard in both G1 and G2.
Thanks to their nice bilinear property, pairing-based cryptosystems
are part of the constructions presented in Section 3.4 and Section 4.4.2.
These constructions will only rely on asymmetric pairings.
2.1.3 Public-key encryption scheme
We describe the cryptographic primitives that are relevant to this thesis
and we begin with the public-key encryption scheme. Loosely speaking,
an encryption scheme allows messages to be encrypted and decrypted
through the use of a public key and a secret key respectively.
Definition 2.1 (Public-key encryption scheme). A public-key en-
cryption scheme ΠE is a triple of algorithms (Gen,Enc,Dec) such
that :
Gen(1λ): on input 1λ a string of length λ where λ is a security parameter,
outputs a key triple (pp, pk, sk) ∈ K composed of
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• public parameters pp describing the encryption setting (such
as public generators), the specification of a message space M,
a ciphertext space C and a finite key space K,
• a public key pk, and
• a secret key sk.
Enc(pk,m): on input the public key pk and a message m ∈M, outputs
a ciphertext c ∈ C.
Dec(sk, c): on input the secret key sk and a ciphertext c ∈ C, outputs a
decryption of the ciphertext m¯ ∈M.
We assume that Gen and Enc are probabilistic algorithms while Dec
is deterministic. We also assume that pp is available to all algorithms
apart from Gen. The scheme ΠE possesses the following property:
Correctness: ∀(pp, pk, sk) ← Gen(1λ), ∀m ∈ M, we have for c ←
Enc(pk,m) that Dec(sk, c) = m with probability 1.
Saying that an encryption scheme is secure raises several questions
about what we mean by security or what kind of adversary the encryp-
tion scheme will encounter. Loosely speaking, we say that a scheme is
secure if no Probabilistic Polynomial Time (PPT) adversary is able to
“break” it, meaning that it is able to retrieve meaningful information
from the ciphertext. Since it is not feasible to enumerate all kind of
adversaries, we proceed by reduction which essentially works as follow :
1. let A be a PPT adversary able to “break” the scheme Π.
2. from A, we build a PPT adversary A′ against some cryptographic
assumption. We explain how A′ uses A to break the assumption.
3. the success probability PrA′ of A′ is the success probability PrA of
A eventually divided by a polynomial function. On the other hand,
since PrA′ is bounded by the probability to break the assumption,
so is PrA. Thus, if the probability to break the assumption is
negligible, so must be the success probability PrA of A.
Above, we say that a function η : N → R≥0 is negligible if for any
c ∈ N we have that lim
λ→∞
η(λ).λc = 0. An overwhelming function is
close to 1 up to a negligible function.
In this regards, the security of some cryptographic scheme, given a
security parameter λ, rests on the fact that the probability for every
adversary that runs in polynomial time in λ to break any useful crypto-
graphic assumption must be negligible.
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Proceeding in this way, we do not have to care too much about the
abilities of an adversary as long as we know that he is limited in his com-
putational power and we define precisely what kind of information he is
given access to perform his attack. For example, we allow the adversary
to eavesdrop communication, to “play” with the encryption scheme or
even to access side-channel information issued by the algorithm’s exe-
cution. Doing so, we differentiate classes of adversaries or encryption
schemes depending on the point of view.
In the following we present experiments defining the goals of the
adversary. There are mainly two different goals : indistinguishability
of encryption (IND) where we want an adversary to be unable to learn
any information about a plaintext m, given a cipertext c. This was
introduced by Goldwasser and Micali [GM84]. The second goal is non-
malleability (NM) and is due to Dolev et al. [DDN98]. In this case,
we want an adversary to be unable, given a ciphertext c, to output
another ciphertext c′ such that the respective plaintexts m and m′ are
in a meaningful relation (e.g. m′ = 2m).
The first security definition targets the weakest adversary, the eaves-
dropper. To encounter him, we denote the eavesdropping indistinguisha-
bility experiment PubKind-eavA,Π (λ) where ΠE is an encryption scheme (Gen,
Enc,Dec), A is a PPT adversary and λ is the security parameter. In
this experiment the adversary is given the public key of the encryp-
tion scheme which turns out to be the same as giving the adversary
an access to an encryption oracle. For this reason, the security against
eavesdroppers is equivalent to the security against chosen plaintext
attack (CPA) described in the experiment PubKind-cpaA,Π (λ) :
Experiment 2.1 (PubKind-cpaA,Π (λ)).
1. run (pp, pk, sk)← Gen(1λ).
2. give (pp, pk) to A. Then, A has access to the encryption oracle
Enc(pk, ·). Finally, A outputs m0,m1 ∈M.
3. select b
rand←− {0, 1} and compute c← Enc(pk,mb). Hand c to A.
4. give A access to the encryption oracle Enc(pk, ·). Then A outputs
a bit b′.
5. the output of the experiment is 1 if b = b′ and 0 otherwise.
Definition 2.2. A public-key encryption scheme Π := (Gen,Enc,Dec)
has indistinguishable encryption under chosen plaintext attack
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if for any PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible function η such that
Pr[PubKind-cpaA,Π (λ) = 1] ≤
1
2
+ η(λ)
We say that the scheme is IND-CPA-secure.
In the above experiment, the security requirement states that no ad-
versary is able to distinguish between two random looking ciphertexts.
A stronger requirement of security called non-malleability targets an
adversary pursing the following goal. This adversary is able to extract
information from a given ciphertext on a message m in order to produce
another one on a message m′ such that there is a meaningful relationship
between m and m′. Of course the notion of “meaningful relationship”
must be clarified. To illustrate it, imagine an adversary seeing an en-
cryption Enc(m), would be able to output Enc(m+1) without decrypting
m. This adversary would be able to win every time a two-bidders auc-
tion where the bids are encrypted and sent to the auctioneer if he is able
to eavesdrop the bid of the other candidate before submitting his.
The NM-CPA security is defined through Experiment 2.2 [DDN98].
In this experiment, the adversary is split into two parts A = (A1,A2).
Adversary A1 runs first and describes a valid message space Ms from
which messages are pulled out. Then, A2 is presented with the encryp-
tion of a message from Ms and produces a vector of ciphertexts possibly
related to this message. The experiment measures if this vector is in-
deed related to the message encrypted or if it is related to any random
message.
Experiment 2.2 (PubKnm-cpaA,Π,b (λ)). Let the adversary A be split into
(A1,A2), Π := (Gen,Enc,Dec) an encryption scheme and b a bit.
1. run (pp, pk, sk)← Gen(1λ).
2. give (pp, pk) to A1. Then, A1 has access to the encryption oracle
Enc(pk, ·). Finally, A1 outputs (s,Ms) where s is the description
of a message space Ms ⊂M.
3. select m0,m1
rand←− Ms such that |m0| = |m1| and compute c ←
Enc(pk,m0). Hand c, s,Ms to A2.
4. give A2 access to the encryption oracle Enc(pk, ·). Then A2 outputs
the description of a relation R and a vector of ciphertexts c′.
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5. decrypt the vector c′ to obtain, m′ ← Dec(sk, c′). Then, define
the output of the experiment as follows:
∀c′ ∈ c′ : c′ ∈ C (2.1)
∧ c /∈ c′ (2.2)
∧
{
R(m0,m
′) if b = 0
R(m1,m
′) if b = 1 (2.3)
In Experiment 2.2, the output condition 2.1 ensures that there is
no invalid ciphertext and condition 2.2 ensures that the adversary A2
cannot copy the ciphertext c. The condition 2.3 is at the core of the
non-malleability definition. Indeed, the goal of the adversary is to find a
vector of ciphertexts c′ whose decryption m′ is meaningful with respect
to the description of R, that is R(mb,m
′) holds. We differentiate two
cases with the bit b to measure if the adversary produces with a non-
negligible probability ciphertexts that are meaningfully related to the
encrypted message (b = 0) from the case of the adversary that produces
ciphertexts that are meaningfully related to any random message (b =
1).
Definition 2.3. A public-key encryption scheme Π := (Gen,Enc,Dec)
has non-malleable encryption under chosen plaintext attack if
for any PPT adversary A = (A1,A2), there exists a negligible function
η such that
|Pr[PubKnm-cpaA,Π,0 (λ) = 1]− Pr[PubKnm-cpaA,Π,1 (λ) = 1]| ≤ η(λ)
We say that the scheme is NM-CPA-secure.
NM-CPA secure encryption scheme are used in the different chap-
ters of this thesis. In multi-party settings, non malleability is a crucial
property to repel simple attacks from corrupted parties. For example, in
our voting schemes of Chapter 4, we must prevent voters from cleverly
copying the votes of other voters. As another example, in the shortest
path applications of Chapters 5 and 6, it would be harmful if a party
would be able to decide the weight of one of his edges according to the
weight of someone else’s edges. Otherwise, it would allow a corrupted
party to lever off the output of the protocol.
For completeness we evoke a stronger kind of security called secu-
rity against chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA) where an adversary is
also given access to a decryption oracle before and after the challenge
ciphertext in step 3 of Experiment 2.2.
There is a slight difference between the types of CCA security lead-
ing to a mid-point between CPA and CCA. Indeed, after the challenge
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ciphertext in step 3, by giving A2 access to the decryption oracle or not,
we define a variant of CCA. We note CCA1 when no access is given,
and CCA2 (or CCA) when access is given. A CCA1-secure scheme is also
called non adaptive against chosen ciphertext attack.
So far we can combine the different security notions by mixing the
goals of the adversary {IND,NM} with the different types of attacks
{CPA,CCA1,CCA2} (we omit EAV) to obtain six security notions :
{IND-CPA, IND-CCA1, IND-CCA2,NM-CPA,NM-CCA1,NM-CCA2}
The work of Bellare et al. [BDPR98] presents and proves the re-
lations and implications between these security notions. This can be
summarized in a graph that we reproduce in Figure 2.1. In this graph,
we observe four hierarchical levels between the different security notions.
A security definition in a given level implies the security notions in the
levels below but does not imply those of the above or equal levels.
NM-CPA
NM-CCA1
NM-CCA2⇔ IND-CCA2
IND-CPA
IND-CCA1×
Figure 2.1: Relations between security notions : A =⇒ B means
that there is a proof that security notion A implies security notion B.
A⇐⇒× B means that there is a proof that security notion A does not
imply security notion B and the other way around.
As a first practical public-key encryption scheme, we present the El-
Gamal encryption introduced in [ElG85]. This scheme can be made
IND-CPA secure under the hardness of the decisional Diffie-Hellman
problem (Assumption 2.4).
Definition 2.4 (ElGamal encryption). A public-key encryption scheme
Π := (Gen,Enc,Dec) is an ElGamal encryption scheme if it is such
that
Gen(1λ): on input 1λ a string of length λ where λ is a security parameter,
produce G a multiplicative cyclic group of prime order q of length
λ-bit as well as a generator g of G. Then choose x
rand←− Zq and
compute h := gx. Set pp := (G, q, g,M,C) where M = G and
C = G×G. Set pk := h and sk := x then output (pp, pk, sk).
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Enc(pk,m): on input the public key pk and a message m ∈ M, choose
r
rand←− Zq and compute c1 := gr and c2 := mhr. Output c :=
(c1, c2).
Dec(sk, c): on input the secret key sk and a ciphertext c ∈ C, parse c as
(c1, c2) and compute m¯ := c2/c
x
1 . Output m¯.
Under the hardness of Assumption 2.4, this encryption scheme is
IND-CPA-secure but not NM-CPA-secure.
Proposition 2.1. An ElGamal encryption scheme Π := (Gen,Enc,Dec)
is IND-CPA-secure if the DDH assumption holds in G where G is the
group generated in Gen.
However, it is easy to see that the scheme is not NM-CPA-secure.
Imagine an adversary receiving c := (c1, c2) = (g
r,mhr) an encryption
of m in step 3 of Experiment 2.2. Then in step 4, the adversary outputs
the ciphertext c′ := (c1gs, c2hs) for a random s. Then c′ is an encryption
of m as well which breaks the NM-CPA security for the identity relation
R.
Homomorphic encryption
Performing operations over encrypted messages opens a panel of cryp-
tographic applications. This is possible when we use an homomorphic
encryption scheme, that is an encryption scheme where the encryp-
tion algorithm acts as an homomorphism between the message space M
and the ciphertext space C. For example some electronic voting schemes
like those studied in Chapter 4 rely on homomorphic encryption to per-
form the tallying operations or to enable verifiability.
Definition 2.5. An homomorphic encryption scheme is a public-
key encryption scheme Π := (Gen,Enc,Dec) such that ∀m1,m2 ∈M,
Enc(pk,m1 ? m2) = Enc(pk,m1)  Enc(pk,m2)
where ?,  are the group operations in M and C respectively. We say that
the encryption algorithm is homomorphic for ? (or ? homomorphic).
We observe that the ElGamal encryption scheme (Definition 2.4)
is homomorphic since we have for c := (gr,mhr) ← Enc(pk,m) and
c′ := (gr′ ,m′hr′)← Enc(pk,m′) that c · c′, the component-wise product,
equals (gr+r
′
,mm′hr+r′) which is an encryption of mm′. The Enc algo-
rithm plays the role of a multiplicative homomorphism. However, the
homomorphic property of the ElGamal encryption scheme is not very
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helpful for a direct practical use. Indeed, remember that m must be a
group element of G. Actually, this message space is not very practical,
for example, if we want to encrypt strings or numbers. In this case,
we have to use an encoding operation, κ : Mreal → M where Mreal
is the “real” message space targeted. The encryption process is thus
Enc◦κ : Mreal → C and the decryption process is κ−1◦Dec : C→Mreal.
This works nicely but if we want to keep the homomorphic property of
the scheme, we must have that κ is also homomorphic. There lies our
problem. Indeed, if we could find such efficient homomorphic κ−1 be-
tween M (G) and an organized space Mreal which is equivalent to a space
with an order relation (Mreal ⊂ Z), then the discrete logarithm problem
assumption does not hold in G and our encryption scheme cannot be
made IND-CPA secure.
To get around this issue we introduce a new encryption scheme based
on ElGamal and called exponential ElGamal. In this scheme, we see
that the above encoding function κ is the modular exponentiation and
thus κ−1 is the discrete logarithm function. For this reason, the message
space must remain small.
Definition 2.6 (Exponential ElGamal encryption). A public-key en-
cryption scheme Π := (Gen,Enc,Dec) is an exponential ElGamal
encryption scheme if it is such that
Gen(1λ): on input 1λ a string of length λ where λ is a security parameter,
produce G a multiplicative cyclic group of prime order q of length
λ-bit as well as random generators g1, g2
rand←− G. Then choose
x
rand←− Zq and compute h1 := gx1 . Set pp := (G, q, g1, g2,M,C)
where M = Zq and C = G × G. Set pk := h1 and sk := x then
output (pp, pk, sk).
Enc(pk,m): on input the public key pk and a message m ∈ M, choose
r
rand←− Zq and compute c1 := gr1 and c2 := gm2 hr1. Output c :=
(c1, c2).
Dec(sk, c): on input the secret key sk and a ciphertext c ∈ C, parse c as
(c1, c2) and compute m¯ := c2/c
x
1 . Output Dlogg2m¯.
We see that in order for the decryption algorithm to work, the mes-
sage space must be limited to a small part of Zq. The homomorphic
property of the scheme is preserved. However, the encryption is now an
additive homomorphism, Enc : (Zq,+)→ (G, .).
To avoid the decryption limitation problem of exponential ElGamal,
we present another homomorphic encryption scheme, that is the Paillier
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encryption scheme proposed in [Pai99] that can be made IND-CPA se-
cure under the hardness of the decisional composite residuosity (DCR)
problem (see Assumption 2.1).
Definition 2.7 (Paillier encryption). A Paillier encryption scheme
is a public-key encryption scheme Π := (Gen,Enc,Dec) such that
Gen(1λ): on input 1λ a string of length λ where λ is a security parameter,
produce n = pq where p and q are primes of length λ-bit. Set pp =
pk := n and sk := ϕ(n) = (p − 1)(q − 1) then output (pp, pk, sk).
We have that M = Zn and C = Z∗n2.
Enc(pk,m): on input the public key pk and a message m ∈ M, choose
r
rand←− Z∗n and compute c := rn(1 + n)m mod n2. Output c.
Dec(sk, c): on input the secret key sk and a ciphertext c ∈ C, compute
m¯ as
m¯ :=
cϕ(n) mod n2 − 1
n
· ϕ(n)−1 mod n
Output m¯.
We see that the correctness of the decryption holds since,
m¯ =
rnϕ(n)(1 + [mϕ(n) mod n]n) mod n2 − 1
n
· ϕ(n)−1 mod n
(2.4)
=
(1 + [mϕ(n) mod n]n) mod n2 − 1
n
· ϕ(n)−1 mod n (2.5)
=
[mϕ(n) mod n]n
n
· ϕ(n)−1 mod n (2.6)
= [mϕ(n) mod n] · ϕ(n)−1 mod n
= m
where in equation 2.4, we use the fact that (1 + n)a = 1 + an mod n2
for any a ∈ Zn by computing the binomial coefficients. In equation 2.5,
rnϕ(n) = 1 since rn ∈ Res(n2) is of order ϕ(n). Finally in equation 2.6,
we have that 1 + [mϕ(n) mod n]n is always smaller than n2, so we can
drop the mod n2 part.
Proposition 2.2. A Paillier encryption scheme Π := (Gen,Enc,Dec) is
IND-CPA-secure if the DCR assumption holds for n generated in Gen.
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Moreover, for a Paillier encryption scheme, we have ∀m1,m2 ∈ Zn :
Enc(pk,m1) · Enc(pk,m2) = rn1 (1 + n)m1 · rn2 (1 + n)m2
= (r1r2)
n(1 + n)m1+m2
= Enc(pk,m1 +m2).
The Paillier encryption scheme is thus homomorphic for the addi-
tion with the encryption algorithm acting as an homomorphism between
Zn × Z∗n and Z∗n2 . The Paillier encryption scheme is used in our generic
construction in Chapter 3 that we use in Section 4.3 for our generic
voting system.
By their very nature, homomorphic encryption schemes are mal-
leable. Achieving non-malleability for those schemes while keeping their
homomorphic property is possible but will require additional tools like
the proofs of knowledge introduced in Section 2.1.5. This particular
construction will be used to perform NM-CPA secure encryption scheme
with homomorphic property in our voting schemes of Chapter 4.
Note that when M and C are rings and that the encryption algorithm
acts as a ring homomorphism between them, we say that the encryption
scheme is fully homomorphic. Such encryption schemes exist [Gen09]
but remain to be improved regarding efficiency in order to be used for
concrete applications.
2.1.4 Commitment scheme
Loosely speaking, commitment scheme allows us to commit on a mes-
sage through a commitment which does not leak information about
the message until an opening of the commitment is revealed. A com-
mitment can be thought as a sealed box in which someone (say Alice)
hides a message. The box is then handed to someone else (Bob) who
makes sure that the content remains unchanged until Alice gives Bob
the key to open the box. The commitment scheme is said to be hiding,
when, given a commitment, it is hard to retrieve information about the
message – the box hides its contents – and, the commitment scheme is
said to be binding, when, given a commitment on some message m and
its respective opening, it is hard to forge another opening that opens to
a different message m′ – it is hard to modify the content of the box –.
Definition 2.8 (Commitment scheme). A commitment scheme ΠC
is a triple of algorithms (GenC,Com,Verify) such that:
GenC(1
λ): on input 1λ a string of length λ where λ is a security parame-
ter, defines a finite key space KC and a commitment key cpk ∈ KC
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that contains the specification of a message space MC, a commit-
ment space CC and an opening space O.
Com(cpk,m): on input the public key cpk and a message m ∈MC, out-
puts a commitment d ∈ CC and an opening o ∈ O.
Verify(cpk, d, o,m): on input the public key cpk, a message m ∈MC and
opening o ∈ O, returns either 1 or 0.
We assume that GenC and Com are probabilistic algorithms while
Verify is deterministic. The scheme ΠC possesses the following property:
Correctness: ∀cpk ← GenC(1λ), ∀m ∈ MC, ∀d, o ← Com(cpk,m), we
have that Verify(cpk, d, o,m) = 1 with probability 1.
We specify the hiding and binding properties through the following
experiments and definitions. During Experiments 2.3 and 2.4, once the
adversary receives cpk, he is able to compute Com(cpk, ·) at will.
Experiment 2.3 (PubKhidingA,ΠC (λ)).
1. run cpk← Gen(1λ).
2. give cpk to A. Then A outputs m0,m1 ∈MC.
3. flip a coin b
rand←− {0, 1}, then compute d, o ← Com(cpk,mb) and
hand d to A.
4. A outputs a bit b′.
5. the output of the experiment is 1 if b = b′ and 0 otherwise.
Definition 2.9 (Hiding commitment scheme). A commitment scheme
ΠC defined as above is computationally hiding, if for all PPT adver-
sary A, there exists a negligible function η such that
Pr[PubKhidingA,ΠC (λ) = 1] ≤
1
2
+ η(λ).
Moreover, the commitment scheme ΠC is perfectly hiding, if for
every adversary A, we have
Pr[PubKhidingA,ΠC (λ) = 1] =
1
2
.
Experiment 2.4 (PubKbindingA,ΠC (λ)).
1. run cpk← Gen(1λ).
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2. give cpk to A. Then A outputs d,m, o,m′, o′ where m′ 6= m.
3. the output of the experiment equals 1 if
Verify(cpk, d,m, o) = 1 ∧ Verify(cpk, d,m′, o′) = 1
and 0 otherwise.
Definition 2.10 (Binding commitment scheme). A commitment scheme
ΠC defined as above is computationally binding, if for any PPT ad-
versary A, there exists a negligible function η such that
Pr[PubKbindingA,ΠC (λ) = 1] ≤ η(λ).
Moreover, the commitment scheme ΠC is perfectly binding, if for
every adversary A, we have
Pr[PubKbindingA,ΠC (λ) = 1] = 0.
Observe that it is not possible to achieve a commitment scheme
that would be perfectly hiding and perfectly binding at the same time.
Indeed, if we suppose that such a scheme exists, it would mean that it is
not possible for any adversary A1 with unbounded computational power
to find that a commitment d on a message m with opening o an a second
message m′ 6= m with opening o′ such that both Verify(cpk, d, o,m) and
Verify(cpk, d, o′,m′) accept because it would break the perfectly binding
property. Nevertheless, a second unbounded adversary A2 on input
d can compute every possible commitment which will, eventually but
certainly, lead him to find m and o so that Verify(cpk, d, o,m) accepts.
However this is a violation of the perfectly hiding property.
A rather essential commitment scheme that is used throughout this
thesis, is the so called Pedersen commitment scheme proposed by
Pedersen in [Ped92]. The binding property of the scheme relies on the
DL problem (Assumption 2.2).
Definition 2.11 (Pedersen commitment). A Pedersen commitment
scheme is a commitment scheme ΠC := (GenC,Com,Verify) such that,
GenC(1
λ): on input 1λ a string of length λ where λ is a security param-
eter, produce G a multiplicative cyclic group of prime order q of
length λ-bit as well as generators g, h
rand←− G. Output cpk := (g, h).
We have that MC := Zq, CC := G and O := Zq.
Com(cpk,m): on input the public key cpk and a message m ∈ MC,
choose o
rand←− Zq and compute d := gmho. Output d, o.
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Verify(cpk, d, o,m): on input the public key cpk, a commitment d ∈ CC,
an opening o ∈ O and a message m ∈MC, return d ?= gmho.
Proposition 2.3. The Pedersen commitment scheme of Definition 2.11
is perfectly hiding and computationally binding if one chooses h at ran-
dom in G and that thus Dloggh is unknown.
Proof.
perfectly hiding: given a commitment d ∈ G, ∀m ∈ MC = Zq, we
show that it is possible to find o ∈ O = Zq such that d = gmho.
Indeed, since g is a generator of G, there exists x, y ∈ Zq such
that h = gx and d = gy. It suffices then to set o = (y − m)/x
to obtain our equality. This shows that a commitment can be
opened to any message. Moreover, we see that the distribution of
the commitments inG is independent of the message and uniformly
distributed in G thanks to the random choice of o.
computationally binding: imagine, on the contrary, a computation-
ally bounded adversary A succeeding to output, with non negligi-
ble probability, a commitment d on a message m with opening o
as well as another message m′ with opening o such that d = gmho
and d = gm
′
ho
′
at the same time. Then we can use A to break the
DLP. Indeed, since gmho = gm
′
ho
′
, we have that gm−m′ = ho−o′
and thus that Dloggh = (o − o′)/(m − m′). Since h was chosen
at random, A can be used to break the DLP with non negligible
probability.
Trapdoor commitments. We define another kind of commitment
schemes which are called trapdoor commitments. The trapdoor com-
mitment scheme features one additional property: given a special value
called the trapdoor, it is possible to open a commitment to any mes-
sage. For example, the Pedersen commitment scheme can be turned into
a trapdoor commitment if instead of choosing randomly the generator
h in GenC, we choose randomly x
rand←− Zq and set h = gx. The trapdoor
is then the value x. It is now clear that given x, we can compute an
opening to any desired message (by following the steps in the proof of
the perfectly hiding property of Proposition 2.3).
2.1.5 Proof of knowledge and sigma-protocols
In verifiable protocols, a party (person, server, user) often needs to prove
to another party that he has access to some private information (secret
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key, credential, encrypted message, etc.). This proof takes the form of an
exchange between the first party usually called the Prover and the second
party called the Verifier. At the end of the exchange, the Verifier agrees or
disagrees that the Prover has access to the private information or to some
knowledge. We call this exchange a proof of knowledge. To be more
specific about what is meant by “knowledge”, we must first clarify the
way problems can be formulated. For this purpose, we define a formal
NP-language LNP composed of a set of words and grammatical rules and
used to express statements s. For these statements we say that the set
W (s) contains the solutions for which we can build acceptable proofs
for s. We call w ∈ W (s) one of the solutions or witnesses of s. This
language LNP allows us to consider any binary relation R ⊂ LNP×W (s)
for some computational problem in NP. Loosely speaking, we say that a
protocol between the Prover and the Verifier is a proof of knowledge for a
relation R on a language LNP, if the following holds. Given the common
input s, and the private input w for the Prover such that (s, w) ∈ R, at
the end of the protocol, the Verifier is convinced that the Prover knows
a witness w. The classical definition of the proof of knowledge is given
by Bellare and Goldreich [BG93]. We refer to [Dam99, Gol05, HL10] for
additional details on this section.
Sigma-protocols
Sigma (or Σ) -protocols turn out to be an elegant way to obtain proofs
of knowledge [Cra97]. It is a three-move exchange between the Prover
and the Verifier (hence the Σ form).
Definition 2.12 (Σ-Protocol). A Σ-protocol pi for a relation R on an
NP-language LNP, is a pair of interactive algorithms (Prover,Verifier)
such that, on inputs (s, w) ∈ R for Prover and, s for Verifier, a three-
move interaction takes place:
1. Prover outputs a “message” a to Verifier.
2. Verifier selects a “challenge” e of length t-bit uniformly at random
from a challenge space and sends it to Prover.
3. Prover sends a “response” z and halts.
Eventually, Verifier evaluates a predicate Check on the statement s and
the transcript t := (a, e, z) and returns 0 or 1, then halts.
Moreover, the Σ-protocol satisfies the following properties:
Completeness An honest exchange between Prover(s, w) and Verifier(s)
always accepts if (s, w) ∈ R.
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Special soundness There exists a polynomial time extractor E that,
on input of two valid transcripts t := (a, e, z) and t′ := (a, e′, z′)
with respect to the same s where e 6= e′, returns a correct witness
w. As a result, it is hard to produce invalid proofs.
Special honest verifier zero-knowledge There exists a probabilistic
polynomial time simulator M which on inputs s ∈ LNP and a ran-
dom challenge e, outputs a valid transcript t := (a, e, z) in the sense
that this transcript is perfectly indistinguishable from a transcript
issued from a real interaction between Prover and Verifier.
Let us take a closer look at the special soundness and the special
honest verifier zero-knowledge properties. The idea behind the sound-
ness property is that it gives the Verifier the guarantee that the Prover
really knows a witness w. And by knowing, we mean here that, some-
how, the Prover is able to compute at least one valid w. Indeed, if the
soundness holds, an honest Prover being able to answer correctly two
different challenges must therefore be able to compute the witness. On
the contrary, a cheating Prover who does not know w can only be able
to answer at most one challenge (otherwise he knows w after all) with
a probability of 2−t which corresponds to the probability of answering
correctly by randomly guessing.
Regarding the special honest verifier zero-knowledge property, it al-
lows producing transcripts that look exactly like real conversations be-
tween Prover and Verifier but without the knowledge of a witness. This
can be done without violating the soundness property. The reason is
that the components of the transcript do not need to be produced in the
same order as those of a real conversation. The goal of this property is
to make sure that transcripts issued from real conversations do not leak
any information about the witnesses since they are not distinguishable
from any other transcripts.
The key property that we want to achieve in proofs of knowledge is
the guarantee that the Verifier or any observer of the transcript of the
proof cannot gain any information about the witness whatsoever except
for the one bit of information that tells if the Prover knows the witness for
a given statement or not. This property is called zero-knowledge and
was formalized in the seminal paper of Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff
[GMR85]. It can be shown (see e.g. [HL10]) that given a perfectly hiding
trapdoor commitment and a Σ-protocol for a relation R we can achieve a
proof of knowledge with the zero-knowledge property for R. This proof
is called a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge or ZKPK.
We make the distinction between perfect, statistical and compu-
tational zero-knowledge which indicates the distance between the two
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distribution in the honest verifier zero-knowledge property of Definition
2.12. For any Verifier, the first distribution comes from the simulated
transcripts issued by simulator M and the second distribution comes
from the transcripts issued from the real interaction between Prover and
Verifier. Perfect zero-knowledge means that the two distributions are
equal and statistical zero-knowledge means that the statistical distance
between them is negligible. We have that perfect zero-knowledge (as
stated in Definition 2.12) implies statistical zero-knowledge which in
turns implies computational zero-knowledge.
ZKPK plays a significant role in this thesis. As an illustration but
also for later use, we describe here the sigma-protocol that can be used
to obtain a proof that the discrete logarithm of some group element
relative to a given generator is known. Let p be a prime, q be a prime
divisor of p−1 and g ∈ Z∗p be a generator of order q of the group G. For
a random w
rand←− Zq chosen by Prover, the relation we target is
RDL := {(s, w)|s = (G, p, q, g, h) ∧ h = gw}
where
Protocol 2.1 (Σ-protocol for DL knowledge).
Prover and Verifier input: (G, p, q, g, h).
Prover private input: w such that h = gw.
Process:
1. Prover chooses x
rand←− Zq and computes a = gx. Then it sends a to
Verifier.
2. Verifier selects a challenge e
rand←− {0, 1}t where 2t < q and sends it
to Prover.
3. Prover computes z := x+ ew mod q and sends z to Verifier. Even-
tually, Verifier checks that ahe
?
= gz.
Proposition 2.4. Protocol 2.1 is a Σ-protocol.
Proof. Completeness is straightforward. Regarding soundness, given
two valid transcripts t := (a, e, z) and t′ := (a, e′, z′) if we divide ahe′ = gz′
by ahe = gz side by side, we get he−e′ = gz−z′ . We can extract w as
(z − z′)/(e − e′) which is well defined since e 6= e′. Considering the spe-
cial honest verifier zero-knowledge, given (h, e) as inputs, the simulator
M proceeds in this way: it selects a random z
rand←− Zq and computes
a = gzh−e. It is clear that (a, e, z) has the same probability distribu-
tion as a transcript issued from a real exchange between Prover and
Verifier.
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2.1.6 The Fiat-Shamir transformation
It is possible to render sigma-protocols non-interactive which is of great
interest when the number of exchanges between the different parties
involved in a protocol has to be minimized. The Prover prepares a non-
interactive proof that is later verified by the Verifier. The result is a
Non-Interactive Proof of Knowledge (NIZKPK).
Definition 2.13 (Non-interactive proof of knowledge). A couple of ef-
ficient algorithms (Prove,Check) is called a non-interactive proof of
knowledge piNI on an NP-language LNP for a relation R if it is such
that:
Prove(s, w): on inputs a statement s and a witness w with (s, w) ∈ R,
produce a transcript t.
Check(s, t): on inputs a statement s and a transcript t, outputs 0 or 1.
where Prove is a probabilistic algorithm run by the Prover and Check is
a deterministic algorithm run by the Verifier. Moreover, we have the
following properties:
Completeness ∀(s, w) ∈ R, ∀t ← Prove(s, w) we have, with over-
whelming probability, that Check(s, t) = 1 .
Zero-knowledge (informal) there exists a simulator that can produce
simulated transcripts such that no adversary can distinguish a real
proof from a simulated one with a probability non-negligibly better
than 1/2. We refer to [BR93, BPW12] for details.
In order for this setting to work, imagine that the Prover and the
Verifier have access to a random oracle. This entity sets up a random
function r : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}l, for some k, l and answers bit-string queries
a of length k by returning r(a), a uniformly distributed, independent
of a, random bit-string of length l. In addition, the random oracle
remembers former queries and replies consistently.
If such a random oracle exists, the Prover can convince the Verifier
without interacting with him and thus it allows to remove the second
step in a Σ-protocol. To do that, the Prover sends a to the random
oracle and uses the oracle answer r(a) as the challenge e to compute
z. Then the Prover sends (a, z) to the Verifier which, in turn, obtains e
from the oracle queried on a and checks z. This course of actions is not
different for the Prover since, as before, he has no influence on the choice
of the challenge. Moreover, the Verifier is now forced to be honest since
he can no longer choose the challenge. The only real difference is that
the parties are free to call the oracle at will.
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With all these considerations, in order to build the simulator of the
zero-knowledge property, we must emulate the random oracle. The sim-
ulator will answer queries on behalf of the random oracle by maintaining
a list of oracle query/response pairs. Then, the simulated transcripts are
produced via the emulated random oracle of the simulator. The ques-
tion that remains is the following. Is it possible to produce an imitation
random oracle that is indistinguishable from an ideal one?
One way to implement the random oracle is to use cryptographic
hash functions as done in the Fiat-Shamir/Blum transformation [FS87]
(attributed to Blum by [BR93]) described below. This leads to efficient
protocols. However, the counterpart of using hash functions is that the
security model, in which security proofs are formalized, shifts from the
standard model where no unrealistic assumptions are admitted to a
security model called the random oracle model. This model intro-
duced by Bellare and Rogaway [BR93] makes the assumption that (good)
cryptographic hash functions exist and are indistinguishable from per-
fectly random functions (or random oracles). Although hash functions
provide a fairly good and unpredictable (with respect to today’s knowl-
edge) source of randomness, it is clear that they will never be equivalent
to random oracles. Indeed, hash functions are deterministic and not
random, which means that it is possible to know them entirely.
Nevertheless, security achieved in the random oracle model does not
translate to the standard model (see [CGH04, Dam07]). It seems that
security proofs made in the random oracle model are a healthy start to
ensure security at minima against design flaws and well-studied attacks
but it is not a sufficient condition if we seek security guarantee in the
real-world.
While keeping this in mind, we present the Fiat-Shamir/Blum trans-
formation that turns Σ-protocols into non-interactive proofs using cryp-
tographic hash functions. For this purpose, we define algorithm Recomb
used to recombine the a message from the statement s, a challenge e and
a response z produced in the Σ-protocol.
Theorem 2.1 (Fiat-Shamir/Blum transformation [FS87, BPW12]).
Given a Σ-protocol pi := (Prover,Verifier) on an NP-language LNP for a
relation R, an efficient cryptographic hash function H and a determin-
istic algorithm Recomb, a Fiat-Shamir/Blum transformation of pi
is a non-interactive proof piNI defined as follows:
Prove(s, w): on inputs a statement s and a witness w with (s, w) ∈ R,
run the Prover on step 1 with (s, w) as inputs to obtain the message
a and compute e := H(s, a). Then run the Prover on step 3 with
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e as input to obtain the response z. Output the transcript as t :=
(e, z).
Check(s, t): on inputs a statement s and a transcript t, parse t as (e, z)
and compute a′ := Recomb(s, e, z). Then output e ?= H(s, a′).
Moreover, ∀(s, w) ∈ R, ∀a obtained from the Prover in step 1 of pi, t←
Prove(s, w), we have that Recomb(s, e, z) = a holds with overwhelming
probability.
As an illustration of the Fiat-Shamir/Blum heuristic, we apply it
to the Σ-protocol for DL knowledge (Protocol 2.1) to obtain a non-
interactive proof of DL knowledge:
Protocol 2.2 (Non-interactive proof for DL knowledge).
Given (s, w) ∈ RDL (s := (G, q, g, h) and w such that h = gw). We define
piNI,DL := (Prove,Check) as follows:
Prove(s, w): choose x
rand←− Zq and computes a = gx and e := H(s, a).
Then compute z := x+ ew mod q and output t := (e, z).
Check(s, t): get a′ ← Recomb(s, e, z) where Recomb(s, e, z) outputs gzh−e.
Then, output e
?
= H(s, a′).
Despite the inconvenient of falling in a weaker security paradigm,
the use of non-interactive proofs of knowledge achieved through hash
functions opens the door to very practical and efficient applications.
The ones targeted in this thesis strongly rely on NIZKPK. One of the
main reasons is that we remove the constraints due to communications
between the parties. Communications, especially when they need to
be synchronized, are curbing large scale multi-party applications. For
example, it is not conceivable to force a voter to stay behind his com-
puter with a stable internet connexion to provide challenges to election
authorities or other voters during the whole election process.
2.2 Secret sharing
Historically, secret sharing was introduced to split a secret between dif-
ferent parties in a way that only one subset if not all of them can re-
construct the secret. Secret sharing can be used for secret data storage
where the user splits his private data between different data centers with
the guarantee for the user that none of the servers can retrieve his per-
sonal information. In the same fashion, secret sharing comes in handy
for threshold encryption (Section 2.2.1) to split the private decryption
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key between the key holders. Finally secret sharing is convenient in pro-
tocols involving multiple parties where there is often a need to spread
the private information of the participants among themselves to allow
computations while preserving the privacy.
Secret sharing schemes were proposed independently by Shamir
[Sha79] and Blakey [Bla79]. A whole literature of secret sharing schemes
has been proposed to achieve diverse functionalities such as specific hi-
erarchical rules between the parties or to allow computations over the
shares (a short survey on secret sharing can be found in [Bei11]). We
present here the main ideas of secret sharing as well as Shamir’s secret
sharing scheme, which is used in this thesis.
In the following, we adopt the conventional notation where for a
secret value s, [s] is a vector of shares of the secret s (in particular, [s]i
is one of the share of s usually given to participant i), and we commonly
say that [s] is the shared value of s. We also use the notation [v] to
designate a vector of shared values for example [v] := ([v1], . . . , [vn])
on the list of secret values (v1, . . . , vn). In the same way, we use the
notation [M ] to designate a matrix of shared values.
Definition 2.14 (Secret sharing scheme). A secret sharing scheme
Υ between n parties denoted P1, ..., Pn, is a pair of efficient algorithms
(Share,Open), the specification of a space Se for the secrets, the specifi-
cation of a space Sh for the shares as well as a recovery family of sets
R ⊆ P({1, ..., n}) (where P designates the power set and R is the family
of sets of the parties that can jointly open a secret from the shares) such
that:
Share(s): on input a secret s ∈ Se, output a vector of shares [s] :=
([s]1, ..., [s]n) ∈ Shn. Note that the shares are supposed to be dis-
tributed among the parties, Pi receiving share [s]i.
Open([s]): on input a vector of shares [s] := ([s]l1 , ..., [s]lt) ∈ Sht with
t ≥ 1 and where {l1, ..., lt} ∈ R, output a secret s′ ∈ Se. Note that
the vector [s] is supposed to be aggregated by the parties.
Algorithm Share is probabilistic while algorithm Open is deterministic.
Moreover, we have the following properties:
Correctness ∀s ∈ Se, ∀([s]1, ..., [s]n)← Share(s), ∀[s] := ([s]l1 , ..., [s]lt)
such that {l1, ..., lt} ∈ R we have that Open([s]) = s with over-
whelming probability.
Perfect Privacy (Unauthorized set of parties cannot recover anything
about the secret) ∀[s] := ([s]l1 , ..., [s]lt) such that {l1, ..., lt} /∈ R, we
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have ∀s′, s′′ ∈ Se with s′ 6= s′′ that:
Pr[[s] ⊂ ([s′]1, ..., [s′]n)|([s′]1, ..., [s′]n)← Share(s′)]
=Pr[[s] ⊂ ([s′′]1, ..., [s′′]n)|([s′′]1, ..., [s′′]n)← Share(s′′)].
We can achieve complex recovery sets R corresponding to hierarchi-
cal structure between the parties (e.g. P1 can recover the secret alone
but P2 cannot recover it without the help of P1, etc.) but one of the
simplest is the threshold structure where R := {A ⊆ {1, ..., n}||A| ≥ t}
with 1 ≤ t ≤ n meaning that if at least t parties joint together, they
can open a secret from their shares. Secret sharing schemes of this kind
are called t-out-of-n threshold secret sharing schemes. One example of
such a scheme is given by Shamir in [Sha79] and is based on polynomial
interpolation.
Definition 2.15 (Shamir’s threshold secret sharing scheme). Given a fi-
nite field of order q, Fq and α1, ..., αn
rand←− F∗q where the αi-s are distinct,
we define a t-out-of-n Shamir’s threshold secret sharing scheme
Υ := (Share,Open) between n parties denoted P1, ..., Pn, as a secret shar-
ing scheme where Se = Sh := Fq, R := {A ⊆ {1, ..., n}||A| = tA ≥ t}
and such that:
Share(s): choose a1, ..., at
rand←− Fq and compute [s]i := s+
t∑
j=1
ajα
j
i for i =
1, ..., n. Note that [s]i is the evaluation of the t-degree polynomial
f(x) := s+
t∑
j=1
ajx
j at αi. Output ([s]1, ..., [s]n).
Open([s]): if [s] is not of the form ([s]l1 , ..., [s]ltA ) where the li-s are the
indexes of existing parties, halt. Otherwise compute and output s′
as
tA∑
i=1
[s]li
tA∏
j=1
j 6=i
αlj
αlj − αli
Note that s′ is the evaluation of Lagrange’s interpolation polyno-
mial g(x) :=
tA∑
i=1
[s]li
tA∏
j=1
j 6=i
αlj−x
αlj−αli
in 0.
It is easy to see that the above definition holds correctness. Regard-
ing perfect privacy, it suffices to notice that every set of at most t − 1
parties holding t − 1 points can recover exactly one polynomial of de-
gree t− 1 and q distinct polynomials of degree t corresponding to the q
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possible choices of an extra point in Fq. This shows that a group of less
than t parties might open its vector of shares to any possible secret in
Se without any preference.
Secret sharing is at the root of numerous multi-party computation
schemes as it offers privacy of the inputs and in some schemes, the
possibility for the parties to compute over the shares. This is the case
for Shamir’s threshold secret sharing scheme that features addition and
multiplication operations over the shared secrets.
Consider the two shared values [s1], [s2] issued from Share(s1) and
Share(s2) respectively. To obtain a shared value [s3] opening on s1 + s2,
each party Pi computes [s3]i := [s1]i + [s2]i. Since the sum of the two
corresponding polynomials f1(x), f2(x) is a polynomial of the same de-
gree f3(x) and that f3(0) = f1(0) + f2(0) the operation is consistent.
For the multiplication, the product of the shares [s3]i := [s1]i[s2]i leads
to polynomial f3(x) := f1(x)f2(x) for which f3(0) = s1s2. However, this
polynomial is now of degree 2n. To reduce this degree to n, the parties
need to re-share the vector [s3]. In practice, each party Pi computes
[ui] ← Share([s3]i) and sends [ui]j to party Pj . Then, each party Pi
computes [v]i ← Open(([u1]i, ..., [un]i)). We see that the shared value
[v] := ([v]1, ..., [v]n) distributed among the parties opens on the secret
s1s2 through a polynomial of degree t. It is worth noticing that the
addition operation is almost free for the parties since it can be done
locally while the multiplication operation requires a re-sharing phase
which implies a round of communication between the parties. This sim-
ple difference will have a huge impact on the design of the protocols
and is a continuous concern throughout this thesis and in particular in
Chapter 6.
2.2.1 Threshold encryption scheme
From secret sharing, there is one step to cross to achieve threshold en-
cryption scheme. Threshold encryption is very useful when it comes to
distributing the risk of privacy leakage due to the fact that the secret
key of an encryption scheme may fall into the wrong hands. Indeed,
in some scenarios, we do not want to entrust only one party with the
responsibility to decrypt any encrypted message. To achieve this, the
secret key must somehow be split between a set of key holders. Then,
the key holders must all agree if they want to decrypt a ciphertext. This
gives some guarantees that only desired ciphertext are decrypted. For
example, in voting schemes, after that the tally is computed over the ci-
phertext thanks to the homomorphic property of the encryption scheme
used, the election authorities gather and decrypt the resulting ciphertext
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(and only this one).
Loosely speaking, a threshold encryption scheme allows us to
spread the decryption key among a set of key holders. Then, the de-
cryption of a given message requires the collaboration of a subset of
key holders whose number is fixed as a security parameter. For scheme
based on the DLP assumption, one way to achieve this goal was pro-
posed by Pedersen in [Ped91] to turn the ElGamal encryption scheme
into a threshold ElGamal encryption scheme. The idea is quite simple.
Given a public generator g of a prime order q group G, each of the key
holders (or authority) Pi selects randomly xi
rand←− Zq, computes hi = gxi
and sends hi to every other Pj . Then, each Pi computes the public key∏
hi = g
∑
xi while the secret key X :=
∑
xi mod q − 1 remains secret
to everyone unlesss every party join together to recover X. The key
distribution algorithm can also be based on polynomial interpolation as
what is done in the previous section, and can be used to achieve t-out-
of-n threshold encryption schemes where a subset t of the n parties can
gather in order to decrypt a ciphertext. As an illustration, the ElGamal
threshold encryption is in use in the current version of the Helios voting
system [ADMPQ09, AdMP12].
There is, obviously, threshold encryption schemes based on different
cryptographic assumptions. Damg˚ard and Jurik propose a threshold
encryption version of the Paillier encryption scheme in [DJ01] which
could be used in the generic instantiation of our voting scheme in Sec-
tion 4.3. For the RSA assumption, we mention the schemes presented
in [BF97, FMY98, FS01]. However, note that in this case, the key gen-
eration algorithm is trickier to set up compared to the one presented
above. It may require a trusted third party or an additional secure
multi-party protocol emulating this third party for jointly generating an
RSA modulus with unknown factors.
2.2.2 From secret sharing to secure multi-party compu-
tation
Multi-party computation comes down to this: a set of n parties
(P1, ..., Pn) wishes to evaluate a function f over their respective pri-
vate inputs (x1, ..., xn) to obtain f(x1, ..., xn). We talk about secure
multi-party computation (SMC) when in addition, the parties re-
ceive guarantees about the privacy of their inputs and about the cor-
rectness of the result. This problem was introduced by Yao in his 1982
paper [Yao82] through the millionaires’ problem in which two million-
aires want to know which of them is the richest without revealing what
is on their bank account. This section follows notations and definitions
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of [HL10, CDN10].
It should be stressed clearly that the privacy property ensures the
privacy of the parties inputs except everything that could be inferred
from the result. For example, an auctioneer not winning an auction is
allowed to deduce that the winning bid is higher than his own bid.
In order to provide security guarantees for SMC protocols, we ought
to define the kind of adversary we encounter. Literature considers two
main categories: first the honest-but-curious adversary also called the
passive adversary. This adversary is able to corrupt some of the
parties statically or adaptively and his goal is to learn the private in-
formation of the (uncorrupted) parties. We say the adversary is honest
since he does not make the corrupted parties deviate from the protocol.
On the contrary, the second kind of adversary called malicious adver-
sary or active adversary is able to corrupt the parties and force them
to arbitrarily deviate from the protocol. Doing so, the active adversary
seeks one or both of two goals: learn about the private information of
the parties, and modify the result of the evaluation of the function.
We present a multi-party protocol in terms of ideal functionality, that
is, we define our expectations in an ideal world and then, we confront
the real world execution of the protocol to a simulation of the protocol in
the ideal world. We expect these two executions to be equal or at least
indistinguishable. Doing so, we do not have to explicit every possible
behaviour of an adversary. Instead, we show that any real adversary
can be efficiently simulated which means that his capabilities are limited
within the ideal functionality definition. For multi-party protocol, the
ideal functionality is played by a trusted third party that collects the
private inputs of the parties, computes the target function and then
discloses the result to each party. It is quite easy to see that in this
scenario, both privacy and correctness hold perfectly.
Functionality 2.1 (Secure multi-party computation: FSMC,f ). Let
(P1, ..., Pn) be a set of parties holding the private inputs (x1, ..., xn) ∈ In
respectively where I is the input space and let f : In → O be the function
that the parties wish to evaluate over their private inputs where O is the
output space. We define the SMC functionality FSMC,f that is realized
by an uncorrupted trusted third party T as follows:
1. each party Pi sends his input xi to T . If xi /∈ I, T aborts otherwise
T stores xi.
2. when T has received all the inputs, T computes y := f(x1, ..., xn)
and sends y to each Pi then T halts.
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In Definition 2.16 below, we use the notation execE,Api (z) to denote
the environment E ’s view of the execution of protocol pi on input z in
the presence of adversary A.
Definition 2.16 (Secure multi-party computation protocol). Protocol
piSMC,f is a passively (or actively) secure multi-party computa-
tion protocol if it securely computes a function f for a set of parties
(P1, ..., Pn) holding the private inputs (x1, ..., xn) ∈ In in the presence of
passive (or active) adversaries if for any environment E and for any PPT
adversary A, there exists a simulator S that simulates the behaviour of
A such that:
execE,SFSMC,f (z)
∼= execE,ApiSMC,f (z)
where z states the initial input of every participant of the protocol and
where the symbol ∼= means that the two distributions are computationally
indistinguishable.
A direct way to build SMC protocols relies on Shamir’s secret sharing
scheme. We can see that this provides passive security (e.g. [CCD88,
GRR98]) as long as a threshold of corrupted parties is not crossed. Re-
lying on various techniques such as oblivious transfer, many other SMC
protocols exist that provide either passive or active security in a more
and more efficient way (non exhaustively, [LPS08, PSSW09, BDOZ11,
BNTW12, NNOB12, DKL+13]). Some of these protocols have been
implemented and laid down frameworks for SMC prototyping or appli-
cations (most notably, Sharemind [BLW08], Fairplay [MNPS04], VIFF
[DGKN09], TASTY [HKS+10], SEPIA [BSMD10], SCAPI [EFLL12],
Wysteria [RHH14]). The framework VIFF [VIF] was used during the
thesis for prototyping (see Chapter 6). It is based on Shamir’s secret
sharing scheme and offers passive security as well as active security how-
ever for this last case, the authors do not give any strong guarantee.
In the protocols we address using SMC, we analyse the complexity
as if the operations involved (additions, multiplications, comparisons)
are all atomic. In this regards, we treat these operations as calls to
black boxes and focus on the complexity of the algorithm itself. Al-
though this approach allows us to obtain results independent of the
SMC scheme used, we have to keep in mind that a complete complex-
ity analysis would take into account the real cost of the operations and
in particular the communication cost. For example, in VIFF (as likely
in most SMC frameworks), one multiplication involves a round of com-
munication between the parties whereas one comparison costs about
165 multiplications. Moreover, note that the number of communication
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channels grows quadratically in the number of parties and linearly for
each party.

Part II
Auditable Multi-Party
Function Evaluation

Chapter 3
Commitment Consistent
Encryption: A New Cryptographic
Primitive
The commitment consistent encryption primitive was introduced in our
paper [CPP13] presented at the ESORICS conference in 2013 within the
framework of cryptographic voting. Since the range of application of this
primitive was enlarged during this thesis, we dedicate this chapter to its
presentation.
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3.1 Introduction
One of the cornerstone of this thesis is the introduction of a new primitive
called commitment consistent encryption (CCE). This primitive of-
fers a commitment scheme within an encryption scheme in a way that
both functionalities and advantages are combined together. Indeed, our
audit mechanisms require a trail allowing observers to verify the cor-
rectness of the result (the tally of the votes in Chapter 4 and the output
of the function in Chapter 5). As it is available to the public, this trail
could lead to the impairment of the privacy property. Imagine however
that the public audit trail contains only perfectly hiding commitments.
Then, through the trail, no information can be leaked whatsoever in the
sense of the theory of information. This provides us a perfectly private
audit trail (PPAT).
On the other hand, in a multi-party setting, the private inputs of
the parties (clients, voters, etc.) must be conveyed to the set of peo-
ple (workers, voting authorities, servers, etc.) that actually perform
the computations. This is naturally achieved throughout an encryption
scheme. The trick is now to combine commitment and encryption in a
consistent way for one main reason. Indeed, since the audit trail is used
to assert the correctness of the result, it must be bound to the private
inputs on which the result is computed. This gives guarantee to the
clients and to the workers. First, to the clients, for they only see the
audit trail and this must be enough to assure them that the result is
correct and consistent with the inputs committed by the other clients.
Then, to the workers since they ought to be sure that they will be able
to compute a result that is consistent with the audit trail, otherwise the
proof of correctness would be violated.
3.1.1 Our contributions
This chapter introduces the commitment consistent encryption primitive
that is used throughout this thesis. This primitive is de facto an encryp-
tion scheme that can be made homomorphic if needed. We explain the
mechanism that allows us to enforce the consistency of the commitment
part and the encryption part of the CCE. This mechanism that we call
validity augmentation does not go against the homomorphic property of
the scheme. Moreover it allows us to build NM-CPA secure CCE scheme.
We provide a generic and two concrete implementations of the CCE
scheme in this chapter. The generic construction is made from a com-
mitment scheme and an encryption scheme such that the opening and
the message space of the commitment scheme correspond to the mes-
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sage space of the encryption scheme. The first concrete implementation
is the combination of a Pedersen commitment scheme and a Paillier en-
cryption scheme. While this construction based on well-known tools is
easy to set up, it also has some drawbacks. Its threshold version, pos-
sibly required for a multi-party setting, needs a tedious key generation
algorithm and its efficiency is far behind of what we achieve in the sec-
ond concrete construction. This is due to the RSA sized parameters of
security used. The second construction, however, relies on ElGamal en-
cryption in prime order groups on elliptic curves which at the same level
of security are 16 times smaller.
Finally, we implemented a prototype in Python to test and compare
our CCE instances. The code has been written in a friendly-user way to
allow the reproduction of our results as well as the use of our libraries
that implement all the arithmetic needed to perform operations on el-
liptic curves and on extension fields. The prototype also allowed us to
implement three test applications of secure multi-party function evalua-
tion that are described in Chapter 5. In this regards, the code available
online at [Cuv15] is meant to be used to create other secure multi-party
function evaluation that provide a perfectly private audit trail.
Organisation of the chapter. In Section 3.2, we introduce the CCE
primitive. In Section 3.3, we provide generic instantiation of CCE while
Section 3.4 present an optimal construction called PPATS that is used in
both Chapter 4 and 5. Finally, in Section 3.5, we detail the parameter
choice and the implementation performed in Python for the PPATS.
3.2 Commitment consistent encryption
A CCE primitive is a traditional public key encryption scheme that offers
an extra feature: from any CCE ciphertext, it is possible to derive a
commitment on the encrypted message, and the private key can also be
used to obtain an opening on that commitment. We expect the clients to
CC encrypt their private inputs, which will allow the worker to compute
the output of the result of the function over the private inputs (e.g., by
decrypting the homomorphic sum of the ciphertexts if the function is a
sum like it may be the case in electronic voting). Furthermore, when
receiving a CC ciphertext, the workers can use a DerivCom algorithm to
derive commitments from CC ciphertexts and post that commitment on
a public bulletin board PB. This provides a PPAT if the commitments
are perfectly hiding. In order to offer universal verifiability, the workers
can also make use of an Open algorithm that makes it possible to derive
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openings of commitments on the output of the function.
For simplicity, we make our whole treatment in the single-key setting.
The extension to the full threshold setting can be made using traditional
techniques as sketched in Section 2.2.
Definition 3.1 (CC Encryption). A commitment consistent en-
cryption scheme Π is a tuple of efficient algorithms (Gen, Enc, Dec,
DerivCom, Open, Verify) and the description of a key space K (as Kpp×
Kpk ×Ksk) such that:
Gen(1λ): Given a security parameter λ, output a triple (pp, pk, sk) ∈ K,
respectively the public parameters, the public key and the secret
key. The public parameters are implicitly given to every other
algorithms and contain the description of the message space M,
the ciphertext space C, the commitment space CC and the opening
space O.
Enc(pk,m): Output a ciphertext c ∈ C which is an encryption using the
public key pk of a message m ∈M.
Dec(sk, c): From a ciphertext c ∈ C, output a message m¯ ∈M using the
secret key sk.
DerivCom(pk, c): From a ciphertext c ∈ C, output a commitment d ∈ CC
using the public key pk.
Open(sk, c): From a ciphertext c ∈ C, output an opening value o¯ ∈ O
using the secret key sk.
Verify(pk, d, o,m): From a message m ∈M, a commitment d ∈ CC with
respect to key pk and an opening value o ∈ O, output a bit. This
algorithm checks the validity of the opening (m, o) with respect to
d and pk.
Dec,DerivCom,Open and Verify are deterministic while Gen and Enc
are probabilistic.
We expect CCE schemes to satisfy the following correctness proper-
ties.
Correctness: ∀(pp, pk, sk) ← Gen(1λ), ∀m ∈ M, ∀c ← Enc(pk,m), it
holds with overwhelming probability in λ that Dec(sk, c) = m and
that
Verify(pk,DerivCom(pk, c),Open(sk, c),Dec(sk, c)) = 1.
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The security properties that we can expect from a CCE scheme and
for the derived commitments are the traditional ones and we will discuss
later the ones that are appropriate for our applications.
As a first example of CCE motivating our further developments, con-
sider the following ElGamal based CC encryption scheme:
Gen(1λ): Output a triple (pp, pk, sk) ∈ K where pp is the description of
a group G of prime order q such that M := Zq, C = O := G2×Z2q ,
and CC := G. The public key pk consists of two generators g and
h of G as well as an efficient hash function H : Kpp × G4 → Zq
while the secret key sk is α where h := gα.
Enc(pk,m): For a message m ∈M, select randomly r, r′ ∈ Zq, compute
c0 := g
r, d = gmhr, acc := (g
r′ , hr
′
), ecc := H(pp, c0, hr, acc) and
zcc := r
′ + eccr mod q and output c = (c0, d, ecc, zcc) ∈ C.
Dec(sk, c): Parse c as (c0, d, ecc, zcc) and output m¯ ∈M as Dloggd/cα0 .
DerivCom(pk, c): Parse c as (c0, d, ecc, zcc) and output d ∈ CC.
Open(sk, c): Parse c as (c0, d, ecc, zcc) and output o¯ = (c0, o0, ecc, zcc) ∈ O
where o0 = c
α
0 .
Verify(pk, d, o,m): Parse o as (c0, o0, ecc, zcc) above and test if
ecc
?
= H(pp, c0, o0, gzccc−ecc0 , hzcco−ecc0 ).
This encryption scheme produces traditional ElGamal ciphertexts
together with a Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge (ZKPK) of the
randomness and the plaintext. This proof is called a proof of con-
sistency or a validity proof and denoted picc. The second element of
the ElGamal ciphertext can be seen as a Pedersen commitment, which
is made binding thanks to the ZKPK. While offering a particularly
simple verifiable decryption procedure (only o0 needs to be computed),
this scheme has two major limitations for the applications we have in
mind: it is not homomorphic, and the validity of ciphertexts cannot be
determined without decryption. For example, in the context of cryp-
tographic voting, the first limitation prevents us from using traditional
tallying procedures, while the second could make a tallying procedure
fail if encrypted votes happen to be invalid.
We address these two concerns by introducing the notion of Validity
Augmentation (VA) for CCE schemes. A VA guarantees the validity of
CCE ciphertext. This makes sure that the workers are able to produce
an output from the ciphertexts they receive.
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Contrary to CCE ciphertexts, our VA ciphertexts do not need to be
homomorphic: as soon as the workers are convinced of the validity of
a VA ciphertext, they can strip it and recover an homomorphic CCE
ciphertext for further operations.
From an operational point of view, a validity augmentation of a CCE
scheme adds three algorithms: Expand, Strip and Valid. Expand aug-
ments the public key for the needs of the other algorithms. Valid takes
an augmented CCE ciphertext cVA that contains a CCE ciphertext along
with some proofs of validity, and runs a verification procedure on those
proofs to make sure that it is possible to extract from the ciphertext
a commitment and an encryption of an opening for that commitment.
This is the crucial part to convince the workers that they will indeed
be able to produce an output. Eventually, Strip removes those proofs
to provide some homomorphic properties such as additivity on the en-
crypted messages.
Definition 3.2 (Validity augmentation of CCE). Given a CCE scheme
Π := (Gen,Enc,Dec,DerivCom,Open,Verify), we say that scheme ΠVA :=
(GenVA,EncVA,DecVA,DerivComVA,OpenVA,VerifyVA,Expand, Strip,Valid)
is a validity augmentation of the CCE scheme Π if ΠVA is a CCE
scheme equipped with three additional efficient algorithms Expand, Strip
and Valid that satisfy the following conditions.
Augmentation: GenVA runs Gen to get (pp, pk, sk) and outputs an up-
dated triple (ppVA, pkVA, skVA) := (pp,Expand(pk), sk).
Validity: we have ∀(ppVA, pkVA, skVA)← GenVA(1λ), ∀m ∈M, ∀cVA ←
EncVA(pkVA,m), that Valid(pkVA, cVA) = 1. Moreover, for every
honestly generated ciphertext and keys and, for any PPT adversary
A, there exists a negligible function η such that the probability for
A to win the following game is bounded by η:
1. run GenVA(1λ) to get (ppVA, pkVA, skVA) and send (ppVA, pkVA)
to A.
2. A generates cVA.
3. compute d← DerivComVA(pkVA, cVA), o← OpenVA(skVA, cVA)
and m ← DecVA(skVA, cVA) as well as β ← Valid(pkVA, cVA)
and β′ ← Verify(pk, d, o,m). Output β and β′.
We have that Pr[β = 1 ∧ ¬β′ = 1] ≤ η(λ). This condition guaran-
tees that decryption and opening succeed.
Consistency. ∀m ∈M, the distributions of Strip(pkVA,EncVA(pkVA,m))
and Enc(pk,m) are the same, that is, we can strip a VA cipher-
text into a normal one. Furthermore, the decryption, opening and
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commitment derivation of ΠVA are consistent with those of Π: for
every ciphertext and generated keys, it must hold that
DecVA(skVA, cVA) = Dec(sk, Strip(pkVA, cVA)),
OpenVA(skVA, cVA) = Open(sk,Strip(pkVA, cVA)),
DerivComVA(pkVA, cVA) = DerivCom(pk,Strip(pkVA, cVA))).
The algorithm Expand is probabilistic while Strip and Valid are determin-
istic.
We refer to the result of the augmentation of a CCE scheme as a
CCVA encryption scheme or simply a CCVAE scheme.
According to this definition, validity augmented schemes are valid-
ity augmented for themselves. While this is not a problem, it will not
be useful since the purpose of the augmentation is to provide a validity
verification mechanism while not being required to preserve the homo-
morphic properties of the basic scheme.
3.3 Generic commitment consistent encryption
scheme
In this section, we propose a generic construction of a CCVAE scheme as
well as a simple instance of this construction based on a combination of
the Paillier cryptosystem (Definition 2.7 [Pai99]) and a Pedersen com-
mitment (Definition 2.11 [Ped92]). This natural instantiation leads to a
fairly inefficient and complex scheme, but provides the main ingredients
that we will use next. Note that the generic construction is suitable for
voting with PPAT (see Section 4.3).
3.3.1 Construction from standard building blocks
Our generic construction of a CCE scheme is based on a traditional
homomorphic commitment scheme and on two homomorphic encryption
schemes for encrypting the committed message and the opening value.
We do not discuss here the way the function evaluation is performed
and we delay this aspect to the specific applications of Chapter 4 and 5.
The Com + Enc1 + Enc2 construction
Let ΠC = (GenC,Com,Verify) be a commitment scheme and ΠEi =
(Geni,Enci,Deci) be an encryption scheme for i = 1, 2. We assume
the following mild condition for the generation algorithms: GenC,Gen1
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and Gen2 can be run on a common input returned by a probabilistic
algorithm Setup such that we will get M1 ⊂ MC and O ⊂ M2 where
Mi is the message space of ΠEi . Then we define the following generic
CCE scheme ΠG = (GenG,EncG,DecG,DerivComG,OpenG,VerifyG):
GenG(1
λ): Run Setup(1λ) to get a common public parameter pp and
compute
cpk← GenC(pp),
(pk1, sk1)← Gen1(pp),
(pk2, sk2)← Gen2(pp)
Output pk = (cpk, pk1, pk2) and sk = (sk1, sk2) with the above
specification.
EncG(pk,m): Parse pk as (cpk, pk1, pk2). For m ∈ M ⊂ M1 compute
(d, o) ← Com(cpk,m), c1 ← Enc1(pk1,m) and c2 ← Enc2(pk2, o).
Output the ciphertext c = (d, c1, c2).
DecG(sk, c): Parse sk as (sk1, sk2) and c as (d, c1, c2) and return ⊥ if
it has not the right form. Otherwise return the plaintext m¯ :=
Dec1(sk1, c1).
DerivComG(pk, c): Parse pk as (cpk, pk1, pk2) and c as (d, c1, c2) and re-
turn ⊥ if it has not the right form. Otherwise return d.
OpenG(sk, c): Parse sk as (sk1, sk2) and c as (d, c1, c2) and return ⊥
if it has not the right form. Otherwise return the value o¯ :=
Dec2(sk2, c2).
VerifyG(pk, d, o,m): Parse pk as (cpk, pk1, pk2) and output Verify(cpk,
d, o,m).
The following theorem shows that schemes built according to this
approach, using secure components, keep the same level of security.
Theorem 3.1. Let ΠC be a computationally hiding commitment scheme
and ΠE1, ΠE2 be two IND-CPA secure encryption schemes which to-
gether support the Com + Enc1 + Enc2 construction. Then, the resulting
scheme ΠG consists in an IND-CPA secure CCE scheme.
Proof. First, the CCE correctness follows immediately from the correct-
ness of the underlying components. Now, let us focus on the security
property. Let A be an adversary against ΠG. From A we build an ad-
versary B against at least one of the underlying schemes ΠC, ΠE1 or
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ΠE2 , which succeeds with a closely related success probability. For con-
venience we denote ΠC by Π0, ΠE1 by Π1 and ΠE2 by Π2. Given any
message m ∈M, we consider the following distributions.
D3 is the distribution (d, c1, c2) ← EncG(m) of the encryptions of m in
ΠG.
D2 Defined as D3 except for the generation of c2. Instead it computes
c∗2 ← Enc2(o∗) for a random opening value o∗.
D1 Same as D2 except that c1 is replaced by c∗1 ← Enc1(m∗) for a
random m∗.
D0 Same as D1 except that d is replaced by d∗ computed with an inde-
pendent random value.
Remark that D0 is the uniform random distribution on CC ×C1 ×C2
which is not the uniform random distribution on CG.
In the CPA experiment, A outputs (m0,m1) and must distinguish
D3(m0) from D3(m1). We define
AdvΠGA (λ) := |Pr[1← A(D3(m0))]− Pr[1← A(D3(m1))]|
and we set Prb,k = Pr[1← A(e)|e← Dk(mb)].
We bound AdvΠGA (λ) by a linear combination of Adv
Πk
B (λ). Note that
the CPA experiment for B is defined for a slightly different but equivalent
experiment: B has to distinguish whether an output in CC,C1 or C2
is computed from a chosen message or from a uniformly distributed
message in MC,M1 or M2.
Let us see how B works. B runs Gen(1λ) generating instances for Π0,
Π1 and Π2. On these inputs, B runs A and receives (m0,m1). B flips
two coins b← 0, 1 and k ← 0, 1, 2. Depending on b and k, B follows one
of the next patterns.
k = 0: B computes c∗1 and c∗2 identically to D0(mb) and D1(mb). Then
B queries the Π0 oracle O0 on mb and receives d˜. O0 computes
d˜ as Com(mb) or as Com(m
∗) by tossing a coin. Finally B sets
c = (d˜, c∗1, c∗2).
k = 1: B computes d and c∗2 identically to D1(mb) and D2(mb). Then
B queries the Π1 oracle O1 on mb and receives c˜1. O1 computes
c˜1 as Enc1(mb) or as Enc1(m
∗) by tossing a coin. Finally B sets
c = (d, c˜1, c
∗
2).
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k = 2: B computes d and c1 identically to D2(mb) and D3(mb). Then
B queries the Π2 oracle O2 on the opening value o given by the
computation of the commitment and receives c˜2. O2 computes
c˜2 as Enc2(o) or as Enc2(o
∗) by tossing a coin and sends c˜2 to B.
Finally B sets c = (d, c1, c˜2).
In all these cases, B sends c to A. B outputs the guess of A. It is clear
that B runs in polynomial time ifA does. Using the triangular inequality,
from AdvΠGA (λ) = |Pr0,3(λ)− Pr1,3(λ)| and Pr0,0(λ) = Pr1,0(λ), we have:
AdvΠGA (λ) ≤
2∑
k=0
1∑
b=0
|Prb,k(λ)− Prb,k+1(λ)|
≤
2∑
k=0
|Pr0,k+1(λ)− Pr0,k(λ)|+ |Pr0,0(λ)− Pr1,0(λ)|
+
2∑
k=0
|Pr1,k(λ)− Pr1,k+1(λ)|
≤ 1
6
2∑
k=0
1∑
b=0
AdvΠkB (λ)
≤ η(λ)
where η is a negligible function.
Validity augmentation
If the commitment and encryption schemes used in the construction
above are compatible with Σ-protocols (see Section 2.1.5), then it is
easy to augment this IND-CPA secure CCE scheme into an NM-CPA
secure CCVAE scheme.
Theorem 3.2 ([BPW12], informal). Let ΠE be an IND-CPA secure en-
cryption scheme and pi be a Σ-protocol in the NP-language LNP for the
relation R := {((pp, pk, c),m)|(pp, pk, sk) ← Gen(1λ), c ← Enc(pk,m)}
with special soundness, special honest verifier zero-knowledge, unique
responses and a challenge space {0, 1}t where the inverse of t is negligi-
ble in λ. Let H be a random oracle {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}t. Then the following
scheme is NM-CPA secure:
• The key generation algorithm is the one of ΠE augmented with H.
• In order to encrypt m, run the encryption algorithm of ΠE, then
compute the corresponding proof of knowledge made non-interactive
using the Fiat-Shamir transform (Theorem 2.1).
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• In order to decrypt a ciphertext, check the proof and in case of
validity run the decryption algorithm of ΠE on the ciphertext part,
or return ⊥ otherwise.
This Σ-protocol immediately provides a validity augmentation. More
precisely, in the case of our ΠG construction, we obtain a proof in
LNP for the relation R := {((pp, pk, c), (m, o))|c = (d, c1, c2), (d, o) ←
Com(pk,m), c1 ← Enc1(pk,m), c2 ← Enc2(o): such a proof not only
guarantees the knowledge of the plaintext and opening, but also that
the ciphertext is valid.
We can then define a validity augmentation in a straightforward way:
Expand adds the oracleH to the public key, Strip removes the sigma proof
from the ciphertext, and Valid returns “1” only if the proof is valid. The
validity condition holds thanks to the completeness and the soundness
of the proof.
The consistency of the augmentation is straightforward by inspection
of Definition 3.2.
In the case of threshold CCE scheme, we observe that this upgrading
makes the extension of threshold IND-CPA schemes to threshold NM-CPA
schemes immediate, and prevents common difficulties from happening
in threshold versions of non-malleable encryption schemes for which the
ciphertext validity tests require the knowledge of the private key (see,
e.g.,[CG99]).
3.3.2 Instance based on Pedersen and Paillier
The PPATP scheme.
The ΠG construction can be instantiated using a combination of Paillier
and Pedersen commitments, inspired from a proposal by Moran and
Naor [MN10]. This leads to a scheme that we call PPATP: the idea
is to select a traditional Paillier modulus N2, and then to perform the
Pedersen commitments in a subgroup of the quadratic residues modulo
a prime P = 2kN + 1, whose order equals N . The small public odd
k-value is not fixed to facilitate the generation of P .
Protocol 3.1 (PPATP CCE scheme).
GenP(1
λ): Choose two λ-bit safe primes, p = 2p′ + 1 and q = 2q′ +
1, and compute the public modulus N = pq for the Paillier en-
cryption. The corresponding secret key skP is the number l :=
lcm(ϕ(p), ϕ(q)) = 2p′q′ = ϕ(N)/2. Then pick a prime P =
2kN+1 and two public generators g and h of a N -order subgroup of
the quadratic residues QRP for the Pedersen commitment. Output
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ppP = (P,N), pkP = (g, h) and skP = l. Consequently, we have
that M = O := ZN , CC := 〈g〉 and C := CC × (Z∗N2)2.
EncP (pkP,m): For m ∈ ZN , choose r rand←− ZN and s, t rand←− Z∗N , compute
d = gmhr in Z∗P and, c1 = (N + 1)msN and c2 = (N + 1)rtN in
Z∗N2. Output the ciphertext c = (d, c1, c2).
DecP(skP, c): Parse c as (d, c1, c2) and compute m0 := ((c
l
1 mod N
2)−
1)/N . Output m¯ := m0(l
−1 mod N) ∈ ZN as in the Paillier
decryption (Definition 2.7).
DerivComP(pkP, c): Parse c as (d, c1, c2) and output d.
OpenP(skP, c): Parse c as (d, c1, c2) and compute o0 := ((c
l
2 mod N
2)−
1)/N . Output o¯ := o0(l
−1 mod N) ∈ ZN as in the Paillier de-
cryption.
VerifyP(pk, d, o,m): Output 1 if d
?
= gmho mod P . Otherwise output 0.
Thanks to the careful choice of the parameters (the messages and
opening values lie in ZN ), the scheme ΠP is additively homomorphic,
which makes it convenient to apply the generic transformation described
above by using a simple non interactive proof of knowledge that enjoys
all the properties we need for the validity augmentation.
Protocol 3.2 (The validity augmentation of PPATP).
ExpandP(ppP, pkP, skP): Augment the public key pkP with the descrip-
tion of an efficient hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → ZN and return
(ppVAP , pk
VA
P , sk
VA
P ).
EncVAP (pk
VA
P ,m): Compute c := EncP(pkP,m) using random values r ∈
ZN , s, t ∈ Z∗N as above. Then select random m′, r′ in ZN and
s′, t′ in Z∗N , and compute acc := EncP(pkP,m′) using r′, s′, t′ as
random values. Compute ecc := H(ppVAP , pkVAP , c, acc) and then
zcc := (zm, zr, zs, zt) as (m
′ + eccm, r′ + eccr, s′secc , t′tecc). The ci-
phertext is made of cVA := (c, ecc, zcc).
ValidP(pk
VA
P , c
VA): Parse cVA as (c, ecc, (zm, zr, zs, zt)) and check whether
all the elements of the ciphertext are properly encoded. Com-
pute d′ := gzmhzrd−ecc, c′1 := (N + 1)zmzNs c
−ecc
1 and c
′
2 := (N +
1)zrzNt c
−ecc
2 , and test whether the following equality holds: ecc
?
=
H(ppVAP , pkVAP , c, a′cc) for a′cc := (d′, c′1, c′2). If the verifications fail,
output ⊥ else output 1.
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StripP(pk
VA
P , c
VA): Parse cVA as (c, ecc, zcc) following the description of
pkVAP . If that fails, output ⊥, and c otherwise.
The other CCVA algorithms are entirely determined by Definition 3.2.
This instance of our generic construction is very simple. Unfortu-
nately, it exhibits at least two important limitations for a practical use.
First, being based on a Paillier cryptosystem, for a practical threshold
version of the PPATP, the threshold key generation algorithm either
requires the existence of a single trusted party that produces an RSA
modulus N and forgets its factorization, or the use of fairly sophisti-
cated multi-party computation protocol to generate this modulus in a
distributed way [DJ01]. The first option is often challenging to setup in
practice, while the second can seldom be feasible as it requires substan-
tial expertise from the key holders.
As we will see in Section 3.5, the computational cost of this scheme
stands in contrast with encryption schemes based on prime order groups:
they enjoy considerably simpler key generation procedures [GJKR07],
and typically enable much more efficient computation in the underlying
groups, which can be of 256-bit instead of 2048-bit order for similar
security levels.
As mentioned above, the PPATP scheme is a slight variant of a
scheme suggested by Moran and Naor [MN10] and also used by Demirel
et al. [DvdGA12]. Their version however relies on cut-and-choose tech-
niques to prove the validity of ciphertexts and is therefore considerably
less efficient.
3.4 Commitment consistent encryption for sim-
ple messages
The CCE instantiation presented here is a construction based on elliptic
curves. It is efficient compared to the PPATP scheme based on the
factorization problem for the same level of security. Accordingly, our
implementation shows better timing results (see Table 3.3).
This instantiation is based on the TC2 perfectly hiding commitment
scheme proposed by Abe et al. [AHO10] as well as on ElGamal encryp-
tion. It is scaled to encrypt small size message since its decryption
algorithm rests on retrieving the discrete logarithm of a group element.
The mathematical materials involved in the following construction
and the arithmetic deployed around them regards extension fields, ellip-
tic curves and pairings. Since these notions might seem abstruse to the
unfamiliar reader, we cover them in the memento of Appendix A.
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Computational setting. The security of the PPATS relies on the
hardness of the SXDH problem (Assumption 2.5) for the pairing-based
constructions. This setting is noted PairSXDH := (q,G1, G2, G3, e, P,Q)
where (G1,+), (G2,+) and (G3, ·) are groups of order q, a λ-bit prime, e
is an efficient and non-degenerating bilinear map e : G1 ×G2 → G3 and
P , Q are generators of G1 and G2 respectively. These groups are such
that there is no known efficient mapping between G1 and G2 in either
direction.
Protocol 3.3 (The PPATS scheme).
GenS(1
λ): The public parameters pp contain the description groups G1,
G2 and G3, the pairing e and generators P, P1 for G1 and Q for
G2. Note that DlogPP1 is unknown. Select x
rand←− Zq and compute
Q1 = xQ. The public key is pk := Q1 and the private key sk := x.
Return (pp, pk, sk).
EncS(pk,m): Pick r, s
rand←− Zq and compute d := rP + mP1, c1 := sQ,
and c2 := rQ+ sQ1. Return c := (c1, c2, d).
DecS(sk, c): Parse c as (c1, c2, d) and compute m˜ := e(P, xc1−c2)e(d,Q).
Return Dloge(P1,Q)m˜.
DerivComS(pk, c): Parse c as (c1, c2, d) and return d.
OpenS(sk, c): Parse c as (c1, c2, d), compute and return o := c2 − xc1.
VerifyS(pk, d, o,m): Verify the equality e(P, o)
?
= e(d − mP1, Q). If it
holds return 1, otherwise return 0.
We delay to Section 4.4.1 the VA augmentation of the PPATS and
the proof that the augmented scheme offers NM-CPA security.
3.5 Implementing commitment consistent en-
cryption
A prototype implementation of the PPATS (but also the PPATC of Sec-
tion 4.4.2 and the test applications of Chapter 5) was performed in
Python. This allowed us to test our CCE schemes “in the real world” but
also to build a generic protocol that generates a perfectly private audit
trail in the general case of multi-party function evaluation of Chapter 5.
We put a lot of efforts to select fast algorithms and used precomputa-
tions when available to reduce the cost of the basic arithmetic, group
and field operations. The choice of Python is motivated by the fact that
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the code and the applications are meant to be as transposable as pos-
sible. Thus, prototyping new cryptographic applications in the vein of
what is done in Chapter 5 is facilitated. Moreover, the PPAT technique
developed for voting systems in Chapter 4 could easily be integrated to
the Helios voting system [AdMP12] for the server side even though it
would be necessary to implement the PPATS in JavaScript for the voters.
Finally, the VIFF framework that we used to test our SMC applications
in Chapter 6 is based on Python. Moreover since this work was achieved
before the prototype implementation discussed here, it seemed natural
to go on with Python. Nevertheless, we do not ignore that using an
optimized language with dedicated hardware operations should bring a
nice improvement to our timing results. We made all our code available
online [Cuv15] for the reproduction of our results.
The implementation was made from scratch and thus provides all the
materials needed for the arithmetic on finite field, on extension field and
on elliptic curves (EC) as well as the algorithms for the pairings. This
last part is the trickiest one since it is the heaviest operation required in
the different schemes for decryption and verification. For that reason,
lots of efforts and optimizations targeted the pairing operation resulting
in ∼ 20ms per pairing, which is reasonable considering the high-level
language used.
We refer to the notations and results given in Appendix A for the
constructions below. We recall that φ is the Frobenius endomorphism,
φ(x, y) 7→ (xp, yp).
In order to implement the PPATS scheme we work with an optimized
set of Barreto-Naerhig (BN-)curves [BN06, PSJNB11] which enables ex-
tension fields with nice properties (for more details on the motivations
of this choice, we refer to Appendix A.3). We denote Fp the prime
field where p is a λ-bit prime. EFp is the BN elliptic curve of equation
y2 = x3 + b where b = c4 + d6 is a parameter in Fp.
In EFp , we pick P a generator of prime order q where q = |EFp |. The
primes p and q are given by p = p(u) = 36u4 + 36u3 + 24u2 + 6u + 1
and q = q(u) = 36u4 + 36u3 + 18u2 + 6u+ 1 for u ∈ Z. The EC point P
generates a group G1 := EFp [q] = EFp that will be used to compute the
perfectly hiding commitments of the CCE scheme.
We also consider E′Fp2 the twisted elliptic curve over the extension
field Fp2 where E′ ≡ y2 = x3 + ξ¯ with ξ := c2 + d3i. Indeed, the BN
elliptic curve EFp12 admits a sextic twist E
′
Fp2
which means that there
exists a group homomorphism ψ : E′Fp2 ← EFp12 . In other words, the
twist allows us to represent points of G2 := EFp12 [q] ∩ ker (φ− p) origi-
nally in EFp12 in a group G
′
2 := E
′
Fp2
[q] over a smaller field, namely Fp2 .
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In particular, the homomorphism ψ is given by ψ : (x, y) 7→ (µ2x, µ3y)
where µ is a root of (Y 2 − ξ) in Fp12 . In EFp12 , we find the EC point
Q, a generator of G2 ' G′2 ⊂ E′Fp2 , a prime order q group. For now
on, we consider indistinctly a point in G2 from its image point in G
′
2
through the homomorphism ψ−1. Obviously, we prefer computations
in E′Fp2 whenever possible. The group G2 will be used to compute the
encryption part of the CCE scheme.
The exponential ElGamal encryption part of the scheme in G2 al-
lows decryption for a small range of messages m (for example m < 216).
We use the “comb2” algorithm of [HDNP11] for scalar multiplication
of EC points when precomputation is available. When it is not how-
ever, we rely on optimized field and elliptic curve arithmetic operations
[Joy08, FVV09]. We perform elliptic curve operations in the Jacobian
coordinates and the algorithms used for the field operations are men-
tioned below. We also rely on several optimizations to compute pairings
when necessary [FVV09, DSD07, BGDM+10, AKL+11, SBC+09] as ex-
plained below.
The extension field Fp2 is naturally constructed as Fp/(i2 +1). Then
we build EFp12 in two steps. First, we tower Fp6 above Fp2 as Fp6 :=
Fp2/(X3− ξ). Second, we tower Fp12 above Fp6 as Fp12 := Fp6/(Y 2− ξ).
Note that ξ is neither a cubic root nor a square root in Fp2 . To sum up,
we have Fp12 : Fp6 : Fp2 : Fp. Note that the multiplication and squaring
operations in each field are handled differently. For Fp2 and Fp12 , it is
the complex multiplication and squaring algorithm while for Fp6 , we use
the Karatsuba algorithm for the multiplication and the Chung-Hasan
algorithm for the squaring.
This setting offers an optimal ate pairing if one considers G3 ⊂ F∗p12
as the subgroup of q-th roots of unity. This pairing was introduced
in [HSV06] and optimized for BN-curves [DSD07, BGDM+10, Ver10,
AKL+11]. We define the non degenerate bilinear ate pairing e : G1 ×
G2 → G3. This pairing is used in the decryption algorithm and it is also
used to provide consistency zero-knowledge proofs, picc. Refraining here
from going into deeper details, in the next section, we describe Algorithm
3.1 that is used to compute the optimal ate pairing. Its complexity is
linear in the length of parameter u.
3.5.1 Computational workload
In order to compare the different PPAT schemes, at equivalent security
level, we estimate the cost of each operation in the different fields: Z∗P
(or equivalently ZN ) and Z∗N2 for the PPATP schemes (Section 3.3.2).
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G1 and G2 for the PPATS and PPATC schemes (the PPATC construction
is introduced in Section 4.4.2, for complex ballot voting). We associate
a unit cost denoted U to the multiplication of two 256-bit integers and as
a preliminary assumption, we assume that this cost grows quadratically
with the length of the operands. We target a security level equivalent to
2048-bit RSA modulus N . Table 3.1 details the costs of each operation
in terms of U in the underlying fields.
The elliptic curve points are represented in Jacobian coordinates.
Thus, the addition (A) of two different EC points requires 12 multipli-
cations (M) and 4 squarings (S) while the duplication (D) of one EC
point requires 4M + 6S. Regarding the scalar multiplication of an EC
point, when precomputation is not available or when the point is not
a fixed base, we use the “double and add” algorithm which requires
128A + 256D operations in average. However, when precomputation is
possible, we use the comb2 algorithm with a window size of 10. In this
case the complexity of the scalar multiplication algorithm for a multiplier
of length 256-bit is 26A+ 12D. This method requires the computation
and storage of 210 points per fixed base which represents 98.304 kB for
a point of G1 and 196.608 kB for a point of G2.
In the integer field, the algorithm used for modular exponentiation
is the classic “square and multiply” which requires 1.5l multiplications
in average where l is the length of the exponent. When precomputation
is available and when the base is fixed, we use the comb2 algorithm as
before with a window size of 10. The complexity of the algorithm is
205M + 102S. In the case of an exponentiation modulus N , storing 210
group elements per fixed base takes 262.144 kB while it rises to 524.288
kB when the modulus is N2.
Regarding the complexity of the pairings, we report all the details
in Section 3.5.1.
In Table 3.2, we compare the cost of the different algorithms of the
CCE schemes devised in this thesis. They are put on equal footing in
terms of security levels. We consider two cases, the encryption of a 0/1
message with the PPATP and the PPATS and the encryption of a 256-bit
message with the PPATP and the PPATC.
Table 3.3 gives the different timing measured with our prototype im-
plementation for the algorithms and proofs of the PPATP,PPATS and
PPATC. The tests were performed on a standard laptop: Intelr Core
i5-3320M CPU @ 2.60GHz×4 with 7.7 GB of RAM. We differentiate the
cost for the client from the cost for the server in anticipation with the
applications of Chapter 4 and 5 where the clients are respectively vot-
ers and participants to a multi-party function evaluation and where the
server(s) is(are) respectively the election authority(ies) and the worker
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Table 3.1: Costs of operations in the different PPAT schemes.
. U is the number of multiplications between two 256-bit integers.
. M in Z∗P is the modular multiplication between two 2048-bit elements.
. Ep and E in Z∗P are the modular exponentiations where the base, the
exponent and the modulus are 2048-bit long. Ep designates the use of
precomputed table for a fixed base.
. M in Z∗N2 is the modular multiplication between two 4096-bit elements.
. Ep and E in Z∗N2 are the modular exponentiations where the exponent
and the base are 2048-bit long while the modulus is 4096-bit long.
. A is the addition of two EC point in the underlying group.
. Smp and Sm are the scalar multiplications of an EC point by a 256-bit
integer in the underlying group. Smp designates the use of precomputed
table for a fixed base.
. P is the pairing from G1×G2 → G3 involving operations in these three
groups.
Operation U Algorithm used
PPATP
Z∗P
M 64
Ep 19,648 comb2
E 196,608 square and multiply
Z∗N2
M 256
Ep 78,592 comb2
E 786,432 square and multiply
PPATS
&
PPATC
G1
A 16
Smp 592 comb2
Sm 4,608 double and add
G2
A 64
Smp 2,366 comb2
Sm 18,432 double and add
G1,2,3 P 47,522 Ate pairing
that evaluates the function. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show important dif-
ferences between PPATP,PPATS and PPATC: computing a PPATP ci-
phertext is theoretically 227 times more expensive than computing a
PPATC ciphertext. However this difference is less evident in the timing
measurements. One reason might be that the quadratic growth of the
multiplication cost stated as a preliminary assumption is not accurate
enough. A second reason might be that the way Python handles and
generate objects comes with extra hidden features that slow the execu-
tion. Nevertheless, it is worth noticing that the extra work required to
compute the pairings does not outweigh the benefits of the elliptic curve
setting.
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Table 3.2: Costs of the algorithms of two versions of PPATP and of the
PPATS and PPATC.
Z∗P Z∗N2 Total cost
M Ep E M Ep E U
PPATP
(0/1 vote)
Enc 1 1 0 2 1 2 1,671,680
Verify 1 1 0 0 0 0 19,712
picc (VA) 5 2 2 2 2 2 2,163,392
pior 2.5 2 1 0 0 0 236,064
Dec 2 0 0 0 0 1 786,560
Open 2 0 0 0 0 1 786,560
Validcc 2 2 1 4 2 4 3,539,968
Validor 3 2 2 0 0 0 432,704
PPATP
(256-bit
vote)
Enc 1 2 0 2 2 2 1,769,920
Verify 1 2 0 0 0 0 39,360
picc (VA) 5 2 2 2 2 2 2,163,392
Dec 2 0 0 0 0 1 786,560
Open 2 0 0 0 0 1 786,560
Validcc 2 2 1 4 2 4 3,539,968
G1 G2 Total cost
A Smp Sm A Smp Sm P U
PPATS
(0/1 vote)
Enc 1 3 0 1 1 0 0 4,222
Verify 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 95,108
picc (VA) 1 3 0 1 2 0 0 6,588
pior 0 0 0 2 2 1 0 23,292
Dec 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 99,668
Open 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 4,624
Validcc 3 3 2 2 2 1 0 17,743
Validor 0 0 0 4 2 2 0 41,852
PPATC
(256-bit
vote)
Enc 2 5 0 1 2 0 0 7,788
Verify 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 142,582
picc (VA) 3 5 1 1 2 0 0 12,412
Dec 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 4,624
Open 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 4,624
Validcc 6 5 4 2 2 1 0 44,780
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Caption of Table 3.2 (previous page):
M is the number of modular multiplications.
Ep is the number of modular exponentiations with precomputation avail-
able for a fixed base.
E is the number of modular exponentiations.
U is the number of multiplications between two 256-bit integers.
A is the number of point additions over the Elliptic Curve (EC).
Smp is the number of scalar multiplications over the EC with precompu-
tation available for a fixed base.
Sm is the number of scalar multiplications over the EC.
P is the number of pairings.
Table 3.3: Time measurements in ms.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Enc
client
picc (VA)
client
Validcc
server
pior
client
Validor
client-server
PPATP (0/1 message)
PPATP (256-bit message)
PPATS (0/1 message)
PPATC (256-bit message)
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Complexity of the pairing
The pairing operations present in our PPAT algorithms is one of the most
expensive since it is performed in Fp12 . For this reason, we deploy many
optimizations to fasten its computation. Its computation is performed
thanks to Algorithm 3.1. We recall that an overview on pairing can be
found in Appendix A.3.
Algorithm 3.1: Optimal ate pairing
Input: P ∈ G1 and Q ∈ G2.
Output: x := e(P,Q)
1 T ← Q
2 x← 1Fp12
3 write r ← abs(6u+ 2) as r = ∑ ri2i
4 for i← log2 r − 1 to 0 do
5 x← x2.TangT (P )
6 T ← 2T
7 if ri = 1 then
8 x← x.LineT,Q(P )
9 T ← T +Q
10 end
11 end
12 if u < 0 then
13 T ← −T
14 x← x−1
15 end
16 Q1 ← φ(Q)
17 Q2 ← φ2(Q)
18 x← x.LineT,Q1(P )
19 T ← T +Q1
20 x← x.LineT,Q2(P )
21 x← x−1.φ6(x)
22 x← x.φ2(x)
23 x← x p
4−p2+1
q
Comments on Algorithm 3.1.
• Operations on T and Q are performed in E′Fp2 while operations on
x are performed in Fp12 .
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• TangT (P ) is a function that, first, computes the tangent line to
the curve E′ passing by T and then evaluates this tangent in P .
The result stands in Fp12 . This function requires 13M + 2S in Fp.
• Similarly, LineT,Q(P ) is a function that, first, computes the line
passing by T and Q and then evaluates it to the point P . The
result stands in Fp12 . This function requires 12M in Fp.
• The multiplication of two elements in Fp12 requires 128M in Fp.
The squaring of one element in Fp12 requires 12S + 98M in Fp.
The inversion of one element in Fp12 requires 145M + 30S + 3I in
Fp where I is the number of modular inversions.
• φ is the Frobenius endomorphism. Over points of E′Fp2 , it requires
8M in Fp. Indeed, in this case, φ(Q) = φ(xQ, yQ) = (xpQ, y
p
Q) =
(xQ.=(ξ
p−1
3 ), yQ.=(ξ
2(p−1)
3 )) where ξ
p−1
3 and ξ
2(p−1)
3 can be precom-
puted. Over points of EFp12 , observe that for x ∈ Fp12 , we can write
x as x0 +x1
3
√
ξ+x2
3
√
ξ
2
+ (x3 +x4
3
√
ξ+x5
3
√
ξ
2
) 2
√
ξ where xi ∈ Fp2
and then, compute φ(x) = xp as
φ(x) = x0 +x1.ξ
p−1
3
3
√
ξ+ x2.ξ
2(p−1)
3
3
√
ξ
2
+ (x3.ξ
p−1
2 +x4.ξ
p−1
2 .ξ
p−1
3
3
√
ξ+ x5.ξ
p−1
2 .ξ
2(p−1)
3
3
√
ξ
2
) 2
√
ξ
resulting in 7M in Fp2 or 28M in Fp. As before, we rely on the fact
that ξ
p−1
3 , ξ
2(p−1)
3 and ξ
p−1
2 can be precomputed. For more details,
see [BGDM+10].
• The exponentiation at the last line of the algorithm is obviously
called the final exponentiation. Its role is to normalize x ∈ Fp12
so that the pairing result is unique and gives an element of order
q. In the original algorithm, the exponent is (p12 − 1)/q which
can be written as (p6 − 1)(p2 + 1)(p4 − p2 + 1)/q. The first two
multipliers are handled thanks to the Frobenius in lines 16 to 22
and it remains the last one. The final exponentiation weights a
lot in the total computational effort, and for that reason we rely
on addition chain technique as well as, again, the Frobenius to
optimize its computation. This method targeted to BN-curves
is presented in [SBC+09] and its cost is (640WH(u) + 2425)M +
(640|u|+ 78)S.
• As a result, the exact complexity of the algorithm is (181|6u +
2|+ 204WH(6u+ 2) + 640WH(u) + 640|u|+ 3318)M + (2|6u+ 2|+
136)S + 9I in Fp.
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With careful choice of parameters, the optimal ate pairing main loop
is short and the number of operations can be reduced when 6u+ 2 has
low Hamming weight. Nevertheless, the main loop remains the main
computational contributor of the algorithm. For our prototype tests,
we choose a curve proposed in [PSJNB11] whose parameters are given
below:
c, d = 1
b = 2
ξ = 1 + i
E ≡ y2 = x3 + b
E′ ≡ y2 = x3 + 1− i
u = −262 + 255 + 1
p := p(u) = 16798108731015832284940804142231733909889187 · · ·
121439069848933715426072753864723
q := q(u) = 16798108731015832284940804142231733909759579 · · ·
603404752749028378864165570215949
|p| = |q| = 254
|u| = 64
|6u+ 2| = 66
WH(u) = 3
WH(6u+ 2) = 5
In our setting, the number of operations to compute one pairing
rises to 47, 218M + 268S+ 9I which is roughly 47, 522U if we assimilate
squarings to multiplications and if we approximate one inversion to five
multiplications.

Chapter 4
Cryptographic Vote with Perfectly
Private Audit Trail
Cryptographic vote is one of the most broadly used cases of multi-party
computation. It is a sensitive area where the security requirements are
strong and where cryptography has much to offer to a large public. It is,
therefore, a well-studied branch of cryptography and, for us, a natural
gateway to verifiable multi-party function evaluation. Indeed, in voting
schemes the tally function to evaluate can be very simple in some cases
(e.g. the sum of the votes) and starting from the results of this Chapter,
we will extend the function evaluation to any arithmetic function in
Chapter 5.
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In the current chapter we describe the results presented at the con-
ference ESORICS 2013 in the paper “Election Verifiability or Ballot
Privacy: Do we Need to Choose?” [CPP13]. In this work, the goal
is to conciliate the confidentiality property and the verifiability prop-
erty that a voting scheme must possess. The confidentiality guarantees
a voter that his vote remains secret and verifiability ensures that the
tally of the election is in accordance with the votes of the legitimate
voters. Prior to this work, it seems that these two properties tended to
cancel each other out in the sense that one cannot be completely ful-
filled without jeopardizing the other. On the other hand, our solution
proposes a verifiable voting scheme that is also perfectly private. To
reach this objective, we use the commitment consistent encryption
(CCE) introduced in Chapter 3. This primitive enables us to build the
first universally verifiable voting scheme with a perfectly private audit
trail (PPAT) and practical complexity. That is:
• the audit trail that is published for verifying elections guarantees
everlasting privacy, and
• the computational load required from the participants is only in-
creased by a small constant factor compared to traditional vot-
ing schemes, and is optimal in the sense of Cramer, Gennaro and
Schoenmakers [CGS97].
These properties make it possible to introduce election verifiability in
large scale elections as a pure benefit, that is, without loss of privacy
compared to a non-verifiable scheme and at a similar level of efficiency.
We propose different approaches for constructing voting schemes
with PPAT from CCE, as well as an additional CCE constructions. A
first voting scheme is based on the PPATS of Section 3.4 and is tailored
for elections with a small number of candidates. The second, based on
another CCE scheme, is suitable for elections with complex ballots.
Finally, we present the concrete implementation and timing results
obtained for our PPAT constructions.
4.1 Introduction
Elections enable a set of voters to express their opinion regarding one
or more questions, and build an aggregate outcome from these personal
opinions. While very simple election mechanisms, like hand raising, can
be very convenient to organize, various properties are usually required
from voting schemes nowadays, and those are not guaranteed by a hand
raising process.
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Vote privacy is probably the most important property that has been
added on top of correctness/verifiability (guaranteed by the hand rais-
ing process). It even became mandatory for public elections in most
countries during the 19th century, as a way to prevent coercion and
bribery [Sal06].
Elections guaranteeing the privacy of the votes while preserving the
correctness of the outcome are unfortunately much harder to organize
in a trustworthy way: as usual, correctness and privacy guarantees tend
to conflict.
As a result, most voting schemes used today enforce privacy at the
expense of the correctness properties: in the traditional paper-based
scheme, it is most of the time impossible for a voter to convince himself
that his vote is included in the ballot boxes that are tallied (he has to
trust election officers on that), and the same happens with the commonly
deployed non-verifiable electronic voting schemes which also makes it
impossible for the voters to verify what is counted by the computers, if
there is anything counted at all.
As a way to solve this problem, universally verifiable voting systems
were proposed in the seminal works of Benaloh et al. [Ben87, CF85].
These works have been followed by a considerable body of research dur-
ing the last 25 years (see [CEC+08, CFSY96, CGS97, DJ01, FOO93,
HS00, MN06, RBH+09, SK95] for instance).
Universally verifiable elections are carried out by including in the
voting process the production of an audit trail (which can be electronic,
made of paper, or both). This enables voters to check that their vote
was recorded properly and that the election outcome is consistent with
all the votes submitted by legitimate voters (formal definitions appear
in [KTV10, KRS10] for instance.)
The adoption of universally verifiable technologies is however compli-
cated if the audit trail, provided in order to guarantee the correctness of
an election, in turn weakens the privacy of the votes: this raises questions
about the relative importance of the correctness improvement resulting
from the audit trail versus the potential decrease of privacy that results
from that same audit trail, as well as about the consequences of any
(even partial) failure with respect to one of these properties. These are
sensitive problems, and the balance between these requirements will typ-
ically depend on the specifics of each election (stakes, voter population,
culture, . . . ).
This compromise between correctness and privacy needs to be made
in the vast majority of the verifiable voting schemes that were pro-
posed [Ben87, CGS97, DJ01, FOO93, HS00, RBH+09, SK95] (we discuss
the few exceptions in Section 4.1.2) including those that were used in
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real-world elections. The public audit trail of all those voting systems
indeed includes information that could reveal individual votes if a com-
putationally secure cryptosystem is broken. This will eventually happen
in a hard to predict future, either because of the increase of power of
computing devices, or because of a cryptanalytic breakthrough that may
happen at any time.
For instance, the voting system Helios [ADMPQ09] publishes the
encrypted votes, which may eventually be revealed if the encryption
scheme used is broken. This in part motivated the decision of the IACR
to only display aliases instead of voter names on their election bulletin
board: in case of broken encryption, the election bulletin board would
then only reveal the content of encrypted votes but not their author
(the voting server is still aware of the link between aliases and voters,
though, and these aliases circulate in cleartext emails). Such a procedure
however impairs eligibility verifiability, as it becomes infeasible for the
voters to verify whether the ballots present on the bulletin board were
submitted by legitimate voters or are the result of ballot stuffing by the
organizers [KRS10, ACKR13].
In a similar way, Scantegrity II [CCC+10] publishes a Q table con-
taining the confirmation codes that were unveiled during the voting
phase, and, as soon as there are a few dozens of voters, the content
of this table will determine uniquely the value of the seed used to build
the original P table. This in turn reveals the votes corresponding to all
the voter’s receipts. This may be enough to defeat the purpose of the
introduction of privacy in voting systems, since voters may be coerced
just by fear of a future loss of privacy.
4.1.1 Our contributions
We address this problem using the commitment consistent encryption
(CCE) introduced in Chapter 3, that can be plugged in voting schemes
as a replacement for traditional encryption. The use of this primitive
makes it possible to obtain verifiable elections with a perfectly private
audit trail (PPAT), that is, an audit trail that preserves the privacy of the
votes even when facing a computationally unbounded adversary. As a
result, adding a PPAT on top of a traditional voting scheme provides the
benefits of universally verifiable voting technologies without interfering
with the privacy properties of the original system.
As an important example of application, we investigate the use of
CCE for building single-pass [BCP+11] voting schemes with PPAT. Those
voting schemes support a voting process that executes asynchronously
and in a single step, which makes them well-suited for large scale elec-
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tions: voters just produce their ballot and send it to the authorities. The
reception of the ballots and the tally are then orchestrated by a set of
authorities, who are also in charge of publishing the election audit trail.
The correctness of this audit trail ensures the correctness of the election
outcome even if all the authorities are corrupted. Still, the privacy of
the votes relies on the number of corrupted authorities to be lower than
a certain threshold.
With this application in mind, we design two efficient CCE encryption
schemes. The first of our schemes is additively homomorphic and is
particularly suitable for elections based on homomorphic tallying. It is
however limited to elections that have a small election outcome space
(e.g., elections in which the outcome is simply the sum of votes received
by the candidates). Our second scheme is suitable for elections with
mixnet-based tallying, in which all ballots are decrypted after shuﬄing,
which allows supporting arbitrary ballot formats. We eventually propose
a third scheme that is flexible enough to be used in both contexts but
is complicated and much less efficient to use.
Our first two schemes admit simple distributed and threshold key
generation procedures: all the computations happen in prime order
groups and the standard threshold key generation techniques available
in such groups apply [GJKR07]. This is particularly important, espe-
cially in terms of round complexity, as the trustees of an election will
often not be able to set up specific software for running key generation:
for instance, the Helios voting system used by IACR relies on n-out-of-
n distributed key generation just to keep the key generation ceremony
simple (traditional threshold key generation would require more than
one single round).
These two CCE schemes are also very efficient, making them usable
in JavaScript applications like Helios for instance: based on the perfor-
mance on the JSBN cryptographic library, the preparation of any vote
that can be encoded on 256 bits requires less than a second. Our pro-
totype implementation realized in Python allowed us to perform timing
measurements confirming the efficiency of our schemes.
Based on these schemes, we obtain the first universally verifiable vot-
ing protocols with PPAT and optimal efficiency (in the sense of [CGS97]):
• the ballot size and the voter computational load do not depend on
the number of voters nor on the number of authorities and
• the workload of the tallying authorities grows linearly with the
number of voters and candidates.
Furthermore, our schemes do not rely on expensive cut-and-choose tech-
niques: the number of exponentiations to be performed is independent
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of the security parameter.
4.1.2 Related works
Very few voting protocols offer a perfectly private audit trail, and they all
require either an amount of work by the voters that grows linearly with
the number of trustees, or the use of specific communication channels,
or are inefficient.
A first class of voting schemes that can offer a PPAT is based on blind
signatures [FOO93]. Here, ballots are blindly signed by an authority,
then unblinded by the voters who eventually publish their authority
signed ballot through an anonymous channel. The vote privacy issue is
here taken care of by the anonymous channel and the audit trail only
contains anonymous information. Setting up a perfectly anonymous
channel can however be very challenging in a large scale election.
A second approach was proposed by Cramer, Franklin, Schoenmak-
ers and Yung [CFSY96]. Here, a verifiable secret sharing scheme is used
by the voters to distribute the information needed to tally their vote.
The shares are then distributed to the authorities either through private
channels or protected by encryption. The computational load of the vot-
ers then grows linearly with the number of authorities. This motivated
the consecutive proposal by Cramer, Gennaro and Schoenmakers of a
scheme that offers a computationally private audit trail but a work load
for the voters that is independent of the number of authorities [CGS97].
In the same spirit as the work of Cramer et al. [CFSY96], Moran
and Naor proposed a voting scheme with everlasting privacy [MN10].
Here again, the privacy of the votes is protected through secret sharing
and the complexity of the ballot preparation task grows linearly with
the number of authorities.
As far as we know, our solutions are the first to offer a PPAT while
being based on the third approach of e-voting, that is, the tallying of
threshold encrypted ballots [Ben87, CF85, CGS97, HS00]. In a contem-
porary work, Demirel, van de Graaf and Arau´jo [DvdGA12, DvdG12]
explore a similar problem and propose a solution based on the combina-
tion of Pedersen’s commitments and Paillier’s encryption proposed by
Moran and Naor [MN10]. As acknowledged by these authors, this solu-
tion is not practical: it relies on cut-and-choose zero-knowledge proofs
(ZKPK), which makes it slower than ours by approximately 4 orders
of magnitude for comparable security levels and requires the execution
of sophisticated SMC protocols for distributed key generation by the
trustees.
In terms of modelling, symbolic techniques have also been recently
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proposed to model everlasting privacy [ACKR13].
Two flavours of verifiability. Just like privacy comes in computa-
tional and information theoretic flavours, election verifiability can be
computational or information theoretic. Again, just as in the case of
ballot privacy, the verifiability property is computational in most of the
currently known efficient voting schemes. A common place where this
computational aspects appear is in the zero-knowledge proofs that are
used in these schemes, which are usually only computationally sound
(typically relying on the Fiat-Shamir heuristic). If computational as-
sumptions are broken, this could allow voters to fake a vote validity
proof, or trustees to fake a decryption proof. The lack of soundness of
these proofs might become apparent in an unpredictable future, when
people will be able to break the encryption scheme used. This is however
expected to happen way too late to provide an effective way of correcting
the election outcome.
We point out important practical differences between the effects of
computational privacy and computational verifiability.
1. While breaking the privacy of the votes can be harmful at any
time, an adversary who would like to fake the outcome and the
audit trail of an election needs to break the system during the
election (that is, provide audit information that would pass all
verification procedures even though the properties that the veri-
fication is supposed to guarantee are violated), since this is the
time when the audit trail must be published. Breaking a scheme
in real time seems much more demanding than breaking it in some
future.
2. Universal verifiability is a correctness property that people adopt
by comparing verifiable systems with the non-verifiable systems
that they used in the past. We believe that this adoption can be
simplified if it does not impact the other properties of the system
and, in particular, if the audit trail that is produced does not de-
crease the privacy properties of the previously used systems. (Sim-
ilar considerations motivated the design of Scantegrity: its practi-
cal adoption is expected to have been facilitated by the absence of
the need to decrease the usability of the paper ballots [CCC+10].)
We believe that those reasons support the development of voting schemes
with PPAT.
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Coercion resistance. The historical motivation for introducing se-
cret ballots was the prevention of bribery or coercion. The schemes we
propose address the concern of a voter who fears that the audit data
of an election could reveal his vote. This concern is certainly the most
ubiquitous and hard to prevent through law enforcement or by voter
education: it does not require any visible step by a coercer who just
needs to look at available data. We do not focus on specific coercion
resistance procedures in our simple application examples, as coercion
prevention is a much broader problem than what can be addressed at a
protocol level, especially when vote-by-mail is authorized or when noth-
ing prevents bringing camera phones in a voting booth. Our schemes
are however compatible with most existing approaches, e.g., revoting as
first used in Estonia or coercion detection [GRBR13].
Organisation of the Chapter. The rest of this Chapter is organized
as follows. Section 4.2 states the computational assumptions we use. In
Section 4.3 discusses security properties that these encryption schemes
need to satisfy for use in voting applications. Then, Section 3.3 describes
a generic construction of CC and CCVA encryption schemes. Section 4.4
defines two efficient CCVA encryption schemes and explains how they can
be plugged in classical voting schemes. We finally analyze the efficiency
of our solutions in Section 4.6.
4.2 Computational setting
We rely on the DCR problem (Assumption 2.1) for the security of our
Paillier based scheme in Section 3.3. The security of our two efficient
schemes described in Section 4.4 relies on the hardness of the DDH prob-
lem (Assumption 2.4) as well as the SXDH problem (Assumption 2.5) for
the pairing-based constructions. In this setting, we assume the existence
of a bilinear group generator that, on input 1λ, produces a description
of bilinear groups PairSXDH = (q,G1, G2, G3, e, g1, g2) where G1, G2
and G3 are groups of order q, a λ-bit prime, e is an efficient and non-
degenerating bilinear map e : G1×G2 → G3 and g1, g2 are generators of
G1 and G2 respectively. We expect that these groups are chosen in such
a way that there is no known efficient mapping between G1 and G2 in
either direction. Common concrete choices include the use of BLS and
BN curves [BLS03, BN06].
Note that all our schemes could be easily adapted to the symmetric
pairing settings, typically by relying on the hardness of the DLIN problem
instead of DDH [BBS04]. The choice we made provides more efficient
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protocols and makes it also possible to compute in smaller fields for
equivalent security levels.
4.3 Voting scheme with perfectly private audit
trail
In the spirit of [BCP+11], we now propose a “minivoting” scheme, that
we use to describe how a validity augmented CCE scheme (Definition
3.2) can be used to submit ballots in an election. We then describe
the security guarantees that CCVAE schemes need to provide for their
application in voting with PPAT.
The minivoting scheme we consider follows a classic workflow. First,
a setup phase takes place, during which two clean bulletin boards PB
and SB are created and elections keys are generated and appropriately
published. The board PB contains the public audit trail, while SB is
kept secret by the authorities and used to compute the tally. Voters then
produce their ballots by encrypting their votes and send these ballots to
the election authorities. The ballots are processed by these authorities,
and the bulletin boards are updated accordingly. At the end of the
voting phase, a tallying protocol is executed and the election outcome
is published.
Definition 4.1 (Minivoting scheme). Let Π be a CCVAE scheme, and
let ρ be a result function that takes a set of valid votes and produces
the corresponding election outcome. From these, we build a minivoting
scheme Enc2Vote(Π, ρ) as follows:
Setup(1n): run the key generation algorithm Gen of Π on the same in-
put to obtain a triple (pp, pk, sk). Initialize a public and a secret
bulletin board, PB and SB, to ⊥.
Vote(pk, v): encrypt a vote v with pk using Π to obtain a ballot b. This
is executed by voters to prepare their ballot.
ProcessBallot(pk, b,PB,SB): reject b if it is already present in SB. Oth-
erwise, run Valid(pk, b) and reject b if it fails. If all these steps
succeed, append b on SB and DerivCom(pk, b) on PB. This is
executed by the authorities every time a ballot is received.
Tally(sk,PB,SB): decrypt all ballots on SB to obtain a vector of votes
v, and publish ρ(v) on PB. This is executed by the authorities.
A minivoting scheme does not require any proof of the validity of
the ballots (for example that they would encrypt 0 or 1 in an approval
76 Chapter 4. Cryptographic Vote with Perfectly Private Audit Trail
voting system), nor publish any specific information regarding a proof of
correctness of the tally, which will be needed for universal verifiability.
For modularity, we address these concerns separately: the structure of
these proofs of correctness will indeed depend on the result function ρ.
We now focus on the privacy of the votes that is offered in such a
minivoting scheme, which we capture through the vote privacy experi-
ment 4.1 VotePrivBB(λ), strongly inspired from the ballot privacy game
of Bernhard et al. [BCP+11] but with perfect instead of computational
security. This experiment is then used to define the notions of perfectly
private audit trail (PPAT) and ballot privacy.
Experiment 4.1 (The Vote Privacy experiment VotePrivBB(λ)).
1. The challenger randomly picks a bit β
rand←− {0, 1}. He also runs
the Setup algorithm of the voting scheme on input 1λ and obtains
the triple (pp, pk, sk) and empty bulletin boards PBβ and SBβ. He
then sends pp, pk to A and creates two other empty bulletin boards
PB1−β and SB1−β. A is allowed to see the board BBβ, where BB
is a parameter of the experiment.
2. A may address two types of queries to the challenger:
Vote(v0, v1): the challenger executes Vote(pk, vi), obtaining a bal-
lot bi, and then runs ProcessBallot(pk, bi,PBi,SBi), for i ∈
{0, 1}.
Ballot(b): the challenger executes ProcessBallot(pk, b,PBβ,SBβ).
If it succeeds, the challenger runs ProcessBallot(pk, b,PB1−β,
SB1−β).
3. The challenger computes the tally t0 := Tally(sk,SB0) and appends
t0 on PBβ and SBβ.
4. A outputs a bit β′. If β = β′ then the output of the experiment is
1 and we say that A wins.
This experiment is the basis of our notion of perfectly private au-
dit trail, as well as our notion of ballot privacy that matches the one
of Bernhard [BCP+11]. The meaning of “perfectly” is the one of the
security in the information theoretic sense.
Definition 4.2 (Perfectly Private Audit Trail (PPAT)). A minivoting
scheme Enc2Vote(Π, ρ) has a perfectly private audit trail (PPAT) if,
for every adversary A, Pr[VotePrivPB(λ) = 1] = 12 .
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Since this definition does not place any bound on the computational
power of the adversary, the everlasting privacy of the votes is guaran-
teed against people who only see (and record) the PB board. In some
contexts (e.g., when using groups of unknown order), it is useful to re-
lax the above definition by accepting statistical indistinguishability and
tolerating a negligible advantage over 12 .
Independently of this, the private bulletin board, only seen by the
authorities, should provide computational ballot privacy.
Definition 4.3 (Ballot Privacy [BCP+11]). We say that a minivoting
scheme Enc2Vote(Π, ρ) has ballot privacy if, for every PPT adversary
A, there exists a negligible function η such that,
Pr[VotePrivSB(λ) = 1] =
1
2
+ η(λ).
Security. The following two theorems define security properties of a
CCVAE scheme that guarantees the PPAT and ballot privacy of the cor-
responding minivoting scheme. This will be most useful for the con-
structions that we describe next.
Theorem 4.1. Let Π be a CCVAE scheme, and let ρ be a result function.
If the output of DerivCom is perfectly hiding, then the minivoting scheme
Enc2Vote(Π, ρ) has a perfectly private audit trail.
Proof. The view of the adversary is the VotePrivPB(λ) experiment and
this view is independent of β: PB only contains perfectly hiding com-
mitments and then a tally that is always computed from SB0, which is
independent of β.
Theorem 4.2 ([BPW12]). Let Π be an NM-CPA CCVAE scheme, and
let ρ be a result function. Then the minivoting scheme Enc2Vote(Π, ρ)
has ballot privacy.
Proof. The proof of this theorem is very similar to the one that appears
in [BPW12]. It is based on the characterization of NM-CPA security
by Bellare and Sahai [BS99], which is the IND-CPA game in which the
adversary is also allowed to make one single parallel decryption query
after his test query.
Suppose that a PPT adversary A is able to break the ballot privacy
property for Enc2Vote(Π, ρ). We then build an adversary B who can
break the NM-CPA security of Π as follows. Let us consider a (polyno-
mial) upper-bound l on the number of Vote and Ballot queries that A
does, and the distributions H0, . . . ,Hl, where Hi is produced as follows:
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1. The key generation algorithm of Π is executed, and the public part
of the resulting key is submitted to A. Empty boards SB, SB0
and SB1 are initialized as well, but only SB is part of the view of
A. (The public board can be derived from the private one.)
2. A then performs Vote and Ballot queries sequentially which we
number from 1 to (at most) l. On the j-th query:
• If it is a Ballot(b) query and b does not appear on SB, then
it is appended on SB, SB0 and SB1. Else it is rejected.
• If it is a Vote(v0, v1) query, then v0 and v1 are encrypted and
posted on SB0 and SB1 respectively. Furthermore, if j ≤ i
then the encryption of v0 is posted on SB, else the encryption
of v1 is posted there.
3. When A performs a Tally query, all ballots on SB0 and SB1 are
decrypted, and the corresponding votes are tallied. If the results
are identical, then they are appended on SB, else ⊥ is posted
there.
It is easy to observe that H0 and Hl produce the view of A when β = 0
and β = 1 respectively. Now, since A can distinguish H0 from Hl with
non negligible probability , it must also be able to distinguish Hi from
Hi+1 with non negligible probability at least /l, for at least one value
of i. We use this to build an adversary B against the NM-CPA security
of Π as follows.
1. B receives a public key from Π and forwards it to A.
2. B then interacts with A on the Vote and Ballot queries, in the
natural way, producing a view identical to the one A would see in
both Hi and Hi+1.
3. If the i+1-th query is a Vote(v0, v1) query, then B forwards the two
votes v0 and v1 as challenge messages in the NM-CPA experiment.
4. B interacts with A in the natural way for the further Ballot and
Vote queries.
5. When receiving a Tally query, B submits all unique ballots that
were sent as Ballot queries to the NM-CPA decryption oracle and
recovers the corresponding plaintexts. Note that since duplicate
ballots are rejected, this will be a valid query with overwhelming
probability.
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6. B then uses those decrypted ballots and the content of the Vote
queries to compute the tallies corresponding to SB0 and SB1, and
answers A accordingly.
7. B outputs the bit it receives from A.
We can observe that the view of A in these interactions is the one of
Hi and Hi+1 depending on whether v0 or v1 is encrypted as part of
the NM-CPA challenge query. So, the success probability of A in dis-
tinguishing Hi from Hi+1 is equal to the one that B wins the NM-CPA
game.
Minivoting based on the generic construction of CCE
The generic construction ΠG of Section 3.3.1 is a good candidate for
these theorems. Indeed, if the commitment scheme in ΠG is perfectly-
hiding, then all the conditions of Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 4.2 hold:
the resulting minivoting scheme enjoys the PPAT as well as the ballot-
privacy.
Adding extra proofs. The minivoting scheme resulting from ΠG al-
lows any voter to check whether her/his vote is posted on the public
bulletin board. Depending on the election specifics, extra proofs can
be added in order to prove the validity of the votes, or to prove that
the tally is consistent with the posted commitments. These proofs will
not influence the PPAT property as long as they are perfect (or at least
statistical) zero-knowledge.
Paillier-Pedersen instance. We may now build a voting scheme
based on the PPATP scheme presented in Section 3.3.2 and instanti-
ating ΠG. For simplicity, we present this voting scheme in terms of a
single authority. The extension to distributed or threshold mechanisms
is immediate and follows from standard techniques in the case of active
malicious authorities in our Paillier-based scheme [DJ01]. We assume
some unique and efficiently verifiable encoding for the elements of our
various groups. This is needed in order to avoid some trivial malleability
relations.
By construction this scheme satisfies all the conditions of validity
and security of Theorem 3.2 (in the random oracle model, assuming the
hardness of the DCR problem). As a result, for any tallying function ρ,
the corresponding minivoting scheme Enc2Vote(PPATP, ρ) has a PPAT
and guarantees ballot privacy.
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Unfortunately, this instantiation based on Paillier is not satisfactory
for the reasons raised in Section 3.3.2. First, the threshold key genera-
tion algorithm is tedious and challenging as the key is the factorization of
an RSA modulus. Second, the computational cost of this scheme can be
fairly expensive, especially if we desire to use an homomorphic tallying
approach that will usually require us to compute a number of modu-
lar exponentiations that will be 5 to 10 times higher than the number
of candidates [CGS97]. These two reasons motivate the efficient con-
structions presented in the next sections and offering the same level of
security while relying on smaller groups.
4.4 Efficient commitment consistent encryption
schemes with validity augmentation
This section describes two much more efficient and usable constructions
of CCVAE schemes. These schemes do not follow the generic approach
presented in the previous section but combine encryptions and commit-
ments in a more efficient way. They also make it possible to perform the
whole computation in prime order groups.
The first scheme, PPATS introduced in Section 3.4, allows using tra-
ditional ballot validity proof techniques and completing the tally through
the homomorphic addition of encrypted votes. The decryption process
however involves a stage of exhaustive search of the plaintext (just as the
exponential ElGamal scheme used in many applications). This restricts
the use of this scheme to elections where this kind of exhaustive search
can be done, e.g., when the outcome is simply a count of the number
of votes that each candidate received. The second scheme, PPATC, is
tailored for mixnet based tallying procedures: the ciphertexts are not
additively homomorphic but the decryption procedure is efficient regard-
less of the message. In both tally procedures we explicitly show how the
process does not affect the PPAT as well as the ballot privacy of voting
schemes provided by our CCVAE schemes.
Again we present our voting schemes in terms of a single authority.
The extension to distributed or threshold mechanisms is immediate and
follows from standard techniques in the case of active malicious author-
ities in prime order group based schemes [GJKR07].
4.4.1 Elections with simple ballots
In the daily life, there are situations where voting schemes are only
concerned with small domain result functions e.g., with a yes-or-no
vote. Since the result of the election lies in a very small range, it is
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efficient enough for the talliers to make an exhaustive search to find this
result.
We consider here the most simple election case where the voters
have to approve or reject a proposal by encrypting either a 0 value or a
1 value. This case can be generalized to many others (general approval
voting, . . . ) using standard techniques, e.g., [CGS97, HS00].
As part of the tallying procedure the talliers will be required to
perform an exhaustive search to find M =
∑
i≤Lmi where the mi’s are
the L voter’s choices. This is not a real issue as long as M is bounded
by L.
The PPATS scheme makes use of two compatible homomorphic ingre-
dients: exponential ElGamal encryption and the TC2 perfectly hiding
commitment scheme proposed by Abe et al. [AHO10], which is binding
in the PairSXDH setting (see Section 4.2). The resulting CCE scheme
is compatible with Σ-protocols, and the definition of a validity aug-
mentation is then simple. In Protocol 4.1, we denote the NIZKPK for
commitment consistency by picc.
Unlike what is done in Section 3.4, we prefer to use here the multi-
plicative notations for the groups G1 and G2. This allows more compact
expressions but does not affect the scheme.
Protocol 4.1 (The PPATS CCVAE scheme).
GenVAS (1
λ): Generate setting PairSXDH = (q,G1, G2, G3, e, g1, g2) where
|q| = λ together with the following additional public random gen-
erators h1 = g
x1
1
rand←− G1 and h2 rand←− G2. The triple (ppS, pkS, skS)
is defined as ((PairSXDH, h2), h1, x1). The augmented key pkVAS =
Expand(pkS) is obtained by adding the description of an efficient
hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → Zq, resulting in the triple (ppVAS =
ppS, pk
VA
S , sk
VA
S = skS). Consequently, we have that M = O := Zq,
CC := G2 and C := G2 ×G21 × Z3q.
EncVAS (pk
VA
S ,m): For m ∈ Zq, choose random values r, s rand←− Zq and
compute c := EncS(pkS,m) as (d, c1, c2) := (g
m
2 h
r
2, g
s
1, g
r
1h
s
1). Then,
add the following consistency proof. Compute acc := (g
m′
2 h
r′
2 , g
s′
1 ,
gr
′
1 h
s′
1 ) for random m
′, r′, s′ rand←− Zq. Compute tcc := (ecc, zcc) where
ecc = H(ppVAS , pkVAS , c, acc) and zcc := (zm, zr, zs) = (m′+ eccm, r′+
eccr, s
′ + eccs). Output the ciphertext cVA = (c, tcc).
DecVAS (sk
VA
S , c
VA): Parse cVA as (d, c1, c2, tcc) and return the discrete log-
arithm m¯ := Dloge(g1,g2)e(c
x1
1 /c2, h2)e(g1, d).
DerivComVAS (pk
VA
S , c
VA): Parse cVA as (d, c1, c2, tcc) and return d.
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OpenVAS (sk
VA
S , c
VA): Parse cVA as (d, c1, c2, tcc), then compute and output
the ElGamal decryption o¯ := c2/c
x1
1 (i.e., g
r
1, consisting of the TC2
opening value with respect to d).
VerifyVAS (pk
VA
S , d, o,m): Return 1 only if e(o, h2) = e(g1, d/g
m
2 ).
ValidS(pk
VA
S , c
VA): Parse cVA as (c, tcc) = (d, c1, c2, ecc, zcc) and parse zcc
as (zm, zr, zs). Output 1 only if ecc
?
= H(ppVAS , pkVAS , c, a′cc) where
a′cc := (g
zm
2 h
zr
2 d
−ecc , gzs1 c
−ecc
1 , g
zr
1 h
zs
1 c
−ecc
2 ).
The algorithm StripS returns c from c
VA in the obvious way. Applying
StripS to PPATS ciphertexts leads to an homomorphic CCE scheme.
Theorem 4.3. The above PPATS scheme is an NM-CPA secure CCVAE
scheme in the random oracle model within the PairSXDH setting.
Proof. We first observe that PPATS is a CCVAE scheme. Indeed, the
formal aspects of the definition are satisfied, and ValidS algorithm is
sound thanks to the soundness of the picc proof and from the binding
property of the TC2 scheme. Both these properties hold in the PairSXDH
setting.
To verify that PPATS offers NM-CPA security, we show that a PPATS
ciphertext is made of an IND-CPA element c. The NM-CPA security then
follows from the fact picc is a NIZKPK of the plaintext and randomness
used to compute c.
To show the IND-CPA security of c, we show that it is indistinguish-
able of a random tuple of (independent) group elements, using the fol-
lowing intermediary distributions. Let m be an element of Zq.
D3 is the regular distribution (gm2 hr2, gs1, gr1hs1) produced by encrypting
m using random values r, s
rand←− Zq.
D2 is the distribution (gm2 hr2, gs1, gr1hs
∗
1 ) identical to D3 except that the
third element is now computed using a fresh random s∗ rand←− Zq.
Any distinguisher between D3 and D2 can solve the DDH problem
in G1 with the same success probability.
D1 is the distribution (gm2 hr2, gs1, gs
∗
1 ), identical to D2.
D0 is the distribution (hr2, gs1, gs
∗
1 ), which is identical to D1.
We observe that the 3 elements of D0 are all random and independent.
So, the advantage of any adversary against this encryption scheme has
its success probability bounded by the probability of breaking DDH in
G1 by any adversary using the same computational effort (up to the
computation of a constant number of modular exponentiations).
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The validity augmentation part of PPATS simply adds a secure sigma
proof. The NM-CPA security of the scheme is obtained by applying
Theorem 3.2.
Proving vote validity.
Considering the minivoting scheme based on PPATS, it is easy to pro-
vide additional verifiability mechanism to ensure the validity of a vote.
Consider for instance the case of an approval election. In this case, we
need to prove that a voter submitted an encryption of m = 0 or m = 1.
This can be done requiring each voter to append to the encryption of
her choice a non-interactive 0-1 or-proof pior on the public commitment
part [CDS94]. More precisely, when computing cVA = (c, tcc) where
c = (d, c1, c2) the voter conducts the following extra steps: she com-
putes a := (a0, a1) where am := h
r′
2 , a1−m := h
z1−m
2 (d/g
1−m
2 )
−e1−m for
random r′, e1−m, z1−m
rand←− Zq, then defines tor := (e0, e1, z0, z1) with
em := H(ppVAS , pkVAS , d, a)− e1−m and with zm := r′ + emr.
Given the commitment d and the proof tor = (e0, e1, z0, z1), anybody
can verify that d can only be opened to a vote for 0 or 1: compute
a′ = (a′0, a′1) as a′i = h
zi
2 (d/g
i
2)
−ei , for i = 0, 1, and check whether e0+e1
?
=
H(ppVAS , pkVAS , d, a′). Furthermore, since the pior proof is perfect zero
knowledge, it can indeed safely appear on the public bulletin board PB
without affecting the privacy goals in any way.
Note that this pior proof can be easily adapted for the PPATP scheme
encrypting only 0/1 votes. To avoid redundancy, we do not detail this
proof, but we analyse in Section 3.5 the PPATP scheme for 0/1 mes-
sages and the corresponding pior proof as a point of comparison with the
PPATo scheme.
Elections with homomorphic tallying from PPATS.
We can now use this scheme to build a voting scheme PPATSVote based
on Enc2Vote(PPATS, ρS) but from which we modify the Tally algorithm
as follows.
1. Stripping: Once the polls are closed, the authorities run ValidS
and StripS on the CCVAE ciphertexts stored on SB, obtaining CCE
homomorphic ciphertexts.
2. Aggregation: The authorities multiply those ciphertexts, obtain-
ing one resulting CCE ciphertext ctot.
3. Decryption: The authorities compute v = DecS(skS, ctot) the re-
sult of the election. To prove the correctness of the decryption,
84 Chapter 4. Cryptographic Vote with Perfectly Private Audit Trail
they also run OpenS on ctot, obtaining an opening value otot. Fi-
nally the authorities append (v, otot) to PB.
Theorem 4.4. The PPATSVote scheme offers a PPAT and ballot privacy
in the PairSXDH setting in the random oracle model.
Proof. The PPATSVote scheme is equivalent to the Enc2Vote(PPATS, ρS)
scheme except that it also discloses the opening value otot on PB. This
value is fully determined by the commitment on the outcome and by
the outcome itself, which implies that it does not provide any extra in-
formation to an unbounded adversary, and the PPAT property offered
by Enc2Vote(PPATS, ρS) is then preserved. The trustees having access
to SB also see the decryption factors produced by Dec. They are how-
ever indistinguishable from random group elements under DDH, as for
standard ElGamal decryption, and therefore do not help breaking ballot
privacy.
Audit procedure. The audit procedure is performed through the fol-
lowing steps:
1. Run all the verification procedures on the commitments displayed
on PB. If the verification procedure fails for any commitment,
abort.
2. Multiply all the commitments, obtaining a commitment dtot on
the election outcome vtot.
3. Verify that the announced outcome vtot and the opening value otot
passes the VerifyVAS (pk
VA
S , dtot, otot, vtot) algorithm. Abort if it is
not the case.
The first step guarantees the validity of the votes posted, while the
second and last ones guarantee that the tally matches the posted votes.
The binding property of the commitment scheme guarantees that the
only opening that the authorities will ever be able to provide comes
from a honest tallying process.
We emphasize that this last verification is very efficient: it only re-
quires the verification of an opening of one constant-size commitment—
no ZKPK is needed here, contrary to traditional approaches.
As far as eligibility may be concerned, the bulletin board can also
associate a name with each commitment recorded on PB without affect-
ing the PPAT. This offers any observers the possibility to verify that the
posted votes have been submitted by valid voters (e.g., by interrogating
those voters in case of doubt).
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Verifiability/Accountability. Verifiability allows us to check that
the votes have been properly recorded and tallied. In order to decide
what action must be taken if a verification fails, it may be useful to have
a stronger property: accountability. This property was highlighted by
Ku¨sters et al. [KTV10] and applied to the Bingo voting scheme and then
to several variants of the Helios voting system [KTV12].
While plugging the PPATS scheme into Helios would not have any
noticeable impact on the verifiability analysis of Helios proposed by Kre-
mer et al. [KRS10], the distinction between the private and public board
and between perfect and computational privacy has more impact on the
accountability analyses of Ku¨sters et al. [KTV12]. In particular, while
the ballot validity test is fully public in Helios, replacing ElGamal en-
cryption with the PPATS scheme adds a step during which authorities
could decide to reject a ciphertext because the picc proof would be in-
valid, which could not be verified from the content of PB since neither
picc nor the corresponding statement appear on that board. As a result,
it will not be possible to determine whether the authorities or the voter
are cheating without disclosing to a judge information that only offer
conditional privacy. Different strategies for improving the accountabil-
ity in the case of Helios have been explored in [ADMPQ09, KTV12]. A
rigorous cryptographic analysis of verifiability/accountability of a fully-
fledged voting system is an open problem (note that all current works
on Helios [KRS10, KTV12] abstracted the cryptographic aspects and,
as a result, overlooked the recently found attacks on the verifiability of
Helios [BPW12]), and is out of our scope.
Variations on PPATS. In the PairSXDH setting, the group operations
in G2 are typically much more expensive than those in G1. As a result,
it might be more efficient to use a slightly modified version of PPATS for
more complex ballot validity proofs (e.g., the vote is an integer in a larger
range). Indeed the ciphertext could be extended with an extra element
c3 = g
m
1 f
s
1 in G1 (for a third generator f1 of G1) which, together with c1
would consist of an ElGamal (re-)encryption of m. The validity proofs
could then be on c3, and the decryption algorithm could become faster
as well. However, a proof that (d, c3) is well-formed would also have to
be published, which makes that construction more expensive than the
PPATS scheme that we consider since the computations of elements in
G2 for the simple 0/1 validity proof have a lower cost.
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4.4.2 Elections with complex ballots
The PPATS scheme is appropriate for elections with simple ballots. In
some elections, it is however useful to be able to encode complex votes
in a single ciphertext. This happens for instance in elections with a very
large number of candidates or with complex tallying rules that make the
homomorphic aggregation approach impractical, or in elections where
arbitrary write-ins need to be supported. For those elections with com-
plex ballots, a tallying approach based on verifiable mixnets is usually
adopted. This motivates our definition of the PPATC scheme below.
This scheme has an efficiency comparable to the previous one but offers
efficient decryption procedures for arbitrary plaintext. The correspond-
ing CCE scheme is however not additively homomorphic anymore, but
this is not a problem in a mixnet setting since ballots are individu-
ally decrypted. ElGamal encryption is a core ingredient of this scheme,
together with the PairSXDH-secure and perfectly hiding commitment
scheme of Abe et al [AHO12].
Protocol 4.2 (The PPATC CCVAE scheme).
GenVAC (1
λ): Generate PairSXDH = (q,G1, G2, G3, e, g1, g2) for |q| = λ to-
gether with the following additional public random generators h1 :=
gx11 , f1 := g
x2
1 in G1 and h2
rand←− G2. The triple (ppC, pkC, skC)
is defined as ((PairSXDH, h2), (h1, f1), (x1, x2)). The augmented
key pkVAC := Expand(pkC) is computed by adding to pkC the de-
scription of an efficient hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → Zq, result-
ing in the triple (ppVAC = ppC, pk
VA
C , sk
VA
C = skC). We have that
M = O := G1, CC := G1 ×G2 and C := G41 ×G2 × Z4q.
EncVAC (pk
VA
C ,m): For m ∈ G1, choose random values r, s, t rand←− Zq and
compute the ciphertext c := EncC(pkC,m) as (c1, c2, c3, d1, d2) :=
(gr1, g
s
1, h
t
1f
s
1 ,mh
r
1, g
t
2h
r
2) . Add the following consistency proof picc.
Select random values r′, s′, t′ rand←− Zq and m′ rand←− G1 and compute
a := (gr
′
1 , g
s′
1 , h
t′
1 f
s′
1 ,m
′hr′1 gt
′
2 h
r′
2 ) and ecc := H(ppVAC , pkVAC , c, a).
Then, compute z := (zm, zr, zs, zt) where zm := m
′mecc, zr :=
r′ + eccr, zs := s′ + eccs, zt := t′ + ecct. Set tcc := (ecc, z). The
ciphertext cVA is made of (c, tcc).
DecVAC (sk
VA
C , c
VA): Parse cVA as (c1, c2, c3, d1, d2, tcc) and return m¯ :=
d1/c
x1
1 .
DerivComVAC (pk
VA
C , c
VA): Parse cVA as (c1, c2, c3, d1, d2, tcc) and return d
as (d1, d2).
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OpenVAC (sk
VA
C , c
VA): Parse cVA as (c1, c2, c3, d1, d2, tcc), and return o¯ :=
c3/c
x2
2 .
VerifyVAC (pk
VA
C , d, o,m): Parse d as (d1, d2) and return 1 if e(h1, d2)
?
=
e(o, g2)e(d1/m, h2) and 0 otherwise.
ValidC(pk
VA
C , c
VA): Parse cVA as (c1, c2, c3, d1, d2, ecc, zm, zr, zs, zt) and test
whether all elements of the ciphertext are properly encoded. Return
1 only if ecc
?
= H(ppVAC , pkVAC , c, a′) where
a′ := (gzr1 c
−ecc
1 , g
zs
1 c
−ecc
2 , h
zt
1 f
zs
1 c
−ecc
3 , zmh
zr
1 d
−ecc
1 , g
zt
2 h
zr
2 d
−ecc
2 ).
The algorithm StripC returns c from c
VA in the obvious way.
Applying StripC to a PPATC ciphertext leads to a CCE ciphertext
that is homomorphic with respect to the curve group law in G1, which
is sufficient to obtain the randomization properties needed for mixing.
The use of the PPATC scheme also requires the existence of an efficient
mapping between the votes and G1. This can be achieved easily in most
cases. For instance, most pairing friendly curves of the form y2 = x3 + b
on Fq have q chosen in such a way that any message y in Zq can be
mapped on a point ((y2 − b) 13 , y) [BN06].
As far as efficiency is concerned, note that a voter will never have to
compute elements in G3 and especially pairings when creating a ballot.
Theorem 4.5. The PPATC scheme described above is an NM-CPA se-
cure CCVAE scheme in the random oracle model in the PairSXDH setting.
Proof. This proof follows the scheme of the proof of Theorem 4.3. We
first observe that PPATC is a CCVAE scheme. Indeed, the formal aspects
of the definition are satisfied, and ValidC algorithm is sound thanks to the
soundness of the picc proof and from the binding property of the scheme of
Abe et al.[AHO12]. Both these properties hold in the PairSXDH setting.
To verify that PPATC offers NM-CPA security, we show that a PPATC
ciphertext is made of an IND-CPA element c. The NM-CPA security
then follows from the fact that picc is a NIZKPK of the plaintext and
randomness used to compute c.
To show the IND-CPA security of c, we show that c is indistinguish-
able from a random tuple of (independent) group elements, using the
following intermediary distributions. Let m be an element of G1.
D5 is the regular distribution (gr1, gs1, ht1fs1 ,mhr1, gt2hr2) produced by en-
crypting m using random values r, s, t.
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D4 is the distribution (gr1, gs1, ht1f s
∗
1 ,mh
r
1, g
t
2h
r
2) identical to D5 except
that the third element is now computed using a fresh random s∗.
Any distinguisher between D5 and D4 can solve the DDH problem
in G1 with the same success probability.
D3 is the distribution (gr1, gs1, fs
∗
1 ,mh
r
1, g
t
2h
r
2), which is identical to D4.
D2 is the distribution (gr1, gs1, fs
∗
1 ,mh
r
1, g
t
2), which is identical to D3.
D1 is the distribution (gr1, gs1, fs
∗
1 ,mh
r∗
1 , g
t
2), obtained by replacing r with
a random fresh value r∗ in the fourth element. Again, any distin-
guisher between D2 and D1 can solve the DDH problem in G1 with
the same success probability.
D0 is the distribution (gr1, gs1, fs
∗
1 , h
r∗
1 , g
t
2), which is identical to D1.
We observe that the five elements of D0 are all random and indepen-
dent. So, the advantage of any adversary against this encryption scheme
has its success probability bounded by twice the probability of breaking
DDH in G1 by any adversary using the same computational effort (up
to the computation of a constant number of modular exponentiations).
Finally, observe that the NIZKPK picc added to obtain the PPATC
scheme is perfectly zero knowledge and thus does not break the privacy
property. We conclude by applying Theorem 3.2.
A verifiable shuﬄe for voting systems with PPAT
Now we would like to shuﬄe the PPATC ciphertexts and publish openings
of the corresponding anonymized commitments. Since our scheme is
randomizable, this does not raise any specific concern.
We also need to make the shuﬄe verifiable, that is, to provide a proof
of shuﬄe, which needs to preserve the information theoretic privacy of
PB. Various perfect (or statistical) ZK proofs of shuﬄes can be used for
that purpose [Gro10, JJR02, TW10]: these guarantee that a simulator
can produce a proof of shuﬄe just from the inputs and outputs of that
shuﬄe that is indistinguishable from a real proof, even by an unbounded
adversary.
In our context, we need to shuﬄe both the CCE ciphertexts and the
extracted commitments in a verifiable way, with a single permutation,
to keep track of their concordance. The commitment consistent shuﬄe
approach proposed by Terelius and Wikstro¨m [Wik09, TW10] seems
particularly natural for that purpose. This approach splits the proof
of shuﬄe into two stages. First a perfectly hiding commitment on the
permutation matrix used in the shuﬄe is computed and made public.
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This is the most computationally intensive part of the protocol and,
interestingly, it is independent of the actual values that we need to shuﬄe
and of the randomization factors that will be applied on the ciphertexts.
Then, a much cheaper proof is produced that shows that the shuﬄe
performed on the ciphertexts is consistent with the commitment on that
permutation matrix. In our case, that proof can be computed both for
the PPATC ciphertexts on SB and for the corresponding commitments
on PB.
We sketch the resulting tallying protocol below.
1. Stripping: The authorities run ValidC and StripC on the cipher-
texts stored on SB, obtaining a vector c of L ciphertexts and a
vector d of commitments.
2. Permutation commitment: The authorities select a random
permutation σ and compute a commitment u on that permutation,
together with a validity proof piσ.
3. Shuﬄe: The authorities select random vectors r, s, t
rand←− Zlq and
compute a vector of ciphertexts c′ where c′i := cσ−1(i)ai (with
component-wise operations) where ai := EncC(pkC, 1G1) using re-
spectively rσ−1(i), sσ−1(i), tσ−1(i) as random values. The last two
components of c′ are posted on PB and denoted d′.
4. Proof of shuﬄe: The authorities compute two commitment con-
sistent proofs of shuﬄe with respect to the committed permutation
σ: piσ(c) that shows that c
′ is indeed a shuﬄe of c and piσ(d) shows
that d′ is a shuﬄe on d. Then, piσ(c) is posted on SB while piσ(d)
is posted on PB.
5. Decryption of openings: The authorities verify the proofs, then
decrypt all the ciphertexts in c′ and run OpenC on these cipher-
texts in order to obtain the opening values for the corresponding
commitments. The plaintexts and opening values are published on
PB.
Of course, the three middle stages of this procedure, corresponding
to the verifiable shuﬄing, should be repeated by several independent
authorities.
The tally audit procedure for an observer consists in the following
stages.
• Public observers verify the proof of permutation commitment piσ
and abort if it fails.
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• Public observers verify the proof of shuﬄe piσ(d) and abort if it
fails.
• Public observers verify that the authorities published valid open-
ings for the shuﬄed commitments d′ and abort otherwise.
The fact that this whole procedure preserves the PPAT follows from
the fact that all the commitments are perfectly hiding and that all the
proofs can be made perfect zero-knowledge.
4.5 Implementation and efficiency measures
A prototype implementation of the different PPAT CCVAE schemes was
performed in Python. It includes the different commitment consistent
encryption schemes as well as the consistency proofs and other extra
proofs that are needed for the verifiability. The libraries and the code
developed are made available online at [Cuv15]. The details of this im-
plementation, the choice of the parameters as well as the computational
workload are provided in Section 3.5.
In Table 3.1 (page 60) we gathered the costs of each operations where
the U cost represents the multiplication between two 256-bit integers. Ta-
ble 3.2 (page 61) details the cost of each algorithm of the PPAT schemes
at comparable security levels which is equivalent to 2048-bit RSA mod-
ulus N . As already mentioned in Section 3.5, computing a PPATP ci-
phertext is roughly 227 times more expensive than computing a PPATC
ciphertext. This simple observation puts the PPATS and PPATC far
ahead in terms of efficiency.
The cost of the PPATS and PPATC schemes is low enough to make it
possible to use these schemes even on fairly slow platforms. For instance,
considering the computation of a ciphertext in JavaScript in a browser
using the JSBN library, which allows computing a point multiplication
in a 256-bit prime order group in less than 30ms in the Chrome web
browser, the computation of a PPATC ciphertext that can encode a 256-
bit vote would take less than a second [HDNP11].
Several timing measurements have been realized on the Python im-
plementation. The code was run on a standard laptop: Intelr Core
i5-3320M CPU @ 2.60GHz×4 with 7.7 GB of RAM. Table 3.3 (page 62)
summarizes the costs for the CCE of the PPAT schemes as well as the
costs for the VA of the ciphertexts. We distinguish the cost for the voters
(computation) from the cost for the talliers (verification).
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4.6 Conclusion
In this Chapter, we proposed the systematic design of voting schemes
with a perfectly private audit trail. We showed how our CCVAE schemes
are suitable for the organization of large-scale elections.
The PPAT scheme mentioned in Section 3.3.1 is fully generic and
can be used with all classical tallying techniques. Its key generation
algorithm is fairly sophisticated, though, and this scheme is also quite
inefficient compared to our other schemes. We address then two other
voting schemes based on CCVAE schemes, PPATS already introduced
in Section 3.4 and a new CCVAE scheme, PPATC, that are much more
efficient and simple to use though less flexible. Nevertheless, they are
highly relevant for the two most widely used vote tallying techniques:
homomorphic aggregation and mixnets.
The costs of computing a PPATS and a PPATC ciphertexts are simi-
lar. The associated tallying techniques are very different though, being
much more complex for PPATC. A mixnet based technique also reveals
much more information than a technique based on the homomorphic ag-
gregation of ballots. As a result, we would recommend using the PPATS
scheme as long as the ballot format allows it, even if the resulting ballot
preparation cost is higher than the one that would be obtained by using
PPATC.
The ideas exposed in this chapter and beforehand in [CPP13] as
the PPATS scheme will probably be part of the STAR-Vote system
[BBB+13]. This new electronic voting system is meant to be used for
elections in Travis County (Texas, USA).
Finally, the techniques and the use of the CCE primitive introduced
in the current chapter are the starting point of Chapter 5 where we
present verification mechanisms applicable to any function we wish to
evaluate in multi-party. Indeed, in the present case of a voting scheme,
the function is basically a sum function which, combined with the ho-
momorphic property of the encryption scheme, makes it easy to verify.
However, in Chapter 5, we extend our approach to any function. In this
case, as the function is more complex, the verification of the result might
become tedious if we rely only on traditional verification techniques.

Chapter 5
Function Evaluation with Perfectly
Private Audit Trail
This chapter covers results presented at the 1st Symposium on Data
Security in Auvergne, 2014 in a paper entitled “Multi-Party Function
Evaluation with Perfectly Private Audit Trail” [CP14].
In this chapter, we extend the results obtained in Chapter 4. Indeed,
in the electronic voting scenarios we presented, the function to evaluate
is quite simple. In the best case, the function is the sum of the 1/0
votes. The audit procedure is then performed easily since there is an
homomorphism between the message space containing the votes and
the commitment space containing the perfectly hiding commitments on
the votes that are posted on the public bulletin board. However, if
we want to evaluate more complex functions, we need additional audit
mechanisms to encompass the different operations in the function. For
example, we naturally wish to include multiplications and comparisons
but also branchings in the function operands.
With this objective in mind, this chapter proposes an efficient and
simple protocol for the evaluation of functions getting their inputs from
multiple parties in a way that guarantees the correctness of the compu-
tation to everyone. Our protocol finds applications in a clients-worker
environment where we assume that the clients have a strong incentive to
collaborate if they receive a high level guarantee about the result correct-
ness. Note that this setting differs from the setting presented in Chapter
4. Here, the worker is trusted with the privacy of the inputs, and given
this assumption, our protocol provides perfect privacy for the clients.
By putting the emphasis on the verifiability property rather than on the
privacy one as it is the case in most approaches, the goal was to observe
if there was a interesting trade-off for the clients’ computational effort.
As a matter of fact, we point out that in some applications where the
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verification of the solution is cheaper than its computation, the clients’
gain is not negligible.
Compared to the traditional Secure Multi-Party Computation (SMC)
setting, where workers do not learn any information about the inputs,
but which is usually quite challenging to deploy in practice, our solution
considerably decreases the amount of work for the worker, and often
enables a considerably faster verification process by the clients.
Our construction relies on homomorphic commitment consistent en-
cryption presented in Chapter 3 and used in Chapter 4. We rely on
non-interactive zero-knowledge arguments of knowledge to provide proof
that the result is correct.
We present three unrelated applications of our technique: solving
a system of linear equations, an auction scheme and the search of the
shortest path in a shared graph. These examples illustrate the ease of
use and the advantage in terms of complexity of our approach. We made
a prototype implementation, which provides encouraging timing result.
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5.1 Introduction
In a multi-party function evaluation, a set of clients wish to evaluate
a function of their inputs. While keeping the privacy of their inputs,
the clients want a strong guarantee that the output of the evaluation is
correct and consistent with the inputs. With the growth of outsourcing
computation, the needs for such a functionality increase. Numerous
techniques involving highly refined cryptography exist and offer solutions
to this problem. In fact, the whole branch of SMC studies protocols
and mechanisms and offers solutions. We use classic SMC techniques in
Chapter 6 to solve problems similar to those tackled here. It will provide
us with an interesting comparison point for our algorithms.
The work in the present chapter takes place in this history but
favours settings where a third party is trusted for the privacy of the
inputs but not trusted for the correctness of the result. This assump-
tion frees us from difficulties that arise when turning SMC into real-life
applications. To point out some of these challenges, one could mention
the need to run (synchronized) servers, the communication complexity
that is quadratic in the number of clients and a need of large band-
width. Moreover, in SMC settings where computations are outsourced
to several independent trustees, it is sometimes challenging to find those
independent trustees with the adequate technical knowledge. As a re-
sult of these constraints, deployment of SMC protocols is often slowed
down, and real-world applications of SMC are typically played between
a small number of players representative of larger groups, trusted for
privacy, and sometimes for honestly playing the protocol as well. For
example, the sugar beet auction in Denmark [BCD+09] was performed
between three parties representing farmers, buyers and the SMC project
promoters. This is also the case in some cryptographic voting systems
such as Helios [ADMPQ09] where, despite the simplicity of the function
that is evaluated (a sum), the tallying is performed by a small set of
trustees sharing the private key of a distributed encryption scheme, and
all voters need to trust them for privacy.
In the setting we consider, by relaxing the constraint on privacy,
we observe an appealing gain in complexity in several problems that
otherwise would not be considered by classical SMC algorithms due to
a large computational and communication overhead. In particular, this
work offers an easy-to-set-up solution for securely solving several NP-
hard problems that would be prohibitive to solve using SMC techniques.
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5.1.1 Our contributions.
This chapter presents a technique of multi-party function evaluation that
fits very well in a scenario where the clients want absolute confidence in
the correctness of the result. While the clients do not trust other clients
over the privacy of their inputs, they are not reluctant to rely on a
trustworthy third party to preserve the secrecy of the inputs. Moreover,
the clients do not wish to install servers to run a computationally and
bandwidth intensive task but would rather gladly rely on a worker to do
the job.
The level of interaction in our protocol is minimal: the clients submit
their inputs to the worker as a single message, and a single public proof
is made available at the end of the computation. This makes our solu-
tion practical even for applications based on a web interface that clients
could use to submit their input, and later retrieve the outcome of the
computation. (A similar setting was considered by Halevi et al. [HLP11]
for multi-party computation, with impossibility results for large classes
of functions due to the lack of interactions.)
We define the security properties of our scheme through ideal func-
tionalities for secure function evaluation. Our protocol guarantees the
correctness of the output, even if the worker is corrupted. Furthermore,
our protocol guarantees information theoretic privacy if the worker is
honest.
Moreover, we show that the possible complexity gain for the clients
is non negligible compared with classical SMC technique. This is most
visible when solving problems in NP: indeed, while SMC require secure
solving of the problems, bringing the cryptography-related overhead on
the computation phase, we compute in the clear and the complexity
of the audit phase is only related to the computation verification task,
which can be much more efficient. We illustrate our technique via three
test applications: solving a system of linear equations, electronic auc-
tions and finding the shortest path in a graph. Finally, we give some
insight on the performances obtained for these applications through our
prototype implementation realized in Python.
5.1.2 Related works.
Recent works suggest and prove a sharp improvement in multi-party
protocols practicability. For instance, Damg˚ard et al. [DKL+13] present
the “SPDZ” protocol which offers security against active adversary and
achieves high performance for real world applications. “SPDZ” follows
an oﬄine/online model where most heavy precomputations are per-
formed oﬄine which renders the online phase very efficient. Recently, an
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improvement made on “SPDZ” and proposed by Baum et al. [BDO14]
has offered the possibility to audit the SMC protocol. In their proposal, a
set of servers compute the function and provide a transcript of the com-
putations that will be used later by the clients to verify the correctness.
The techniques used there lose most of their appeal when considering
our setting: our worker evaluates the function on cleartext data, as fast
as it can be, and the output is delivered immediately. Then the audit
data can be computed, possibly by performing a completely different
computation (e.g., if verifying the computation can be performed dif-
ferently than recomputing). The verification of the audit data is then
performed using public key cryptography techniques in both cases.
In the area of verifiable computation, the “Pinocchio” protocol pro-
posed by Parno et al. [PHGR13], and its refinement “Gepetto” [CFH+15]
are highly efficient solutions that offer public verifiability in a single
client-worker setting. However, the protocol does not aim at providing
privacy of the inputs. Even more efficient than “Pinocchio”, Backes et
al. [BBFR14] have recently developed a three-party protocol where a
worker is requested to prove computations to a client over authenticated
data received from a single trusted source. The proof of computation
is privacy-preserving. This solution focuses on computation performed
with inputs from a single source, while we focus on problems involving
numerous parties. Along this line, by using the construction of Parno,
Zhang et al. [ZPK14] propose “Alitheia” a single-client verifiable com-
putation system for graph problems such as the shortest path and the
maximum flow studied in this thesis.
Our security model is similar to the one of Choi et al. [CKKC13] who
achieve non-interactive multi-client verifiable computation by relying on
garbled circuits, oblivious transfer and fully homomorphic encryption.
In the follow-up works of Goldwaser et al. [GGG+14] and Gordon et
al. [GKL+15], the solution uses functional encryption, a primitive that
allows to compute a specific function over encrypted data. In these
works, the function is chosen in advance through consensus by the clients
which is a stronger requirement than our proposal. Moreover, relying
on fully homomorphic encryption has not allowed them yet to provide
an efficiency analysis.
Much closer to our technique, Rabin et al. [RST08, PRST08] present
a secrecy-preserving proof of correctness scheme for the evaluation of any
function with straight line computation through an agreed public circuit.
Indeed, similar to what is done in this paper, they propose to perform the
proof of correctness on the commitments on the inputs of the function.
A parallel circuit is evaluated by a worker on the commitments and every
operation is validated by a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge. While
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the proposed schemes rely on symmetric cryptography and a split-value
representation to perform cut-and-choose proofs, we show in this work
better timing results as well as more compact proofs using homomorphic
cryptography based on elliptic curves.
The structure of the chapter is as follows: in Section 5.2 we describe
the functionality and the security proofs. In Section 5.3, we present
the building blocks needed for the generic implementation of Section
5.4. Section 5.5 details the three test applications while Section 5.6
provides the technical information, the complexity study, and the timing
measurements obtained from our prototype implementation.
5.2 Secure multi-party function evaluation
5.2.1 The ideal protocol
In this section, we formalize the protocol expectations in terms of an
ideal functionality, following the notations and definitions of [Can01].
In this regard, let us consider a set of clients C = {C1, · · · , Cn}. Each
Ci gets a private input xi ∈ I, the input space. We define the ideal
functionality that we denote Ff as a process that receives inputs from
the clients and then computes the function f : In → O where O is the
output space. In all cases, when the functionality provides an output,
this output is correct. In the case of a passive adversary Ap, that is,
an adversary who learns the internal state of the corrupted parties but
lets them follow the protocol, the functionality FfAp also guarantees that
the clients do not learn anything about each other’s inputs (apart from
what might be derived from the output of the function). When the
adversary is active Aa (which is equivalent to considering a corrupted
worker,) the client’s inputs are leaked, but the correctness of the outcome
is still guaranteed (functionality FfAa). Functionalities F
f
Ap and F
f
Aa are
presented in Protocol 5.1.
We also want to consider a slightly different functionality in the pres-
ence of active adversary, FfAa∗ that, instead of sending each private input
to the adversary at the moment she receives one, will send all the pri-
vate inputs in one block once they are all collected. This small difference
prevents the active adversary Aa∗ from performing one kind of attack
on FfAa , that is from dynamically changing the inputs of the corrupted
clients when receiving the inputs of other clients. As we will see, imple-
menting FfAa∗ in the real-world comes with some more constraints. This
functionality is presented in Protocol 5.2.
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Protocol 5.1: The ideal functionalities FfAp and F
f
Aa
1. Upon receiving (Send, Ci, xi) from a client Ci or adversary
S, if xi ∈ I, store xi, otherwise abort. Then, in the case of
• a passive adversary, send Ci to adversary S and halt.
• an active adversary, send (Ci, xi) to adversary S and
halt.
2. Upon receiving Compute from S, evaluate y :=
f(x1, · · · , xn). Send y to every client Ci and S, then halt.
Protocol 5.2: The ideal functionality FfAa∗
1. Upon receiving (Send, Ci, xi) from a client Ci or adversary
S,
if xi ∈ I, store xi, otherwise abort. Then, send Ci to adver-
sary S and halt.
2. When all the inputs are received, send x1, · · · , xn to S.
3. Upon receiving Compute from S, evaluate the function to get
y := f(x1, · · · , xn). Finally, send y to every client Ci and S,
then halt.
5.2.2 The real protocol
We now turn to the design of our real-world protocol that realize the
ideal functionalities.
We require our protocol to produce a perfectly private audit trail
(PPAT) of its computation, that is, the privacy guarantees offered by our
protocol will be perfect in the sense of information theory. For simplicity,
we focus on the case of static corruption: corruption of parties happen
before the beginning of the protocol, and not dynamically as the protocol
is executing.
We build the protocol ΠfPPAT which realizes these functionalities in
the real world in the presence of passive and active adversaries. In
this protocol, most of the work of the functionality is performed by an
entity called the Worker W. First, we require that each client Ci sends
his private input to W through a secure channel. For example, the
100 Chapter 5. Function Evaluation with PPAT
secure channel could be achieved through an encryption/decryption of
the inputs between Ci and W. Given a public-key conventional CPA-
secure encryption algorithm ((pk, sk)← Gen,Enc,Dec), we demand that
in protocol ΠfPPAT, Ci sends ei := Enc(pk, xi) to W, and W computes
xi = Dec(sk, ei), which gives him the private input of Ci to compute f .
Up to this point, our protocol offers secure function evaluation in the
presence of a passive adversary.
To ensure that every client receives the same result at the end of the
protocol in the presence of an adversary corrupting the worker, we need
to ask the worker to prove the correct evaluation of the function. This
proof will be posted on a Public Bulletin Board PB, which maintains
publicly available every input sent to him by any parties.
So, as a first step in our protocol, every client sends a commitment
di ← Com(cpk, xi) of his private input to PB. We assume that we have
at hand a perfectly hiding and computationally binding commitment
scheme ΠC := (GenC,Com,Verify) (see Section 2.1.4 for details about
commitment schemes).
Along with commitment di, we require the client to produce a proof
denoted piver(di) that ensures some property of his private input (such
as being in a range of values). This proof must at least convince that
di was obtained through the Com algorithm with a value known by the
client, and make the commitment non-malleable [DDN98] in order to
prevent a client from choosing his input as a function of the input of
another client [BPW12].
Finally, we require W to post the evaluation of f on PB. As W
might be corrupted by Aa, we require that W also publishes a proof
denoted picor of the correctness of the evaluation of f . The key point is
that the verification of picor relies on the commitments d1, ..., dn posted
by the clients on PB. In the general case, this verification involves
the computation of a commitment dy that must be a commitment on
y computed from d1, ..., dn. With this requirement, an active adversary
who would be willing to cheat during the function evaluation process
would need to be able to break the binding property of the commitment
scheme or the soundness of the proof picor.
Protocol ΠfPPAT and Formal Security
The proofs we are referring to here are built from the notion of sigma
(or Σ)-protocols [Dam04] covered in Section 2.1.5. In the following, we
define relations R in a formal NP-language such as R ⊂ LNP ×W (s)
where s is called the statement and w ∈W (s) a witness of s.
A Σ-protocol allows us to produce zero-knowledge proof which is, in
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essence, the couple of algorithms (Prove,Check) with the special honest
verifier zero-knowledge property where Prove is the algorithm executed
by Prover. When it comes to implementation, one key point is the
production of “good” challenges which forces us to choose between the
different security models in cryptography. However it is possible to
achieve the security of our scheme in the standard model. For efficiency
reasons, we implemented the scheme in the random oracle model and
thus proved the security in this model.
We rely on the Fiat-Shamir/Blum transformation (Theorem 2.1) to
turn Σ-protocols into non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowl-
edges (NIZKPK). A complete overview of NIZKPK and Σ-protocols can
be found in Section 2.1.5.
The relations for the NIZKPK picor and piver(di) mentioned in Π
f
PPAT
are defined as follows:
Rcor :={((y, d1, ..., dn), (x1, o1, ..., xn, on))|y = f(x1, ..., xn)
∧i Verify(cpk, di, oi, xi) = 1}
Rver :={(d, (x, o))|Verify(cpk, d, o, x) = 1 ∧ x ∈ I}
where the algorithm Verify(cpk, d, o, x) of the commitment scheme re-
turns 1 only if d is a commitment on x with opening o.
These proofs are published on PB and picor will be checked by each
Ci at the end of the protocol to convince itself of the correctness of the
function’s computation. We are now ready to define protocol ΠfPPAT
(Protocol 5.3) which realizes functionalities FfAp and F
f
Aa in the pres-
ence of Ap and Aa respectively. The protocol that realizes FfAa∗ in the
presence of Aa∗ is an adaptation of ΠfPPAT and we describe it in the
comments. We show in Section 5.4 how to build protocol ΠfPPAT for any
function f and how W can prepare the proof picor.
Remarks on Protocol 5.3 ΠfPPAT:
• To realize functionality FfAa∗ , we demand that the clients do not
send directly their private inputs and openings xi, oi to W in step
1. Instead the clients wait until every other client Ci has published
a commitment di and a proof piver(di) on PB. At this point only,
they send their xi, oi to W through the secure channel. This ad-
ditional step prevents the adversary from modifying dynamically
the inputs of the corrupted clients when they receive the inputs of
the honest clients. While this change looks quite simple to stop
these kinds of attacks, its major drawback is that it adds an extra
step for the clients during which they have to check that the com-
mitments have all been published on PB to proceed with the rest
102 Chapter 5. Function Evaluation with PPAT
Protocol 5.3: ΠfPPAT
Input: Each Ci has his private input xi ∈ I for i = 1, · · · , n.
Output: Each Ci receives y := f(x1, · · · , xn).
1. Each Ci computes a perfectly hiding commitment on xi :
di, oi ← Com(cpk, xi) as well as a proof piver(di) on some
property that xi must meet. Ci publishes di and piver(di) on
PB. Then, Ci sends xi, oi toW through the secure channel.
2. W runs Checkver of piver(di) on each di and aborts if one of the
checks is false. W runs the Verify algorithm on each triple
(di, oi, xi) and aborts if one verification fails. Otherwise,
on inputs x1, ..., xn, o1, ..., on, W computes y := f(x1, ..., xn)
and a proof of correctness picor of the result. Then, W pub-
lishes y and picor on PB.
3. Each Ci runs Checkver of piver(di) on each di and Checkcor of
picor on (y, d1, ..., dn). If each verification accepts, then Ci
accepts output y, otherwise Ci aborts.
of the protocol. This reduces the benefits of the non-interactivity
of the original protocol one may seek. Since considering the re-
alization of FfAa∗ in addition of F
f
Aa would not bring tremendous
changes to discuss, we now focus only on the realization of FfAa by
protocol ΠfPPAT.
• We might also change this protocol slightly to provide another
functionality where the evaluation y of the function is not disclosed
to the clients in step 3. However, the clients receive a commitment
dy on the output y with the guarantee that y = f(x1, ..., xn). The
worker proves that he performed the computations honestly but
without revealing the result. In this way, we might use the protocol
as a subroutine to securely compute larger functions.
We can see that the security of the protocol in the presence of a
passive adversary Ap rests on the fact that every piece of information
present on PB is either perfectly hiding or zero-knowledge. However,
in the presence of an active adversary Aa the privacy of the scheme is
not guaranteed: a corrupted worker could disclose all the clients’ inputs.
Nevertheless, in this scenario, we assert that the verifiability property
still stands. In other words, Aa could leak the private inputs but is not
able to tamper with the correctness of the function evaluation. Thus,
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protocol ΠfPPAT realizes both functionalities in the presence of passive
and active adversaries respectively.
Our first result shows that Protocol ΠfPPAT, executed with an ideal
bulletin board, realizes the functionality FfAp in the presence of passive
adversary Ap, and has a perfectly private audit trail.
Theorem 5.1. Let ΠC be a perfectly hiding commitment scheme and
picor and piver be perfect zero-knowledge proofs. Then, for any set of
corrupted clients, there is a simulator such that, for any environment,
the views resulting from the following two situations are identical:
• interacting with the bulletin board, the clients and the worker play-
ing the ΠfPPAT protocol.
• interacting with the ideal functionality FfAp and the simulator.
The view of the environment includes its accesses to the bulletin board
(controlled by the simulator in the second case), submitting the input xi
to the clients (or to FfAp), and obtaining the outcome y in return.
Informal proof. We proceed by a set of game hops to show that the view
of the environment and the adversary is indistinguishable between the
real execution of the protocol and the ideal execution simulating the
functionality FfAp . The key points are that
1. the commitments published on PB reveal no information whatso-
ever about the committed values.
2. the proofs of knowledge on PB are perfect zero-knowledge and
cannot be used by an adversary to extract information.
3. the proof picor published on PB computationally guarantees the
soundness of the result.
4. the three first points combined form a perfectly private audit trail
of the function evaluation that is computationally sound.
Complete proof. To prove the security of the scheme, we show that the
view of any environment E is identical whether it is a real execution of
the protocol ΠfPPAT under the presence of adversary Ap or an ideal exe-
cution emulating the functionality FfAp in the presence of an adversaryS simulating the execution of Ap.
We create a set of games Gi that are indistinguishable each from
the previous or the next one. The first game G1 representing the real
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execution of the protocol and the last game G6 being the ideal execution
emulating the functionality FfAp .
Let execGA,E(x) be the random variable describing the output of the
environment E when interacting with adversary A and the parties in the
game G on input x. We will prove that, for any environment E , there
exists a simulator S such that execG1Ap,E(x) = execG6S,E(x).
Without loss of generality, and for the sake of the proof, we rearrange
the indexes of the clients by partitioning the set of n clients into two
subsets: {1, ..., n} = HON ∪ COR where HON = {1, ..., k} indexes
honest clients while COR := {k + 1, ..., n} indexes corrupted clients.
G2 In this game we replace the parties by dummy parties controlled
by the simulator. The adversary is able to corrupt a set of clients
COR prior to the execution.
G1 → G2: this does not affect the view of E .
G3 Starting from G2 we define a set of hybrid games denoted G3,i for
i = 1, ..., k. In game G3,1, the proof published on PB by C1 is
replaced by a simulated proof. In game G3,i, the proofs published
on PB by the Cj for j ≤ i are replaced by simulated proofs. At
the end, we obtain game G3 := G3,k where all the honest clients’
proofs have been replaced by simulated ones. More precisely, the
game G3,i takes place as follows:
• for j ∈ HON , when client Cj prepares dj , piver(dj) to be pub-
lished on PB, compute a simulated proof pi∗ver(dj) generated
by the NIZKPK simulator S on inputs (dj , e) where e is a ran-
domly generated challenge. If j > i, publish (dj , piver(dj)) on
PB. Otherwise, if j ≤ i, publish (dj , pi∗ver(dj)) on PB. Mean-
while, Cj sends his private input xj as well as the opening of
dj to W.
• for j ∈ COR, when client Cj sends his inputs to W and
publish on PB, proceed as in the protocol ΠfPPAT.
• when all inputs values have been submitted, and if all proofs
piver are valid, the worker proceeds as in the protocol Π
f
PPAT
by computing and publishing y := f(x1, ..., xn) and picor.
G2 → G3: We prove that for i = 0, ..., k − 1, execG3,iA,E(x) = exec
G3,i+1
A,E (x)
where we define G3,0 as G2. We proceed by induction on i.
The first step is to prove identical views between G3,0 and G3,1.
From any adversary A and environment E able to distinguish be-
tween G3,0 and G3,1, we build an adversary B against the perfect
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zero-knowledge property of the NIZKPK of the scheme. We
claim that the advantage of A is at most the advantage of B. Ad-
versary B runs A and E internally and sets up a distinguisher D.
Instead of one bulletin board, B sets up two bulletin boards PB0
and PB1, then B flips a coin β. During the game, E and A only
see PBβ as PB. Then, B proceeds as follows:
• when client C1 generates x1, o1, d1, piver(d1), B generates a
simulated proof pi∗ver(d1) with the NIZKPK simulator Sver.
Then, (d1, piver(d1)) is published on PB0 while (d1, pi
∗
ver(d1))
is published on PB1.
• when client Cj for j 6= 1 sends dj , piver(dj) to the board, B
publishes dj , piver(dj) on PB0 and PB1.
• once all inputs have been submitted to W, and if all proofs
piver are valid, the worker prepares y and picor that are pub-
lished on PB0 and PB1.
When E stops, B runs D on the local output of E and outputs
whatever D outputs. When E and A have access to PB0, they
are in G3,0 and when they have access to PB1, they are in G3,1.
It follows that whenever D successfully distinguishes between the
outputs in the two games, then B has a way to distinguish between
the proofs piver(d1) and pi
∗
ver(d1). This contradicts the perfect zero-
knowledge property of the NIZKPK.
Fixing some 1 < i1 < k, we assume that for all 1 ≤ i < i1,
we have exec
G3,i
A,E(x) = exec
G3,i+1
A,E (x). From there, we show that
exec
G3,i1
A,E (x) = exec
G3,i1+1
A,E (x). This last equality is verified thanks
to the same kind of reduction appearing in the first step of the
induction. This concludes the proof by induction.
G4 We proceed similarly as in G3 and create a set of intermediary games
G4,i for i = 0, ...k where G4,0 is defined as G3 and G4 := G4,k. In
game G4,i, the commitments generated by the honest clients Cj
for j ≤ i are replaced by freshly generated random commitments.
In game G4, every commitment from the honest clients will be
replaced by randomly distributed commitments. Game G4,i for
i = 1, ..., k takes place as follows:
• for j ∈ HON , when client Cj prepares dj , piver(dj) to be pub-
lished on PB, compute a commitment d∗j and opening o
∗
j on a
random value x∗j as well as two simulated proofs pi
∗
ver(dj) and
pi∗ver(d∗j ) respectively generated by the NIZKPK simulator Sver
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on inputs (dj , e) and (d
∗
j , e) respectively where e is a randomly
generated challenge. If j > i, publish (dj , pi
∗
ver(dj)) on PB.
Otherwise, if j ≤ i, publish (d∗j , pi∗ver(d∗j )) on PB. Meanwhile,
if j > i, send xj , oj to W. Otherwise if j ≤ i, send x∗j , o∗j to
W.
• for j ∈ COR, when client Cj sends his inputs to W and
publishes on PB, proceed as in the protocol ΠfPPAT.
• when all inputs values have been submitted, and if all proofs
piver are valid, W computes and publishes y = f(x∗1, ..., x∗i ,
xi+1, ..., xn) and picor on PB.
G3 → G4: As in the previous game, we proceed by induction on i =
0, ..., k − 1 to prove that execG4,0A,E (x) = exec
G4,k
A,E (x). We begin by
showing that exec
G4,0
A,E (x) = exec
G4,1
A,E (x). From any adversary A and
environment E able to distinguish between G4,0 and G4,1, we build
an adversary B against the perfectly hiding property of the
commitment scheme. We claim that the advantage of A is at most
the advantage of B. Adversary B runs A and E internally and sets
up a distinguisher D. Instead of one bulletin board, B sets up two
bulletin boards PB0 and PB1, then B flips a coin β. During the
game, E and A only see PBβ as PB. Then, B proceeds as follows:
• when client C1 generates x1, o1, d1, piver(d1), B generates a
commitment d∗1 and opening o∗1 on a random value x∗1 as
well as two simulated proofs pi∗ver(d1) and pi∗ver(d∗1) with the
NIZKPK simulator Sver. Then, (d1, pi∗ver(d1)) is published on
PB0 while (d
∗
1, pi
∗
ver(d
∗
1)) is published on PB1. Meanwhile, if
β = 0, W receives x1, o1, else if β = 1, W receives x∗1, o∗1.
• for j ∈ HON , j 6= 1, when client Cj generates xj , oj , dj ,
piver(dj), B generates a simulated proof pi∗ver(dj) thanks to the
NIZKPK simulator Sver. Then, (dj , pi∗ver(dj)) is published on
PB0 and on PB1. Meanwhile, xj , oj are sent to W.
• for j ∈ COR, when client Cj generates xj , oj , dj , piver(dj), B
proceeds as in game G3 and dj , piver(dj) is published on PB0
and PB1.
• once all inputs have been submitted to W, and if all proofs
piver are valid, the worker prepares y and picor to be published
on PB0 and PB1.
When E stops, B runs D on the local output of E and outputs
whatever D outputs. When E and A have access to PB0, they
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are in G4,0 and when they have access to PB1, they are in G4,1.
The output of the distinguisher D is released by B and it comes
that the success of D at differentiating between G4,0 and G4,1 is
used by B to differentiate commitment d1 from commitment d∗1.
This contradicts the perfectly hiding property of the commitment
scheme.
As before, if we assume that for a fixed 1 < i1 < k, we have for
all 1 ≤ i < i1 that execG4,iA,E(x) = exec
G4,i+1
A,E (x), we can prove that
exec
G4,i1
A,E (x) = exec
G4,i1+1
A,E (x) by using the same kind of reduction
as in the first step. Hence, we have showed that execG3A,E(x) =
execG4A,E(x).
G5 In this game, we replace the proof picor generated by W by a sim-
ulated proof pi∗cor that is obtained through the NIZKPK simulator
Scor on inputs y (output by W) and the commitments presents on
PB.
G4 → G5: From any adversary A and environment E able to distinguish
between G4 and G5, we build an adversary B against the perfect
zero-knowledge property of the NIZKPK of the scheme. The re-
duction works as the reductions in the proof that execG2A,E(x) =
execG3A,E(x) yielding an adversary B able to break the perfect zero-
knowledge property of the NIZKPK of the scheme.
G6 In the last game, we build the simulator S that proceeds as follows:
• When notified by the functionality FfAp of an input from an
honest client Ci, S generates a commitment d∗i and opening
o∗i on a random value x
∗
i , and computes a simulated proof
pi∗ver(d∗i ) with the NIZKPK simulator Sver. Then S publishes
d∗i and pi
∗
ver(d
∗
i ) on PB.
• When a corrupted client Cj submits a commitment and a
proof to the board, and the opening of the commitment to
the worker, S submits the opened input xj to FfAp on behalf
of Cj .
• When all input values have been submitted, and if all piver
proofs are valid, S submits Compute to FfAp and obtains y
in return. S uses the NIZKPK simulator Scor to obtain a
simulated proof pi∗cor based on the commitments on the board
and y. Then S publishes y and pi∗cor on the board.
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G5 → G6: This does not change the view of the environment, thus we
have that execG6S,E(x) = exec
G5
A,E(x).
Our second result shows that Protocol ΠfPPAT, executed with an ideal
bulletin board, realizes the functionality FfAa in the presence of an active
adversary Aa who controls the worker.
Theorem 5.2. Let ΠC be a binding commitment scheme and picor and
piver be computationally sound proofs. Then, for a corrupted worker and
any set of corrupted clients, there is a simulator such that, for any en-
vironment, the views resulting from the following two situations are in-
distinguishable:
• interacting with the bulletin board, the clients and the corrupted
worker playing the ΠfPPAT protocol.
• interacting with the ideal functionality FfAa and the simulator.
The view of the environment includes its accesses to the bulletin board
(controlled by the simulator in the second case), submitting the input xi
to the clients (or to FfAa), and obtaining the outcome y in return, and
every communication that the corrupted worker would make.
Informal proof. The demonstration follows the same pattern of Theorem
5.1 with the major difference that the privacy of the inputs is no longer
guaranteed due to the adversary ability to corrupt the worker. However,
the soundness of the proof picor remains ensuring the correctness of the
result. We show that it is still essential that PB displays the computa-
tionally binding commitments of the clients. This condition enforces an
adversary to produce a proof of knowledge on these commitments. As
a result the audit trail present on PB is not perfectly hiding anymore
but remains computationally sound.
Complete proof. We proceed similarly to the proof of Theorem 5.1 by
a set of game hops. By contrast from FfAp of Theorem 5.1, we observe
that FfAa offers correctness guarantees, but no privacy at all: all inputs
are immediately given to the simulator.
Formally, we prove that there exists a simulator S such that the view
for any environment E of an execution of the protocol ΠfPPAT under the
presence of an active adversary Aa is indistinguishable from the view of
E of an execution of an ideal protocol simulated by S and interacting
with the functionality FfAa . In other words, we show that execG1Aa,E(x) ≈
5.2. Secure multi-party function evaluation 109
execG3S,E(x) where the game G1 represents the execution in the real world
of ΠfPPAT while the game G3 is the ideal execution and x is the input of
the parties.
As previously, and without loss of generality, we partition and re-
index the set {1, ..., n} of the clients into the subsets HON ∪COR where
HON := {1, ..., k} is the set of honest clients and COR := {k+ 1, ..., n}
is the set of corrupted clients.
G2 In this game we replace the parties by dummy parties controlled
by the simulator. The adversary is able to corrupt a set of clients
COR prior to the execution.
G1 → G2: this does not affect the view of E .
G3 In this game, we describe how the simulator S interacts with FfAa in
order to emulate the ideal execution of the protocol. S internally
runs the corrupted worker and clients, relays their communications
with the environment, and intercepts their communications with
the bulletin board which is also emulated by the simulator. The
simulator proceeds as follows:
• When notified by the functionality of an input xi from an
honest client Ci, S generates and posts on the board a com-
mitment di and a proof piver(di), following Π
f
PPAT.
• When a corrupted client Cj submits a commitment and a
proof to the board, and the opening of the commitment to
the worker, S submits the opened input xj to FfAa on behalf
of Cj .
• When the corrupted worker submits the result y and the as-
sociated proof picor, verify each of the proofs on behalf of the
honest clients and, if they check, S submits Compute to the
functionality so that it provides its output to the clients.
G2 → G3: By following the real protocol, we provide the environment
with a view that is identical to the real one. However, as the
adversary now controlsW, it is possible for him to publish (y∗, picor)
on PB such that y∗ 6= y := f(x1, ..., xn) and Checkcor(y∗, d1, ..., dn)
of picor outputs 1. This can happen only in three cases:
1. the adversary breaks the soundness property of piver. In
this case, A is able to prove false statements over commit-
ments on PB.
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2. the adversary breaks the computationally binding prop-
erty of the commitment scheme. In this case, Aa is able to
open commitments to any value. For example, Aa produces
commitments dj on both xj 6= x′j with respective openings
oj , o
′
j , such that Verify(dj , oj , xj) = 1 and Verify(dj , o
′
j , x
′
j) = 1
where j ∈ J ⊂ {1, ..., n}. This allows a corrupted worker to
output y∗ 6= y such that y∗ = f(x∗1, ..., x∗n) where x∗j = x′j if
j ∈ J and x∗j = xj otherwise. In such scenario, W is able to
output picor such that Checkcor(y
∗, d1, ..., dn) accepts.
3. the adversary breaks the soundness property of the picor
proof. In this case, Aa is able to prove false statements about
the correctness of the result.
Nevertheless, each situation only occurs with negligible probabil-
ity.
5.3 Building blocks for perfectly private audit
trail
The interactions between the clients and the worker involve the exchange
of private inputs and the publication on a Public Bulletin Board PB of
some trail that will be used to perform further audit of the process.
Commitment consistent encryption
We rely on the CCE primitive introduced in Chapter 3 to encrypt the
private inputs of the clients and extract from the ciphertext a commit-
ment that will be published on PB. This mechanism is similar to the
one explained in Chapter 4. However, within the context of e-voting,
an homomorphic encryption scheme that allows threshold decryption is
mandatory while in other settings, the encryption scheme could be su-
perfluous when using a physically secure channel between the clients and
the workers. In this last case, we may be just fine with a commitment
scheme alone. However, in most cases, we are in an intermediate situ-
ation where the inputs are sent to the worker through a not-so-secure
network where encryption is not a luxury. For this reason a CCE scheme
Π := (Gen,Enc,Dec,DerivCom,Open,Verify) comes in handy. For our
construction, we consider a IND-CPA secure CCE scheme. Note that,
given the proof piver published on PB along with the commitment, we
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can apply Theorem 3.2 on our validity augmented CCE scheme to find
our scheme to be NM-CPA secure.
We note that, when encryption is used instead of a secure channel, we
must make sure that the adversary cannot submit inputs that he actually
ignores by copying CCE ciphertexts. This can be prevented by using the
non-malleability offered by sigma proofs to prevent any re-randomization
of commitments, and by declaring duplicate commitments invalid (see
the validity augmentation of Section 3.2 for details).
In the following, let the commitment obtained through the DerivCom
algorithm on a CCE ciphertext be a perfectly hiding and computation-
ally binding homomorphic1 commitment as it is the case for a traditional
Pedersen commitment. We suppose that from Π, we obtain a commit-
ment algorithm Com(pk, .) and that Gen(1λ) outputs the public key pk
which specifies a group G of order q, a λ-bit long safe prime, as well as
randomly chosen g and h such as 〈g〉 = 〈h〉 = G. As a result of the
random choices of g and h, logh g is unknown. The message and the
randomness spaces are equal, M = R = Zq. The commitment algorithm
Com(pk,m) outputs c = gmhr and a = r for a randomly chosen r ∈ R.
Finally the verification algorithm Verifycpk(c, a,m) outputs 1 if c = g
mha
and 0 otherwise.
Non interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge
The second tool that we need is non-interactive zero-knowledge proof
of knowledge (NIZKPK) that is presented in Section 2.1.6. Below we
explicit the different proofs used in our construction. We present the Σ-
protocols that could easily be turned into NIZKPK by Fiat-Shamir/Blum
transformation. Note that these NIZKPK are performed mostly entirely
on the commitments, and for this reason we give their description con-
sidering commitments as statements. For readability, we do not dif-
ferentiate the commitments obtained through the DerivCom algorithm
from other commitments produced in the following proofs, and, with-
out loss of generality, we assume they are all obtained through the Com
algorithm of some commitment homomorphic scheme.
The first NIZKPK is the classical or-proof of knowledge [CDS94] de-
noted pior(d). Another kind of well-known NIZKPK is the proof of equal-
ity of discrete logarithms between two commitments [CP93] that we
refer to as piDL(d1, d2) and presented in Protocol 2.2. Finally, the proof
of the opening of the commitment is denoted piope(d). This last proof is
used by default to enforce non-malleability of the commitments posted
1This property introduced for encryption schemes in Definition 2.5 is easily trans-
posable for commitment schemes.
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on PB by the clients and when no specific property is required on the
private input. We give the relations for these proofs respectively:
Ror := {(d, (o, x))|Verify(d, o, x) = 1 ∧ (x = 0 ∨ x = 1)}
RDL := {((d1, d2), (d, o1, o2))|Verify(d1, o1, x) = 1 ∧ Verify(d2, o2, x) = 1}
Rope := {(d, (o, x))|Verify(d, o, x) = 1}
To achieve public verification of the audit trail, we may need to
perform arithmetic operations on the commitments, more precisely op-
erations on the values committed to in the commitments present on PB.
If the commitment scheme is homomorphic - which is the case here - we
only have one operation at disposal, usually addition. To allow the pub-
lic verifiers to perform multiplications on the commitments, the Prover
needs to add an NIZKPK each time a multiplication occurs.
NIZKPK for multiplication. We rely on the Σ-protocol presented in
[DF02] to prove a multiplicative relation between commitments. More
precisely, we define
Rmul :={((d1, d2, d3), (o1, x1, o2, x2, o3))|x3 = x1x2∧i
Verify(di, oi, xi) = 1}
This following protocol denoted pimul(d1, d2, d3) is presented in [DF02]
for integer commitments on groups with hidden order but it can easily
be translated to our case.
The inputs of Prover and Verifier are the commitments di = g
xihri
for i = 1, 2, 3. In addition, Prover is given the values xi, ri for i = 1, 2, 3.
Obviously, both parties have access to the public parameters. In the
following Σ-protocol, Prover aims to convince Verifier that x3 = x1x2.
We can see that since d3 = d
x2
1 h
r3−x2r1 is a commitment on the value x2
using d1 as base instead of g, if Prover can convince Verifier that d2 and
d3 commit on the same value and that he can open d1, then the case is
closed.
1. Prover chooses at random x¯1, x¯2, r¯1, r¯2, r¯3 ∈ Zq and computes d∗1 =
gx¯1hr¯1 , d∗2 = gx¯2hr¯2 and d∗3 = d
x¯2
1 h
r¯3 . Then Prover sends a =
(d∗1, d∗2, d∗3) to Verifier.
2. Verifier randomly picks a challenge e and sends it to Prover.
3. Prover computes and sends to Verifier: z := (y1, y2, s1, s2, s3) where
y1 = x¯1 + ex1, y2 = x¯2 + ex2, s1 = r¯1 + er1, s2 = r¯2 + er2 and
s3 = r¯3 + e(r3 − x2r1).
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4. Finally Verifier parses z as (y1, y2, s1, s2, s3) and then checks that
gy1hs1 = d∗1de1, gy2hs2 = d∗2de2 and that d
y2
1 h
s3 = d∗3de3.
Note that the soundness of the proof relies on the binding prop-
erty of the commitment scheme since d3 could theoretically open to any
value. While keeping this in mind, we use the notation  to denote the
multiplicative operator between two commitments.
NIZKPK for interval membership (range proof). More complex
algorithms could be obtained with a comparison operator at hand. This
operator is achieved by using range proofs over commitments: The main
idea of the proof is to decompose a commitment into several commit-
ments respectively to a binary decomposition. Then, the Prover com-
putes a pior on each commitment. The verification of the proof is the
verification of each of the pior and the recombination of the commit-
ment decomposition. However the binary decomposition is a common
possibility, many refinements are available to optimize the cost of the
proof when the intervals are not power of 2. The work of Canard et
al. [CCJT14] provides an interesting comparison between the different
methods as well as an original solution.
The comparison operator is achieved by using range proofs over com-
mitments for the relation:
Rran := {(d, (o, x))|Verify(d, o, x) = 1 ∧ x ∈ I}
We denote this proof by piran(d, I). A direct way to obtain a range proof
that x ∈ [0, 2k+1[ is by composing k proofs pior(xi) where xi is the binary
decomposition of x.
The inputs of Prover and Verifier is the commitment d = gxhr and a
binary decomposition base b0, · · · , bk where bi = 2i. In addition, Prover
is given the values x, r where x ∈ I = [0, 2k+1[. The value x can be
written as x =
∑
bixi where xi ∈ {0, 1} for i = 0, · · · , k.
1. Prover chooses at random ri ∈ Zq for i = 0, · · · , k−1 and computes
di = g
xihri for i = 0, · · · , k where rk = (r −
k−1∑
i=0
ribi)b
−1
k . Prover
sends each di to Verifier and then engages a pior(di) with Verifier
for i = 0, · · · , k.
2. In addition to participating in each pior(di), Verifier checks that
d =
k∏
i=0
dbii . If each proof and the recomposition of the commitment
are accepted, Verifier accepts the proof.
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Zq 0 or qdq/2e
L
−L
x1, x2
x4 := x1 − x2
Figure 5.1: Intervals for the comparison proof.
A proof piran can be used to build a comparison operator between
commitments2 for which we define the relation:
R< :={((d1, d2, d3), (o1, x1, o2, x2, o3, x3))|x3 = x1 < x2
∧i Verify(di, oi, xi) = 1}
To achieve that proof, given d1, d2, we compute a piran(d4, ]−L,L[)
where d4 = Com(x4) := Com(x1)	 Com(x2). Indeed, if x1, x2 ∈ [0, L[ ⊂
Zq where L < dq/2e to avoid overlap, then x4 := x1 − x2 ∈ [−L,L[ =
[−L, 0[ ∪ [0, L[ as shown in Figure 5.1. Given that b0, · · · , bk is the base
for the binary decomposition of a value in [0, L[, we can add the extra
base element bk+1 = q − L. Then x4 admits a binary decomposition in
this new base : x4 =
k+1∑
i=0
x4,ibi where x4,i ∈ {0, 1} for i = 0, · · · , k + 1.
Moreover, x4,k+1 = x3 thus piran(d4, [−L,L[) provides the commitment
d3. As for the multiplicative operator, we use the notation for the com-
parison operator <© between commitments, we write Com(x3) = Com(x1)
<© Com(x2).
Consistency proof. This last kind of proof denoted picc and already
introduced in Section 3.2 is a part of the validity augmented CCE scheme
which enforces its consistency. It allows the worker to verify that a
c := Enc(x), the CCE of x contains a commitment that commits on the
same value x that is encrypted. The protocol relation is:
Rcc := {(c, (o, x))|c← Enc(pk, x) ∧ Verify(pk,DerivCom(pk, c), o, x) = 1}
2Since committed values belong to Zq, this comparison operator makes sense only
on a small interval of Zq where we can define a natural order. Typically an interval
centred in 0 ∈ Zq.
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In our setting however, this relation needs not to be proven through
a NIZKPK since the worker knows the message and the opening of the
CCE ciphertext once he has decrypted and opened it. In any case, the
worker should always check the consistency of the ciphertext to protect
himself from two situations: first, not being able to compute an output
consistent with the commitments present on PB. Second, not being
able to compute a proof of correctness picor of the result.
5.4 Generic construction of the protocol
Commitment consistent encryption and non-interactive zero-knowledge
proofs of knowledge are the building blocks of Protocol ΠfPPAT which
realizes the ideal functionalities in the presence of passive and active
adversaries as discussed in Section 5.2. This also implies a generic con-
struction of the correctness proof picor that allows the clients to accept
or reject the result of the function evaluation. This proof is prepared in
the commitment space that is defined in the Gen algorithm of the CCE
scheme Π.
The commitment space is homomorphic to the message space for
the addition operator. In the previous paragraphs, we allowed complex
computations over commitments, given the ad hoc assistance of a Prover
for multiplications and comparisons. Consequently, the set of arithmetic
operators over the message space M is given by S := (+,−, ·, <), and
finds its counterpart set S′ := (⊕,	,,<©) over the commitment space.
As a result, each operator of S used to evaluate the function f can
be performed over commitments by an operator of S′. In this way, we
obtain a perfectly private audit trail on PB.
The protocol is fairly simple: each client computes a ci ← Enc(pk, xi)
of his private input. From ci, Ci derives a perfectly hiding commitment
di ← DerivCom(pk, ci) and, computes a piver(di), for example pior(di),
piran(di, I) or by default, piope(di). Then, Ci publishes di and piver(di)
on PB, and sends ci to W. After having decrypted every ci to get the
private inputs of every client, W computes y := f(x1, · · · , xn). From
the commitments published on PB, W computes dy := f(d1, · · · , dn)
as well as the NIZKPK-s for each operator of f (except for ⊕ and 	
which are natural operators in the commitment space): the set of the
NIZKPK and all the intermediary commitments created for the needs of
the proofs are executed in parallel to form picor. W publishes y and picor
on PB. Finally, each Ci verifies the correctness of picor in regards to y
and the reconstruction of dy.
As we will see in the next section, this is not the most efficient way
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to achieve the perfectly private audit trail since there are lots of cases
where the verification of the output of the function can be done without
recomputing the entire function in the commitment space.
5.5 Applications
Until now, we have seen how to generate a perfectly private audit trail of
computation from the blueprint of any function. As we will see through
several examples, there is a more direct way to provide the picor that
guarantees the correctness of the output. The main idea is that, once
given the result of the function it is much simpler to verify that it is
correct. For example, once you are told that 8128 is the square root
of 66, 064, 384, it costs you only one squaring to agree while finding the
square root by hand calculus is trickier.
In the following applications, we show how to use this trick to re-
duce the complexity of the proof for the client compared with the original
complexity of the algorithm computing the result as it must be done in
classical SMC. We selected unrelated problems to illustrate the ease of
application of our technique and we conclude by pointing out in Sec-
tion 5.5.4 other examples that may turn into good candidates.
5.5.1 System of linear equations
The first test application is solving a system of linear equations. It is
involved as a subroutine in many algorithms as, among others, in the
Lagrange polynomial interpolation or in linear programming techniques.
In linear programming, the goal is to optimize a solution under a set of
linear constraints. This kind of scenario fits very well in a multi-party
setting. We illustrate it by an example in which a set of companies in a
production line agree to cooperate in order to optimize the production
of some goods but do not wish to divulge their internal work flow to
each other. The gain for the companies is lower costs and the ability
to reallocate resources. Nowadays, all the solutions impair the privacy
in one way or another, thus preventing such benefits. We propose a
solution to solve system of linear equations as a building block to, for
example, find solutions of linear programming problems.
Consider the following system of linear equations L in the coefficient
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space M:
L ≡

α1,1z1 + · · ·+ α1,nzn = b1
...
...
αm,1z1 + · · ·+ αm,nzn = bm
⇔ AZ = B
where A ∈ Mm×n, B ∈ Mm×1 and Z is the matrix of variables with
dimension (n × 1). The unique solution, if it exists, is Zs = A−1B.
When the matrix is not invertible, we might produce Znts a non trivial
solution of the homogeneous system AZ = 0.
In a multi-party setting, the constraints are given by the clients. The
simplest scenario is that client Ci knows the private input αi for i =
(1, 1), · · · , (m,n) and the independent coefficients bj for j = 1, · · · ,m,
are known to everyone.
Each Ci computes ci ← Enc(pk, αi) and derives from it a commitment
on αi: di ← DerivCom(pk, ci). The di-s are published on PB as well as
a proof piope(di) computed by Ci. Meanwhile, the encryptions ci are
passed on to W. We can combine each di on PB to form the matrix D
which can be seen as a commitment on A. After having received and
decrypted each ci to get αi,W computes the inverse matrix A−1 with his
favourite method and thus the solution Zs = A
−1B. The worker then
publishes Zs on PB along with picor. This proof consists of a list of m
openings o1, · · · , om where oj is the opening of b′j = dj,1z1⊕· · ·⊕dj,nzn.
Indeed, to verify the result, each client computes B′ := DZs and checks
that the opening of each entry of this (m, 1)-matrix is valid and that
B′ opens on the values of B. In the case of a non trivial solution Znts
occurring when A is not invertible, the worker opens B′ := DZnts which
must be a series of commitments on zero.
One might also want to include B in the private inputs of the clients.
In this case, the picor is a bit different. Instead of giving the openings
oj , W provides a piDL(b′j , bj) that b′j commits on the same value as bj for
j = 1, · · · ,m.
picor is Zero-Knowledge:
Completeness It is clear that, given o1, ..., om, any client can verify
that Zs is indeed the solution of the linear system.
Soundness This relies on the computationally binding property of the
commitment scheme.
Perfect ZK As the commitment scheme is perfectly hiding, the open-
ings of the commitments must be uniformly distributed in the
space of openings.
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Complexity. For the client, the complexity cost is exactly linear in
the number of clients. In fact, the complexity bottleneck of the protocol
is how to find of Z. Either by inverting A, by the Gauss-Jordan elimi-
nation or more efficiently by the LU decomposition method, computing
Zs requires about O(n
3) operations (or O(n2.373) with the best current
algorithm). It is also noteworthy that these algorithms often require
branching when for example, searching the pivot in a row. However,
when performed in SMC, these operations may become costly.
5.5.2 Auctions
Another type of problems that benefits from our approach is electronic
auctions. We consider a setting of simple auctions where n clients submit
one bid each. The result of the auction consists of a list of the sorted
bids. More precisely, each Ci computes ci ← CCE(xi) where the bid
xi ∈ I = [0, L[. From ci, Ci derives di ← DerivCom(pk, ci) and computes
piran(di, I). While ci is sent to W, each Ci publishes di and piran(di, I)
on PB. W computes the sorted list (x′1, · · · , x′n) from (x1, · · · , xn) with
his favourite algorithm. From the sorted list, W rearranges the di to
produce a sorted list of commitments d′1, · · · , d′n. Then, W computes
n− 1 commitments e1, · · · , en−1 where ei := d′i >© d′i+1. As explained in
Section 5.3, the >© operator comes with n−1 proofs piran(d′i−d′i+1, ]−L,L[)
denoted pii. Thus, picor := ((e1, o1, pi1)∧· · ·∧ (en−1, on−1, pin−1)) where oi
is an opening of ei which must imply that ei commits on 1. W publishes
picor on PB along with d
′
1, · · · , d′n. Then, each client verifies picor to
validate the result of the auctions.
Note that, while there is a strong guarantee for the client that the
winner(s) of the auction are legitimate winner(s), the winning bid and
every other bid remain perfectly private. However, if required, W could
also have revealed the winning bids by publishing the openings of the
commitments. It is possible to transform this protocol into a sorting
protocol that does not reveal which client’s bid arrives in which posi-
tion. This can be done, first, by randomizing the commitments on PB
and, then, providing a proof of shuﬄe that the sorted list of commit-
ments comes from the randomized list. The work of Terelius and Wilk-
stro¨m [Wik09, TW10] proposes such an efficient technique that adapts
our commitment consistent approach. This method is detailed in Sec-
tion 4.4.2 for the complex ballot voting scheme with verifiable shuﬄing.
In this way, we could use the protocol as a subroutine of an algorithm
that needs sorting.
picor is Zero-Knowledge: This is clear since picor is formed by
NIZKPK.
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Complexity. As in the case of the linear system, the complexity
for the client is linear in the number of clients. For the worker though,
the highest complexity comes from the sorting algorithm (for example
O(n log(n)) in the case of Quicksort). However, as it is done on clear
values, the cost is marginal compared with the linear number of range
proofs to compute.
5.5.3 Shortest path
In this third example, we aim at showing that realizing more complex
protocols can be carried out without much difficulty. In the case of
the shortest path, we consider a directed graph with m vertices and n
weighted edges. The goal is to find the shortest path from a source node
to a target node which is the path that minimizes the sum of the weights.
We denote by v1, · · · , vm the vertices, while ei,jk is the edge from vi to
vj , numbered k in the edges list. Similarly, we denote w
i,j
k the positive
weight of edge ei,jk .
This problem has been studied in SMC since it offers a potential
solution to privacy-preserving GPS guidance in which the guided per-
son does not want to reveal its location to the service provider. In a
multi-party setting involving more than two players, we can imagine the
following scenario. A set of competing delivering companies possessing
connections with spare room available for goods might be appealed to
work together to offer a joined transport solution to a client without
disclosing private information. We provide more detailed examples of
applications of the shortest path in Chapter 6.
The Bellman-Ford algorithm solves the shortest path problem in
O(mn) operations. This algorithm maintains two lists : a list of prede-
cessors pred and a list of distances dist. While the algorithm executes,
predi designates the predecessor vertex of vi while disti stores the dis-
tance of vi which is the weight of the current shortest path from the
source vertex to vi.
In a multi-party setting we assume that each client Ci has wi as
private input. It is possible to turn Bellman-Ford algorithm into its
secure version using classical SMC or using our technique. As previously,
the derived commitments di ← DerivCom(pk, ci) are published on PB,
whileW gathers the ci ← Enc(pk, wi) of the clients’ private inputs. Then
W decrypts and computes the shortest path. The algorithm requires a
supremum value denoted > which is the maximum weight a path might
have plus one. We define > as n.L−n+ 1, where L is the bound on the
weights of the edges: wi < L. As a result, we also require Ci to publish
with di, a piran(di, L) on PB. This proof must be verified later by the
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other clients and W.
Let us now focus on the computation of picor by W. This is done
by computing Algorithm 5.4 on the commitments and by providing an
NIZKPK when necessary.
Algorithm 5.4: Secure shortest path based on Bellman-Ford’s
algorithm
Input: A graph G = (V,E) where V is the list of vertices
v1, · · · , vm and E the list of edges e1, · · · , en associated to
a list of committed weights d1, · · · , dn. One of the vertex
is labelled source.
Output: The predecessors list pred and/or the total distances
list dist.
1 for i← 1 to m do
2 predi ← Com(pk, i)
3 if vi = source then
4 disti ← Com(pk, 0)
5 else
6 disti ← Com(pk,>)
7 end
8 end
9 for k ← 1 to m do
10 for l← 1 to n do
11 ei,jl = el
12 y ← disti 	 distj ⊕ dl
13 x← y <© Com(pk, 0)
14 distj ← distj ⊕ x y
15 predj ← predj ⊕ x (Com(pk, i)	 predj)
16 end
17 end
Remarks on Algorithm 5.4:
• the predecessor of a vertex is represented by a commitment to the
number of the vertex (lines 2 and 15). These commitments can
be computed once and then reused when needed. The openings of
these commitments must be provided in picor. We assume that the
commitment algorithm Com is obtained via the CCE scheme.
• in the same way, the commitments on 0 and > on lines 4, 6, and 13
are computed once and then reused. Their openings should also
be given in picor.
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• the comparison on line 13 requires a piran and the two multiplica-
tions on lines 14 and 15 require each a pimul. All these proofs are
aggregated in picor.
picor is Zero-Knowledge: This is clear by the generic construction
of picor (see Section 5.4).
Complexity. In this third application, we provide a verification
algorithm that has exactly the same complexity as the algorithm itself
since it is a secure version of it. As a result the complexity of the
verification of the proof is O(mn) for the client. However, we do not
claim that a simpler verification proof in term of complexity does not
exist for the client. Nevertheless, this example shows that it is always
possible to obtain a complexity equal to the complexity of the algorithm.
Note that modifying the functionality could also result in an inter-
esting decrease of the verifiability computational effort for the clients.
For example, if the path p delivered by the worker is not exactly the
shortest path but rather a path meeting a series of criteria. As an il-
lustration of these criteria, let us imagine that it is mandatory for the
path p to go through some fixed edges and at the same time that the
weight of the path p must be under some fixed bound. Again, given the
solution path p, the verification that the criteria are met could be much
cheaper that the computation of the algorithm itself. Of course this ex-
ample illustrate a more general way of thinking our functionalities and
the requirements fixed for the solution.
5.5.4 Miscellaneous
Exploring some other problems that adapt very well with our approach,
our attention was caught in particular by the wide category of NP-
problems. A first interesting one is the graph colouring problem where
we want to colour each vertex of a graph given a fixed number of colours
and where two adjacent vertices cannot have the same colour. In the
multi-party case we assume that the structure of the graph is secretly
shared among the clients. While this problem might be hard to solve,
the solution when found could be easily verified.
Another graph NP-problem is finding a Hamiltonian cycle in a given
graph. This kind of cycles is a path that visits each vertex exactly once.
No known algorithm computes the solution of this problem in polynomial
time whereas verifying a given solution is linear in the number of nodes.
Again, in multi-party, we assume that each client knows only a subset
of the graph while the entire structure remains hidden.
Finally, other optimization problems might fit well with our tech-
nique. The knapsack problem is a good example with multi-party appli-
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cations. For example, a set of clients share the use of a truck that has a
maximum weight capacity. They all have a fixed number of items with
respective secret weights. The goal is to maximize the number of items
stored in the truck without exceeding its capacity. As this problem may
not have a deterministic solution, the clients could require the worker to
reach some minimal bound. Verifying that the bound is reached is then
a matter of a simple sum.
5.6 Prototype implementation and timing re-
sults
A generic implementation of the protocol has been realized in Python.
The main objective was to create a simple framework to emulate the
clients-worker interaction and measure the load of work of each party
in different scenarios. The implementation aims to be light and rea-
sonably efficient by using optimized algorithms and techniques. Our
implementation is a prototype. However it is already a good indicator
of performance. Nevertheless, we might expect a nice efficiency gain
when using optimized code in C for example. This should be worth for
specifically designed applications. In this regard, we do not claim that
we have the best known time results for our applications. For example,
the recent work of Hamada et al. [HICT14] focussing on SMC sorting is
still hundred times better than the “functionality-like” auctions of this
chapter.
The details of the implementation were provided in Section 3.5 and
we made the libraries and our test applications available online [Cuv15].
We use the PPATS CCE scheme introduced in Section 3.4.
Audit of the code. Our implementation is meant to be used, but
our setting allows the clients and the worker to develop their own code
independently. To do so, the clients and the worker have to agree on
the verification procedure that is used to verify the correctness of the
function evaluation. For example, in the case of auctions, after that
the worker has published the list of the sorted commitments with the
picor proof, the verification proceeds in two steps: first, the clients ver-
ify that the sorted list of commitments is a permutation of the original
list of commitments, then, the clients verify the picor proof which is an
aggregation of pi< proofs. However, other verification procedures are
possible such as verifying the sorting algorithm itself. Aside from this,
the worker needs to produce and send the public key pk of the CCE
scheme to the clients. If someone wants to use our implementation or
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Table 5.1: complexity and size cost for primitives and NIZKPK.
Computation Verification Size
piope 2Smp + 1A Sm + 2Smp + 2A 3V
pior 4Smp + 2A 2Sm + 3Smp + 3A 4V
piDL 4Smp + 2A 2Sm + 4Smp + 4A 4V
pimul 6Smp + 3A 4Sm + 5Smp + 6A 6V
piran(2
k+1) 6kSmp + 3kA
(3k − 1)Sm + 3kSmp 5kV + k
+(4k − 1)A
wants to rely on someone else’s implementation, there are a few verifi-
cations to perform on the code. On the client’s side, preventing privacy
leakages means verifying that the code only CC encrypts his private in-
formation with the public key and sends only his CCE ciphertext to the
worker while publishing the commitment on the public board. More-
over, to obtain verifiability, the clients must check that the code verifies
the picor proof correctly. However, it is not important for the clients to
audit the worker’s code since the verifiability guarantee relies only on
the picor proof and the privacy is, by hypothesis, entrusted to the worker.
Complexity. In the following complexity analysis, we recall the nota-
tions used in Section 3.5. We denote by A the EC Point addition in G1
and by Sm and Smp, the scalar multiplication of EC Point in G1 without
and with precomputation respectively. In Table 5.1, we list the cost of
different NIZKPK we use in our algorithms. We split the cost between
computation and verification of the proof. In this table, we also indicate
the size cost of each proof and the commitment. As a base unit, we
write V for a λ-bit long integer which is the length of a random number
in Fp or roughly in Zq. Storing one EC point could be done by storing
its x-coordinate plus 1 bit of sign.
In Table 5.2, we list the complexities to compute and verify the picor
of the three applications we considered in the Section 5.5. Note that in
the case of a linear system, we place ourselves in the simplest scenario
where the worker provides as picor, a list of openings. From the client’s
point of view, the complexities of the linear system and the auctions
are linear in the number of clients. For the shortest path it equals the
complexity of the Bellman-Ford algorithm.
Several tests were performed on a standard laptop: Intelr Core i5-
3320M CPU @ 2.60GHz×4 with 7.7 GB of RAM. For these tests, the
security parameter λ is 256-bit long. Even though this is the current
security requirement for EC based cryptosystems, we argue that this is
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Table 5.2: complexity and proof size for picor of applications –
the linear system is performed with a coefficients matrix of size m× n,
each client possessing one coefficient. We consider auctions with n + 1
bids of size < 2k+1. The graph used for the shortest path contains m
vertices and n weighted edges of weight < 2k+1, each client possessing
one weighted edge. The cost for checking the proof picor is given for one
client.
Worker
algorithm preparing proof picor
Linear
system
solving
O(n3)
[mn]Sm
+[2mn]Smp
+[2mn]A
proof size : (n+ 2m)V
Auctions
O(n log n)
[(n+ 1)(3k − 1)]Sm
+[(n+ 1)(10k − 1)
−6k + 2]Smp
+[(n+ 1)(7k − 1)
−3k + 1]A
proof size : (n− 1)(5kV + 4V + k)
Shortest path
O(mn)
[n(3k − 1)]Sm
+[mn(6k + 14)
+2m+ 3kn]Smp
+3k + 1]A
proof size : mn(5kV + 30V + k) + 8mV
Client
|C| checking proof picor
Linear
system
solving
mn
[2mn− 1]Sm
+[2mn+ 2m+ 6]Smp
+[3mn+ 1]A
Auctions n
[2n(3k − 1)]Sm
+[n(6k + 2) + 6k + 8]Smp
+[n(8k − 1) + 3k + 3]A
Shortest path
n
[mn(3k + 8) + (n− 1)(3k − 1)]Sm
+[mn(3k + 12) + 8m
+(n− 1)(3k) + 6k + 8]Smp
+[mn(4k + 18) + 4m
+(n− 1)(4k − 1) + 3k + 3]A
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Table 5.3: time results and proof size for the three applications
– timings are given in seconds. |C| is the number of clients. About
the parameters, in the linear system, we suppose square systems and
the shortest path number of vertices equals the number of edges (see
Section 5.5 for details). The proof size is theoretically computed on the
basis of a security parameter λ of 256-bit long.
|C| Worker Client Proof
Size
Linear system solving
16 1.86e10−1 4.14e10−2 384 B
256 3.03 5.62e10−1 1.54 kB
4096 52.34 8.8 6.14 kB
Auctions
10 3.94e10−1 3.87e10−1 22.79 kB
100 4 4.17 250.5 kB
1000 40.08 42.04 2.53 MB
Shortest path
4 2.57e10−1 4.81e10−1 54.81 kB
16 2.57 6.85 864.7 kB
64 35.03 105.7 13.79 MB
too high for our protocol where a polynomial time adversary that would
be able to break the correctness of the scheme needs to run an attack
against the binding property of the commitment scheme (in our case,
break the DLP). However, at the time scale of the protocol execution,
this attack has to be performed in a short amount of time. For this
reason, we suspect that a smaller security parameter would still allow a
high level of security while alleviating the computational burden of the
participants.
The time results including all the computations are presented in
Table 5.3. Whenever possible, the computations are spread through the
different cores of the processor to take advantage of the parallelization.
The results show clearly the linearity in the number of clients in the first
two applications while the complexity of the shortest path follows the
quadratic complexity of the algorithm. The main limitations of efficiency
are inherent to the way Python and the Gmpy package manage the
basic modular operations of addition and multiplication. In counterpart,
prototyping various applications in Python is rather facilitated while an
optimized language like C might be preferred for targeted applications.
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5.7 Conclusion
Current progress and real world applications in the field of secure multi-
party computation are positive indicators for this branch of cryptogra-
phy. Faster and reliable but also user-friendly solutions are provided to
meet the needs of an emerging sector of activity.
This chapter aims at proposing a simple and efficient solution to eval-
uate multi-party function in a clients-worker setting where the clients
want a strong guarantee over the correctness of the result. Our solution
is based on perfectly hiding commitments posted on a public bulletin
board for which a worker will be bound to and will provide a computa-
tionally sound proof of correctness. Combining our CCE primitive with
NIZKPK results in a generic and easy-to-set up protocol that is secure
against passive adversary for the privacy and secure against active ad-
versary for the correctness of the function evaluation. Incidentally, our
protocol provides a perfectly private audit trail.
Moreover, we show that this setting allows the clients to gain in com-
plexity for the verification of the proof when this verification is cheaper
than the algorithm used to compute the result. As a side effect, the
worker is able to use his own algorithm to compute the result of the
function without disclosing the intellectual property of his algorithm.
This is of particular interest when the worker is a company special-
ized in algorithmic optimization. We illustrate the ease of use of our
technique by three – rather simple but already used in real world – ap-
plications. We also provide timing results measured on our prototype
implementation that indicate efficiency even though we point out that
improvements could be achieved with clever optimizations.
Chapter 6
Securely Solving Combinatorial
Problems with Secure Multi-Party
Computation
Most of the work presented in this chapter was published in the pro-
ceedings of the “Financial Cryptography and Data Security” conference
in 2013 [ACM+13].
This chapter investigates the problem of solving traditional combi-
natorial problems using Secure Multi-Party computation (SMC) tech-
niques, focusing on the shortest path and the maximum flow problems.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time these problems have
been addressed in a general multi-party computation setting.
While not really focussed on audit mechanisms, this chapter offers
two valuable pieces of information for this thesis: first, it presents com-
binatorial problems that are good candidates for multi-party real-world
applications. More importantly, the analysis and measurements carried
out on the prototype implementation give us a good point of comparisons
for our test applications of Chapter 5. Second, this chapter highlights
the complexity gaps as well as the different privacy leakages that arise
in secure programming.
We point out that the results presented in this chapter do not give
any verifiability guarantee outside the passive adversary model. To ob-
tain verifiability, we must use traditional SMC schemes that are secure
against active adversaries. In this case, the parties are ensured that all
the participants follow the protocol.
We performed and tested secure implementations of the combina-
torial algorithms by using the VIFF framework [VIF]. We used this
Python framework in the passive security “mode”. However, it can be
switched to an active security “mode” without the need to modify the
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code. Hence, the conclusions of this chapter remain valid within the
active adversary model except for the timing measures which would be
significantly impacted by the change of paradigm.
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6.1 Introduction
Secure multi-party computation is the problem of jointly evaluating a
function on a set of secret inputs without leaking anything but the
output of the function. SMC has been at the center of cryptogra-
phy research for almost 30 years. A first series of foundational works
[Yao82, BOGW88, CCD88, GMW87] demonstrated the possibility to
evaluate any function in various models, the function being described as
a circuit. As already pointed out in this thesis SMC targets the evalu-
ation of functions of specific interest, such as voting or auctions, graph
problems, but also benchmarking, linear programming, secure outsourc-
ing, etc.
One common point of all these applications is that the function eval-
uation process is naturally oblivious of the inputs on which the function
has to be evaluated. Computing the highest one of n bids or summing n
votes is carried out by performing n comparisons or sums independently
of the values that are considered.
However there are large classes of problems for which the natural
evaluation process depends on the input data. In that case, even if
all the manipulated data are appropriately shared or encrypted, the
execution flow might just be sufficient to leak undesirable information.
This is typically the case in combinatorial problems, of which graph
problems are one of the most common examples. Consider, for instance,
a consortium of delivery companies covering different territories through
regular distribution circuits. These companies might be interested in
computing the fastest way to bring a package from one place to another,
but be reluctant to share between each other the precise connections
they are using and the performance of their trucks. Their problem
could be solved by securely evaluating traditional shortest path algo-
rithms such as those of Bellman-Ford or Dijkstra. The immediate way
of securely computing the shortest path would be to blind (encrypt or
share) the weight of all the edges of the corresponding graph. However
this approach could completely miss its purpose depending on the graph
encoding and shortest path algorithm that are used: if the algorithm
conditionally visits the graph by branching as a function of the secret
weights, then the branching patterns could leak a substantial amount
of secret information. In a similar way, the resolution of combinatorial
problems, even on obfuscated inputs, can leak substantial information
through the structure of the combinatorial object that is manipulated,
as well as through its running time. We stress that this is not just a
theoretical concern: numerous techniques have been developed, notably
in the line of work on side-channel attacks [Koc96], that can successfully
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exploit branching patterns and running times in order to recover the
secrets on which computation is performed.
6.1.1 Our contributions
In this chapter, we tackle the problem of securely solving combinatorial
problems in a multi-party setting through a series of examples taken
from graph theory. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time
that these most classical algorithmic problems have been addressed in
a general secure multi-party setting. Our solutions have applications
in the numerous contexts where a graph is shared between competing
entities. Natural examples include:
• privacy-preserving GPS guidance in which one party knows the
map while the other knows his origin and destination,
• privacy-preserving determination of topological features in social
network (the number of different ways to connect two people can be
seen as a special case of the maximum flow problem, for instance,
in which case each party would know his own friends but no more),
or
• privacy-preserving determination of the performance of the coop-
eration between competing network operators (gas, electricity, lo-
gistics, ...), in which each party would know the capacity of his
own infrastructure but no more.
Furthermore, our study raises several intriguing complexity gaps and
suggests the exploration of various trade-offs.
Algorithm design. We focus our research on computing the shortest
path and the maximum flow based on the secure arithmetic black-box
functionality of Damg˚ard and Nielsen [DN03] augmented with compar-
ison [Tof11]. That is, our protocols assume access to a functionality
that offers secure addition, multiplication and comparison. This allows
us to abstract from the specific security model in which we want our
protocol to be secure: depending on the implementation of the secure
arithmetic black-box that is used, our protocols will be secure only in
the presence of an honest majority or with up to all but one corrupted
player, in the information theoretic or computational model, in front of
passive or active adversaries, ... Various such implementations, in vari-
ous models, are available in tools designed for multi-party computation
such as FairplayMP [BDNP08], Sepia [BSMD10], Sharemind [BLW08]
or VIFF [Gei10].
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We focus on two of the most standard graph problems, chosen for
their wide diversity of applications: computing shortest paths and max-
imum flows. For each of these problems, we discuss secure evaluation
techniques inspired from classical algorithms of various complexities:
Bellman-Ford and Dijkstra for the shortest path, and Edmonds-Karp
for the maximum flow.
Our resulting algorithms offer quite different overheads, depending
on the algorithm and the graph structure, as illustrated in Table 6.1. For
those algorithms, the table shows first the traditional (non secure) com-
plexity, then the complexity of our secure versions expressed in number
of calls to the arithmetic functionality. There, we consider the case of
a graph with public structure and then with private structure, meaning
not only that the weight of each edge is kept secret, but also that the
adjacency relation between vertices is kept private as well.
Several observations can already be made.
• The best implementations, using advanced data structures as dy-
namic trees [ST81] or Fibonacci heaps [FT87], are definitely non-
trivial to replicate in the secure setting (see also discussion in Sec-
tion 6.1.2 below). Their relevance is also unclear for the relatively
small size of the problems that we are addressing, as they usually
come with large constants.
• The overheads resulting from moving from the original algorithms
to their secure versions largely differ between algorithms: in the
case of a public structure for instance, we see either no difference,
or an |E| factor or a |V | factor depending on the algorithm.
• The overhead resulting from hiding the graph structure largely dif-
fers depending on the algorithm and type of graph. For Bellman-
Ford, the difference essentially corresponds to always handling a
complete graph when the structure needs to be hidden. For Dijk-
stra however, the secrecy of the graph structure has no impact.
• While Bellman-Ford is traditionally less efficient than Dijkstra,
this is not true anymore (asymptotically at least) for our secure
variants: Bellman-Ford becomes substantially more efficient for
sparse graphs (e.g., if |E| = O(|V |)) and the asymptotic complex-
ities are similar for dense graphs.
The overheads in terms of number of protocol participants, round
complexity, ... largely depend on the implementation of the secure arith-
metic functionality, and are in line with traditional works.
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Table 6.1: Asymptotic complexities: original algorithms and secure ver-
sions with public and private graph adjacency matrix.
Public Secret
Optimized Original Structure Structure
Bellman-Ford |V ||E| |V ||E| |V ||E| |V |3
Dijkstra |E|+ |V | log |V | |V |2 |V |3 |V |3
Edmonds-Karp |V |2|E| |V ||E|2 |V ||E|2 |V |5
Complexity: the constants matter. In order to challenge our al-
gorithms in practice, we implemented them all using the Virtual Ideal
Functionality Framework (VIFF) of Geisler et al. [Gei10], in the honest-
but-curious (or passive) model.
This allowed us to further investigate the constants hidden by the
asymptotic notations discussed above. This made particularly visible
the difference of cost between the different black-box primitives that we
used: addition based on linear secret sharing [Sha79] (see also Section
2.2) comes for free (no communication involved), multiplication is no-
ticeable (it involves one secret sharing), and comparison (based on Toft’s
protocol [Tof07]) is ≈ 165 times more expensive than a multiplication,
something that strongly contrasts with the execution time of traditional
algorithms.
These differences have strong practical impact and motivated some
trade-offs as well.
• Our version of Dijkstra’s algorithm involves only |V |2 comparisons
compared to |V |3 (or |V ||E|) in Bellman-Ford. As a result of
this, for dense graphs or when the graph structure is secret, Dijk-
stra’s algorithm remains considerably more efficient than Bellman-
Ford’s, even when the structure of the graph is public, provided
that the graphs have a reasonably small size (a hundred vertices).
• For sparse public graphs that contain a small number of paths from
the source to the sink, a variant of Edmonds-Karp’s algorithm that
relies on an exhaustive public enumeration of the source to sink
paths can be considerably simpler and more efficient than a secure
version of the breadth-first search for augmenting paths that is
performed in the original algorithm: this allows trading expensive
book-keeping and addressing operations for more but much simpler
rounds.
So, besides the fact that our work offers the first solutions for the
secure evaluation of various graph properties, we think that it raises
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several intriguing complexity issues. Notably, we wonder whether the
complexity gaps that we have are inherent to the added security or if
they can be improved.
6.1.2 Related works
As mentioned above, the large majority of works on secure multi-party
computation focused on functions whose evaluation execution flow is
independent of the secret inputs. There are important exceptions to
this, however.
Branching programs. Branching programs are decision procedures
that, based on some inputs and decision parameters such as thresh-
olds, perform a specific classification of the input. Secure versions of
these programs, where a user does not learn the branching program of
the server while the server does not learn the user’s inputs, have been
considered in various works [KJGB06], [IP07], [BPSW07], [BFK+09],
[BFL+11]. While these works share our goals of hiding the data path
through which the program is going, they do not aim at hiding the length
of that path which, in our case at least, could leak a substantial amount
of information.
Shortest path in the two-party setting. The work of Brickell and
Shmatikov [BS05] addressed the problem of solving some graph problems
securely and their work is, as such, the closest one to ours. Substantial
differences appear, though.
First, their security model is quite different from ours. Their proto-
cols, which are based on a privacy-preserving set union protocol, pro-
ceed by making their outputs known to the participants progressively
as part of the execution (e.g., edge by edge as the protocol runs). Even
though this is not revealing more than the eventual outcome, this makes
their protocols unusable as sub-components of other higher-level pro-
tocols that would rely on using these outputs as part of their secret
state. Revealing outputs part-by-part as the protocol runs might also
be problematic in applications in which some participants could abort
the protocol in the middle of its execution, based on what they have
already learned. Our protocols, on the other hand, can be freely used
as subroutines, and one of our secure max-flow algorithms will make use
of a secure shortest-path algorithm.
Second, the graph problems they consider are different from ours as
well. They do not consider the maximum flow problem at all: their work
focuses on computing shortest distances, from a known source to all the
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vertices or for all the vertex pairs, in a setting where all the participants
assign a weight to all the edges. We further investigate the problem of
computing the shortest path from a single source to a single destination,
which cannot be done using their set union technique as it would reveal
much more information than the specific distance we are interested in.
Eventually, their protocols are not based on generic building-blocks,
like the arithmetic black-box functionality on which we rely. Specifically,
their protocols are designed for the two-party computation setting in the
honest-but-curious model. While these specifics allow them to develop
techniques that are quite efficient in this two-party setting, it is unclear
how efficient a transposition of their approach to the multi-party setting
would be.
Efficient secure data structures. The problem of securely comput-
ing on data structures has been investigated by Toft [Tof11], in the case
of a secure priority queue, which he implements using a variation of
bucket heap. The problem studied there shares similar flavours with
those we address here: to securely compute on structured data by keep-
ing the actions independent of the inputs. The computational overhead
compared to the efficiency of the original bucket heap is logarithmic,
making it occupy an interestingly different spot in the list of overhead
examples discussed above.
Similar effects could also be achieved through the use of oblivious
memories [GO96], [DMN11]. The term “oblivious memories” denomi-
nates the set of techniques that allows hiding the access pattern of a
program to memory against an eavesdropper. If the program execution
is outsourced by the client to a server who might be the eavesdropper,
thanks to oblivious memories, the client is ensured that the eavesdrop-
per does not learn any information regarding the client’s requests. This
technique results in an overhead in the data storage as well as in the
data access operations.
Organisation of the chapter. Section 6.2 describes the building
blocks we will use and our main implementation choices. Section 6.4 de-
scribes our approach to the classical single source and single-pair shortest
path problems, and Section 6.5 describes our approaches of the maxi-
mum flow problem.
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6.2 Preliminaries
6.2.1 Black-box operations
We build our protocols on top of an ideal functionality : the arithmetic
black-box functionality FABB of Damg˚ard and Nielsen [DN03], whose
definition captures the properties we need.
This functionality allows n parties to securely store elements of a
ring Zm, to repeatedly perform the ring operations of addition and mul-
tiplication on these elements, and to open the result of the computation
when needed. Following Toft [Tof11], we consider a slightly extended
and abstracted version of this functionality that offers the possibility to
perform secure comparison and consider any possible ring. So, storing,
opening, addition, multiplication and comparison will be the only secure
operations on which our protocols rely. Following the notations intro-
duced in Section 2.2, we write [x] to address the version of x securely
stored by FABB and we call [x] a shared value of x. We also use the
notation [v] for a vector of shared values and [M ] for a matrix of shared
values. We denote the secure arithmetic operations on shared values in
the natural way, e.g., [z] ← [x] + [y] for the addition of two secrets.
We use the notation (·) to denote the dot product between two vectors.
The actual protocol implementing these operations depends on the de-
tails of the realization of this functionality. Numerous SMC schemes can
be used for that purpose [GMW87, CCD88, DN03] or, for more recent
approaches [BDOZ11, DKL+12, DPSZ12], depending on the security
model that is appropriate.
All our protocols assume that inputs are already stored in the FABB
functionality and give access to the stored outputs (that can be opened
through opening requests to FABB). This feature guarantees the com-
posability of the protocols. The way inputs and outputs are shared
depends on the application: they might come from a specific problem,
or from the needs of a higher-level protocol using this protocol as a
sub-routine, for instance.
6.2.2 Bounds
The size of the ring Zm has to be chosen carefully to prevent overflows.
For each protocol presented in this chapter, we provide the bounds of
m and the value of > in Figure 6.1. These bounds depend on numbers
such as the maximum weight wˆ or the maximum capacity cˆ allowed for
the edges. These maxima are agreed in advance by the players. Remark
that > is smaller than m. Most comparison protocols require a much
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Protocol > > m >
USNM & USM - -
SSPBF |V |.wˆ f(>)
SSPD |V |.wˆ |V |.f(>)
SMFEK - |V |.f(cˆ)
SMFCEK cˆ max(f(>+ cˆ), |V |.f(cˆ))
Figure 6.1: Minimal bounds on > and m to avoid overflows.
SSPBF and SSPD are the secure shortest path algorithms presented
in Section 6.4.
SMFEK and SMFCEK are the secure maximum flow algorithms pre-
sented in Section 6.5.
|V | is the number of vertices, wˆ and cˆ are respectively the maximum
weight and the maximum capacity admissible (by convention) in a graph.
larger m than the values to compare. This dependence is taken into
account via a function f .
6.2.3 Graph representation
Depending on the algorithm we are trying to compute and on the part
of the graph description that is part of the secret input, different graph
representation approaches will show to be useful.
In all cases, we will assume that the number of vertices in the graph
is public (or at least an upper bound on it). Depending on the setting,
the adjacency relationship between the vertices might be public or not.
For instance, it is natural to have it public if the graph represents the
connections between places on a map, but it might be desirable to keep
it secret if the presence of edges reveals the existence of transactions
between competing companies.
A traditional structure for storing a graph consists in storing, with
every vertex, a list of its neighbours (and the weight of the corresponding
edges). This structure is quite efficient in terms of memory. However, it
might be quite problematic from a security point of view, as it discloses
the degree of each vertex. A solution would be to tolerate the leakage
of an upper bound on these degrees, but that upper bound would be
close to imply the storage of a complete graph as soon as one single
vertex is of high degree. Furthermore, even if the leakage of the degree
of the vertices is tolerated, algorithms that perform breadth-first search
on vertices and branch depending on the weight of edges could reveal a
lot of information. As a result, this graph representation can show to
be very effective in some cases, but completely inappropriate in others,
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even when the graph structure is public.
A second traditional way of representing graphs is to store their
adjacency matrix, the elements of the matrix representing the weight of
the edges between vertices. This approach has the benefit of offering a
storage that is independent of the graph structure.
6.2.4 Privacy leakage by execution flow
An omnipresent problem that we have to keep in mind in the design
of our algorithms is the potential leakage over privacy that may occur
during the execution flow. This happens mainly because the branchings
that are naturally numerous in most algorithms, become a source of
leakage in their secure version. Indeed, if we reveals the path that the
execution takes given a fixed set of inputs, an adversary might be able
to deduce all kinds of information about these inputs.
To be more concrete, imagine a sorting algorithm that requires, in
the best case, exactly n comparison operations to check that a list is
sorted and, in the worst case, n2 comparisons. An adversary simply
counting the number of operations or the number of executed loops,
might directly deduce if the list is already or almost sorted, etc. From
that, the adversary knows that the secret input belonging to some player
is smaller that the one belonging to another. This is of course an intol-
erable leakage of information.
The most direct countermeasure is to run the algorithm as if it is
always in the worst case scenario. This leads to an important overhead
compared to the unsecured version of the algorithm. An “if-then-else”
branching must be treated in a similar fashion, both condition must be
handled with the same computations, sometimes resulting with adding
a [0] to a shared value in order to update it.
As discussed in the previous sections, if the structure of the graph
is private, we often have to consider an execution of the algorithm over
the complete graph where the players set the “non existing” edges to
an extrema value determined in advance. In this case, we did not study
how a player deviant from the protocol could use this at his advantage
since we suppose that we remain in passive security.
6.2.5 Unary versus decimal representation
While running our algorithms, we will often need to perform some op-
erations on a specific vertex designated by a secret index. This will
typically be performed by running that operation on all vertices, includ-
ing a cancelling factor everywhere but on the vertex that needs to be
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treated. An obvious way of testing whether we are working on the right
vertex would be to perform a test at each step.
In some cases, we can use a more effective approach that avoids
comparisons, by representing the index of the vertex i by a vector [i] ∈
{[0], [1]}1×b where each entry is [0] except for the i’th which is [1]. We
call this the unary notation. We can then access the weight of the edge
from vertex i to vertex j by computing the matrix product [i].[M ].[j]t
where [M ] is the weighed adjacency matrix. Algorithm 6.1 provides a
way to update an element in a shared list. It can be easily extended to
update an element in a shared matrix. This algorithm also exemplifies
a common way of emulating a branching depending on a secret value:
the arithmetic operation in the loop is actually equivalent to computing
if [i]j = [1] then [l]j = [x].
Algorithm 6.1: Update an element in a shared list and at a shared
position
Input: A list [l] of length b, a shared index [i], a shared value [x].
Output: The list [l] with the update [l]i = [x].
1 for j ← 1 to b do
2 [l]j ← [l]j + [i]j([x]− [l]j)
3 end
For a graph with n vertices, this protocol allows retrieving a se-
cret position in the adjacency matrix in O(n2) multiplications instead of
O(n2) comparisons, which is considerably more efficient, even if it im-
plies a considerable overhead in storage (moving from 1 secret index to
n secret bits). We note that, in all cases, this approach implies treating
the graph as if it were complete, which can be a considerable waste of
resources if the graph is actually sparse.
When working with secret lists or matrices we need to use Algorithm
6.2 to increment an index in unary notation which is in turn used to
access an element of the list as in Algorithm 6.1. Similar to a number
in unary notation, a unary index is a vector of shared [0] with one
element set to [1] indicating a position. For example ([0], [0], [1], [0])
indicates the third position. To increment an index, we need to push
forward the shared [1] in the vector. Algorithm 6.2 includes a boolean
condition [c] in its inputs. This condition decides whether the index is
really incremented or if it remains the same. However, in both cases,
the index is updated which gives no information on [c] for the observers.
Going from decimal notation to unary notation and vice-versa might
be useful in some scenarios. For example, if an algorithm that benefits
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Algorithm 6.2: Increment an index in unary notation
Input: An index [i] in unary notation of length b and a shared
boolean [c].
Output: If [c] is [1], increment the index [i]. Otherwise do
nothing.
1 for j ← b− 1 to 1 do
2 [i]j ← [i]j + [c]([i]j−1 − [i]j)
3 end
4 [i]0 ← (1− [c])[i]0
from the use of unary notation is used as a subroutine of another one
running with decimal representation of the shared values. For exam-
ple, sorting small integers has proved to be more efficient in the unary
case than sorting algorithms that use decimal representation [Maw15,
Chapter 4].
Given a value s and its unary representation vector denoted su of
length b, we want to translate the shared unary representation of s, given
by the vector [s]u into a shared value of the decimal representation of s
denoted [s]d. In this case, we simply need to compute the dot product
between [s]u and (0, ..., b−1) which requires b multiplications. The other
way around is a bit trickier since we have to produce a vector of shared
values of [0] or [1] where the i-th index is [1] only if s = i. In other
words, from the shared value [s]d we have to compute the vector [s]u
where
[s]ui :=
{
[1] if i = s
[0] otherwise.
In this case, considering the polynomial
Pb(x) :=
b−1∏
j=1
x2 − j2
−j2 ,
we compute [s]ui as Pb([s]
d−i) which in turn gives, when i = s, Pb([0]) =
[1] and, when i 6= s, Pb([s]d − i) = [0] as s − i ∈ [1 − b, b − 1] cancels
out one of the denominator factors. The change of representation from
decimal to unary takes b3 − 2b2 + b multiplications.
6.2.6 Prototyping
We implemented all our protocols over the Virtual Ideal Functionality
Framework (VIFF [VIF]) to challenge their performance. We consid-
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ered a 3-party execution in the information theoretic model with pas-
sive security: secret values are shared using Shamir’s secret sharing (see
Section 2.2), the BGW protocol is used for multiplication [BOGW88],
and Toft’s protocol is used for comparison [Tof07]. These choices were
made for simplicity and ease of prototyping, though much more effi-
cient protocols exist and would have led to considerably shorter running
times [BDOZ11, DPSZ12].
The timing measurements were performed on a single workstation
equipped with an Intel Xeon CPUs X5550 (2.67GHz) and 24GB of mem-
ory, running a standard Debian Squeeze.
6.3 Privacy-preserving sorting
Traditional sorting algorithms such as Quicksort have a complexity of
O(n log n) and use the comparison of two elements as an atomic opera-
tion. However, as already mentioned, comparing two values in SMC costs
much more than multiplying two values together and thus we cannot put
both operations on equal footing. For example, in VIFF, the compar-
ison operator is based on the bit decomposition protocol of Damg˚ard
[DFK+06] and, with the setting used in this chapter, one comparison
costs about 165 multiplications, see [Maw15, Appendix A] for details.
Several SMC sorting solutions have been proposed in literature. Jo´
nson et al. [JKU11] proposed a solution based on sorting networks
and implemented with Sharemind which is an SMC framework enabling
passive security for exactly 3 players. Their sorting protocol runs in
O(log2 n) rounds and requires O(n log2 n) comparisons per round. In
two successive Hamada et al. [HKI+13, HICT14] presented sorting so-
lutions based on the Quicksort algorithm and the radix sort algorithm
respectively. They obtain quite practical results with the following com-
plexities: O(log n) rounds with O(n log n) comparisons for the Quicksort
based algorithm and O(1) rounds and O(n log n) comparisons for the
radix sort based algorithm.
The two sorting algorithms we propose in this section do not rely on
comparisons as atomic operations. On the other hand, they are suited
only for sorting values that lay in a small range [0, b − 1]. Indeed, as
we use the unary representation, the cost per operation on an element
is proportional to the length b of the interval. We distinguish the case
where the n values to sort are all different from the case where there
may be several identical values in the list. Note that if the values to
sort are all different, we must have that b ≥ n. The first scenario is
called unary sorting with no multiplicities (USNM). The n players
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
[x1]
u
[x2]
u
[x3]
u
[x4]
u
[x5]
u
 =

[3]u
[4]u
[1]u
[5]u
[0]u
 =

[0] [0] [0] [1] [0] [0]
[0] [0] [0] [0] [1] [0]
[0] [1] [0] [0] [0] [0]
[0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [1]
[1] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0]
 =: [M ]
⇓(
[1] [1] [0] [1] [1] [1]
)
=: [s]
⇓(
[0] [1] [3] [4] [5]
)
:= [t]
Figure 6.2: Unary sorting example. Five players want to sort a secret
list formed by their private inputs xi shared in unary representation.
share their private inputs xi in unary notation, that is [xi]
u, a vector of
size b. Then, we proceed as follows:
1. the n shared values [xi]
u in unary representation form the rows of
matrix [M ] which is of size n× b.
2. sum each column of [M ] to obtain vector [s] of length b.
3. either open [s] to s or output the sorted list [t] as follows: for
i = 0, . . . , b − 1, run through [s]. If [s]i = [1], append [i] to [t],
else if [s]i = [1], do nothing. Appending [i] to [t] is performed by
updating the i-th position of [t]i with the product i[s]i.
These three steps are illustrated in the example of Figure 6.2 and
Algorithm 6.3 details the USNM computation.
In the second scenario where several identical values appear in the
list, the vector [s] summing the columns may contain natural numbers
greater than 1 corresponding to the multiplicities of the numbers in the
list to sort. The sum of these multiplicities must equal n, the number
of elements to sort. Similar to what is done to transform a shared value
from decimal to unary representation, we use the polynomial Qn(x)
defined as follows:
Qn(x) := 1−
n∏
j=1
x− j
−j
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Algorithm 6.3: USNM for sorting different elements
Input: A matrix [M ] where row i contains the secret shared
value [xi]
u in unary representation of player i where
xi ∈ [0, b− 1] are all different. Matrix [M ] is of
dimension n× b.
Output: A list [t] of length n containing the sorted shared
values.
1 [t]← ([0])1×n /* [t] stores the sorted list */
2 d← (1)1×n
3 [s]← d · [M ] /* [s] sums the columns of [M ] */
4 [k]← sharedindex(n)
5 /* index [k] keeps track of where to insert the current
value in [t] */
6 for i← 0 to b− 1 do
7 [c]← [s]i
8 /* [c] is [1] or [0] whether the current value i is to
be inserted or not in [t] */
9 [t]← [t] + i[c][k]
10 /* this update of [t] is effective only if [c] is [1]
and in this case it stores [i] in [t] at the
position given in [k], otherwise it just replaces
[t] by itself */
11 incrementindex([k], [c])
12 end
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and we see that for x ∈ [0, n],
Qn(x) :=
{
0 if x = 0
1 otherwise.
By applying Qn on vector [s], we obtain a condition that is used to
compute the sorted list as shown in the unary sorting with multiplicities
(USM) Algorithm 6.4.
Remarks on Algorithms 6.3 and 6.4:
• The function updatevector calls Algorithm 6.1. The functions
sharedindex(b) returns an index in unary notion of length b set to
a starting position, that is a list beginning by a [1] followed by b−1
[0]. The function incrementindex(i, cond) calls Algorithm 6.2. It
increments the index i only if cond is set to [1] otherwise it returns
an unchanged index. Incrementing a unary index means that the
[1] is pushed forward by one position (e.g. ([0], [1], [0], [0]) becomes
([0], [0], [1], [0])). This algorithm requires exactly b multiplications
where b is the length of the index.
• Algorithm 6.3 requires exactly 3bn multiplications while Algo-
rithms 6.4 needs exactly 3b2 + 3n2 + 6bn + b + n multiplications.
No comparisons are required for neither of them.
• It is possible to keep track of the secret input owners but we have
to add a tracking mechanism in parallel of the execution of the
algorithm. However, in this case, the functionality is slightly dif-
ferent and more comparable to auctions.
We tested both algorithms on VIFF and obtained time results that
are consistent with the theoretic projection. For the USNM Algorithm,
we tested the maximum case scenario where b = n. Of course, in this
case, the result is known in advance since it is the list of integers from
1 to n. Nevertheless it gives us a maximum bound on the execution
time. A similar series of measurements was performed on the USM
Algorithm. Both results are shown in Figure 6.3. We display the case
where b = n even though, in the USM scenario, we might accept n ≥ b
as well.
A thorough analysis reveals that, in specific scenarios, our sorting al-
gorithms take advantage over the secure version of the standard odd-even
merge sort algorithm that uses comparisons. In particular, it appears
that the USNM Algorithm 6.3 could be used when the number of val-
ues to sort do not exceed 1500 items. For less than 1500, the interesting
range of the USNM depends on the bound b. As an illustration, when
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Algorithm 6.4: USM for sorting with multiplicities
Input: A matrix [M ] where row i contains the secret shared
value [xi]
u in unary representation of player i where
xi ∈ [0, b− 1]. Matrix [M ] is of dimension n× b.
Output: A list [t] of length n containing the sorted shared
values.
1 [t]← ([0])1×n /* [t] stores the sorted list */
2 d← (1)1×n
3 [s]← d · [M ] /* [s] sums the columns of [M ] */
4 [j]← sharedindex(b)
5 /* index [j] keeps track of which current value to
insert in [t] */
6 [k]← sharedindex(n)
7 /* index [k] keeps track of where to insert the current
value in [t] */
8 for i← 1 to b+ n do
9 [sj ]← [s] · [j]
10 [c]← Qn([sj ])
11 /* [s] stores the remaining multiplicity of the
current value [j]d, [c] is [1] when this remaining
multiplicity is > 0 */
12 [s′j ]← [sj ]− [c]
13 updatevector([s], [j], [s′j ])
14 /* if [c] is [1], the remaining multiplicity of [j]d is
decreased by one and the vector [s] is updated */
15 [t]← [t] + [c][j]d[k]
16 /* if [c] is [1], [j]d is appended to the sorted list
[t], otherwise [t] remains unchanged */
17 incrementindex([j], 1− [c])
18 /* if [c] is [1], we still have to append a copy of
[j]d to [t] thus we do not update [j] */
19 incrementindex([k], [c])
20 /* if [c] is [1], we just have appended an element to
[t] thus we update [k] that indicates where the
next element needs to be inserted in [t] */
21 end
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Figure 6.3: Time measurements for the implementation in VIFF of the
USNM Algorithm 6.3 and the USM Algorithm 6.4. The complexity
of USNM is O(bn) and the complexity of USM is O((b + n)2). The
slopes of the lines are ∼ 2.1 for USNM and ∼ 2.2 for USM.
b = 256, the threshold for n is 20 ≤ n ≤ 256. Indeed, using USNM to
sort less than 20 values from [0, 256] is worthless since the cost induced
by the size of the representation outweighs the cost of comparisons in
the odd-even merge sort algorithm.
Regarding the USM Algorithm 6.4, its range of applicability is ob-
viously smaller since the protocol runs 3b2 + 3n2 + 3bn + b + n more
multiplications than the USNM algorithm. We refer to [Maw15, Chap-
ter 4] for complementary details regarding the secure implementation of
classical sorting algorithms as the odd-even merge sort. Note that the
previous considerations are only valid in VIFF where one comparison
counts for 165 multiplications. We might find other range of applica-
bility for the unary sorting algorithms if we were to use another SMC
framework.
This section introduced two new algorithms for sorting in unary rep-
resentation that may find interest even outside the scope of secure com-
putations. The motivation that led to conceive those algorithms was
to avoid as much as possible to use comparisons since this operation
is costly in traditional SMC frameworks. This very same motivation
will stick in our mind through the rest of this chapter as it was already
present in Chapter 5.
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6.4 Privacy-preserving shortest path problem
The single-source shortest path problem is a major problem in graph
theory. It has several immediate applications. The typical one is finding
the shortest way to connect two cities on a road map where each city
is represented by a vertex and each road between two cities by an edge.
The edge weights are the road distances between cities. In this context,
a user may then want to obtain driving directions without revealing
neither his starting point nor his destination. Another application is the
one of two entities owning each a secret location in a shared network
and willing to compute the distance between them without disclosing
their location. We note that such a problem is worth solving even for
relatively small graphs. Consider for instance a routing network with a
dozen hubs in different European countries and three competing logistic
companies having each their own transportation costs for a defined set
of roads. As costs typically represent sensitive information that should
not be disclosed to competitors, being able to securely solve the shortest
path problem for 3 parties and a graph with a dozen of vertices is quite
helpful. Similar problems happen for network traffic on routers where
a small number of big hubs is involved. Competing companies have
to solve the shortest path to define routing scheme without revealing
sensitive information about internal network configuration.
Shortest path algorithms are also used as subalgorithms for more
advanced problems like the Chinese postman problem or the max-flow
problem that we address below: this highlights the importance of keep-
ing our protocols composable.
We investigate two standard algorithms for finding the single-source
shortest path in a graph with weighted edges: Dijkstra’s algorithm and
Bellman-Ford’s algorithm. The first one requires all edge weights to be
positive, while the second one only assumes there is no negative-weight
cycle in the input graph. As the non-secure version of all the algorithms
that we treat is widely available [CLRS09], we will only briefly outline
them.
6.4.1 Bellman-Ford’s algorithm
The algorithm of Bellman-Ford is particularly simple, making it a nat-
ural target for building a secure version. This algorithm proceeds by
repeatedly scanning all the edges, in search of adding edges that de-
crease the ongoing distance from the source to the various vertices. If a
pass over the edges does not improve the current solution, or if the edges
are scanned |V | times, the algorithm halts. An interesting feature of this
6.4. Privacy-preserving shortest path problem 147
algorithm is that its flow of operations only depends on the structure
of the graph but not on the weight of the edges. Its drawback is its
time-complexity: its classical implementation runs in O(|V ||E|) time.
Algorithm 6.5 (SSPBF) presents our secure shortest path protocol
based on Bellman-Ford. Note that > is a number agreed in advance by
the players as a higher bound for some calculations of the protocol. We
refer to Section 6.2.2 for discussion of the values of > and m in all our
algorithms. Note that the vertices are identified by a unique number
from 0 to |V |. Finally, updatevector refers to Algorithm 6.1. The
SSPBF protocol differs from the original algorithm only in a limited
number of aspects:
1. the branching corresponding to the discovery of a shorter path is
handled on Lines 9–11 through arithmetic operations as in Algo-
rithm 6.1,
2. the early termination condition of the Bellman-Ford algorithm,
which is triggered if the inner loop happens to have no effect during
one pass, is removed as it may leak information. This does not
invalidate the correctness of the algorithm but only increases the
running time.
The structure of this algorithm makes it easy to implement with
either of the two graph representations discussed above (list or matrix),
making it possible to fully exploit the sparsity of graphs when it is public
(we use the matrix representation if it has to be kept secret).
We see that our implementation requires |V ||E| secure comparisons,
dominating the time required to perform 2|V ||E| secure multiplications
and 5|V ||E| additions. These complexities grow to O(|V |3) when the
graph structure is secret, as the graph is then treated as complete (i.e.,
augmented with edges of infinite weight).
Interestingly, this algorithm is the only one among those we treated
in which our solution does not raise any asymptotic overhead (when the
structure is public).
Security. The simulation of an execution of this protocol is immediate
from the simulators available for the different calls that can be made by
the FABB functionality: the simulators corresponding to each of the
’+’, ’·’ and ’<’ operations can be invoked in turn, in an order defined
by the protocol execution, and a number of times that only depends on
public values (|V | and |E|). The same argument will apply to the other
protocols we present in this chapter, and we will therefore not come back
to it.
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Algorithm 6.5: SSPBF secure shortest path based on Bellman-
Ford’s algorithm
Input: A graph G = (V,E) where V := {vi} is the list of vertices
and E := {ej,k} the list of edges where ej,k is the edge
from vertex vj to vertex vk. A set of shared weights [w]
of length |E|, and a shared index of the position of the
source vertex [s] in unary representation.
Output: The list of immediate predecessors [p] and/or total
distances [d].
1 for i← 1 to |V | do
2 [p]i ← [0]
3 [d]i ← [>]
4 end
5 updatevector([d], [s], [0])
6 for i← 1 to |V | do
7 for l← 1 to |E| do
8 el = ej,k
9 [x]← [d]j − [d]k + [w]l
10 [c]← [x] < 0
11 /* the condition [c] is a shared [1] if
[d]k > [d]j + [w]e which means that [d]k must be
updated */
12 [d]k ← [d]k + [c][x]
13 [p]k ← ([1]− [c])[p]k + [c]j
14 /* if the condition is met, we update [p]k to
vertex vj (labelled to the number j) */
15 end
16 end
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6.4.2 Dijkstra’s algorithm
Dijkstra’s algorithm computes the shortest path from the source to all
vertices in the graph, that is, the shortest path tree rooted at the source.
The algorithm is greedy. At each iteration one vertex (the one with the
smallest distance label) is permanently updated to the scanned status.
Adapting Dijkstra. The fact that Dijkstra’s algorithm goes through
the graph in an order that depends on the weight of the edges makes
it very difficult to efficiently exploit the sparsity of a graph: our best
solutions have all a complexity that amounts to the one of a complete
graph, and we therefore use the matrix representation in all the cases
for our protocol.
Algorithm 6.6 (SSPD) presents our secure shortest path algorithm
based on Dijkstra. Note that updatevector refers to Algorithm 6.1 and
that updaterow is the natural extension of updatevector for replacing a
complete row in a shared matrix. Algorithm binarymin was introduced
by Toft in [Tof09] to obtain the minimal value out of a vector of shared
values. It securely computes a shared minimal value, [min], along with
a shared index [k] of its position. The protocol uses O(n) comparisons
and multiplications. Its overall round complexity is O(log(n)) rounds.
Vector [q] records the status of each vertex. An entry is set to [0] if the
corresponding vertex has not been scanned yet. It is updated to [>] as
soon as the vertex has been scanned.
The main differences between the traditional and our secure version
of Dijkstra’s algorithm happen in the inner loop:
1. On Line 7, the loop goes through all vertices instead of only con-
sidering the neighbours of the current vertex. In particular, this
includes an always transparent step where we consider the current
vertex and gives a substantial overhead if a public sparse graph is
considered.
2. On Lines 6 and 21, we need to go through all the elements of a
row or a vector, even if we know that only one of them is going to
be updated.
Those two modifications contribute to the same effect: they increase
the original complexity of Dijkstra from O(|V |2) to O(|V |3). More pre-
cisely, the exact number of comparisons is 2|V |2−3|V |+1 and the exact
number of dot products (used for the multiplication of vectors, costing
|V | multiplications) is 2|V |2 − |V | for |V | ≥ 4.
As the comparison protocol we use requires 165 multiplications to
compute 1 comparison, the number of multiplications to compute the
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Algorithm 6.6: SSPD secure shortest path based on Dijkstra’s
algorithm
Input: A graph G = (V,E) where V is the list of vertices and E
the list of edges, a matrix of shared weights [M ]i,j for
i, j ∈ {1, ..., |V |} and a shared index of the position of the
source vertex [s] in unary representation.
Output: The vector of distances [d]i and the matrix of
predecessor [P ]i,j for i, j ∈ {1, ..., |V |}.
1 for i, j ← 1 to |V | do
2 [P ]i,j ← [0]
3 [d]i ← [>]
4 [q]i ← [0]
5 end
6 updatevector([d], [s], [0])
7 for i← 1 to |V | do
8 [d′]← [d] + [q]
9 [min], [k]← binarymin([d′])
10 /* select a vertex vk that has not been visited yet,
its position is stored in [k] */
11 for j ← 1 to |V | do
12 /* visit all the adjacent vertices of vk */
13 [x]← ([d] + [M ]t∗,j) · [k]
14 /* [x] stores the distance of vj if reached from
vk by using edge ek,j */
15 [c]← [x] < [d]j
16 /* if the current distance of vj is greater than
[x], update the matrix of predecessor and the
list of distances accordingly as follows */
17 [P ′]j,∗ ← [P ]j,∗ + [c]([k]− [P ]j,∗)
18 [P ]← updaterow([P ], j, [P ′]j,∗)
19 [d]j ← [d]j + [c]([x]− [d]j)
20 end
21 updatevector([q], [k], [>])
22 /* vertex vk is labelled to ‘‘scanned’’ by setting
[q]k to [>] */
23 end
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Figure 6.4: Execution times of Algorithms 6.5 SSPBF and 6.6 SSPD
for a complete shortest path tree (|E| = (|V | − 1)2). The slopes of the
lines are ∼ 3 for SSPBF and ∼ 2.4 for SSPD.
shortest path in a complete tree is 2|V |3 + 329|V |2 − 495|V |+ 165. The
switch from quadratic to cubic dominance is at 165 vertices which is
precisely the number of multiplications used by a single comparison (see
also [Maw15, Figure 6.1]).
Our secure version of Dijkstra comes with an overhead of a factor
|V | compared to the original one, even when the graph structure can
be considered as public. We note that this was not the case in the
work of Brickell [BS05] who considered running Dijkstra securely as
well, but accepted to output the shortest paths step by step. Besides the
limitation that this brings when the protocol has to be composed, we also
observe that our algorithm can be used to solve problems that could not
be solved by Brickell’s approach, namely, computing the shortest path
between two specific vertices without leaking any other information:
their approach indeed leaks the shortest path to all vertices.
6.4.3 Implementation prototype
We ran the two shortest path protocols described above on complete
graphs of various sizes. This first showed that Algorithm 6.5 can only
be conveniently used for graphs where |V ||E| ≈ 103 (a few minutes on
a standard laptop): see Figure 6.4.
The secure versions of Bellman-Ford and Dijkstra have approxi-
mately the same complexity for complete graphs. However the quadratic
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number of comparisons makes it possible to run our secure version of
Dijkstra on a 64-vertex complete graph in roughly twice the time taken
by Bellman-Ford on a 16-vertex graph, and we were able to run it up
to a 128-vertex complete graph (i.e., counting 16256 directed edges) in
a bit more than an hour.
While these timings might look fairly high, they still make it possible
to solve natural problems in a reasonable time. For instance, if the 3-
party, 12-vertex problem outlined above could be solved in about 30
seconds.
For completeness, we point at another secure implementation of Di-
jkstra [Maw15, Section 6.2.6] that is based on the work of Toft [Tof11] on
priority queues. Investigating various secure data structures is a good
starting point to try to mitigate the cost of privacy in regular data struc-
tures where, for example, we have to consider a complete graph even
when the graph is strongly sparse. Unfortunately, the approach based
on priority queues does not seem to bring enough benefits compared to
the solutions proposed above.
6.5 Privacy-preserving maximum flow problem
In an oriented graph where the edges have a constraint of capacity, the
maximum flow problem consists in finding the maximum number of units
that can be carried from a vertex called source to another vertex called
sink. The flow through an edge designates the number of units passing
by it. This number cannot exceed the capacity.
This problem has numerous classical applications. In the spirit of
our previous examples, one of them could be competing transport com-
panies willing to determine the capacity they could reach if they decided
to achieve a joint-venture. It is natural in such a context to expect that
these companies will not be willing to disclose their full network struc-
ture to each other. As in the case of the shortest path, algorithms solving
the maximum flow problem are also very useful as subroutines for solv-
ing other problems. The minimum cut problem is one such traditional
example, which can be solved using O(|V |) invocations of the maximum
flow algorithm. Solving this problem is then useful to determine where
the weak points of the joint network would be.
Although we investigated many different algorithms for a transporta-
tion in SMC as the Ford-Fulkerson and the Push/Relabel algorithms, this
chapter only presents two secure protocols based on the Edmonds-Karp’s
algorithm.
6.5. Privacy-preserving maximum flow problem 153
6.5.1 Edmonds-Karp’s algorithm
The basic idea of the Edmonds-Karp’s (EK) algorithm is to find an
augmenting path in the residual graph that is the graph in which the
edges are weighted by their residual capacity, i.e., the capacity minus the
current flow. Each augmenting path increases the total flow so that the
algorithm eventually terminates when there are no augmenting paths
left. The increase is monotonic and paths are considered only once.
Typically, the EK algorithm uses a breadth-first search to find the next
augmenting path.
The asymptotic complexity of the traditional Edmonds-Karp’s algo-
rithm is O(|V ||E|2), which we can match securely. As we have seen in
the case of the shortest path problem, this complexity will be prohibitive
even for very small graphs if they are complete. It therefore makes sense
to focus our attention on (oriented) strongly sparse graphs, of which we
consider the structure to be public. More precisely, we consider graphs
in which the number of paths from the source to the sink is fairly small,
e.g., bounded by a small polynomial in the number of vertices.
Algorithm 6.7 for secure maximum flow based on Edmonds-Karp
(SMFEK) is given a list on input which contains all the paths sorted
in a growing order of length, p = (p1, ..., pk) where k is the number of
paths in the graph. This list is not secret as the structure is not, and
can therefore be easily constructed in public. As before, the binarymin
function refers to the function introduced by Toft in [Tof09] to compute
the minimum value in a list.
The main differences between this protocol and Edmonds-Karp’s ap-
proach are:
1. the public enumeration of all the paths instead of building of a
breadth-first search for capacity augmenting paths, and
2. the treatment of all the paths as if they were augmenting.
Algorithm SMFEK is correct as the set of all the augmenting paths
is contained in the set of all the paths p. Moreover, it ensures the privacy
of the edge capacities as no information is leaked about which path of p
is augmenting and which is not.
It is easy to see that the SMFEK requires O(k|V |) comparisons, as
the length of the longest path in the graph is bounded by |V | − 1, and
O(k) multiplications. This protocol makes a crucial use of the existence
of a small number of paths in the graph, something that we were not
able to use in the Algorithm SSPD for instance. It is however highly
inefficient for dense graph and would have a factorial complexity for
complete graphs.
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Algorithm 6.7: SMFEK secure maximum flow based on
Edmonds-Karp’s algorithm
Input: A graph G = (V,E) where V is the list of vertices and E
the list of edges, a source vertex so ∈ V , a sink vertex
si ∈ V , and a list p of length k containing the paths
between so and si sorted in a growing order of length. A
set of capacities [c]e and a set of flows [f ]e initially set to
[0] for e ∈ E. e¯ is the edge opposite to e.
Output: The maximum flow value from so to si.
1 while |p| > 0 do
2 p← pop(p)
3 [m]← binarymine∈p([c]e − [f ]e)
4 [b]← [m] > 0
5 [x]← [b][m]
6 /* if [m] is positive it is added to the current
flow */
7 for e ∈ p do
8 [f ]e ← [f ]e + [x]
9 [f ]e¯ ← [f ]e¯ − [x]
10 end
11 end
12 return
∑
e∈S
[f ]e where S = {e ∈ E|e’s origin is so}
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Figure 6.5: Execution times of Algorithm 6.7 for 10-vertex graphs.
This algorithm applies well to our previous example of the three
competing logistic companies trying to determine the max flow in their
joint networks. If we consider a case with 10 vertices and 37 different
paths, the execution takes less than a minute as shown in Figure 6.5.
Algorithm 6.8 (SMFCEK) presents the secure maximum flow im-
plementation based on the complete version of Edmonds-Karp’s algo-
rithm. The SSPBF function is a natural adaptation of Algorithm 6.5
that outputs the shortest path from the source to the sink in the form
of a vector denoted [p] of {[0], [1]} where a [1] at the i-th position indi-
cates that edge i belongs to the augmenting path. Note that the first
augmenting path p is public and given in input. We refer to Figure 6.1
for the value of the bound >.
In line 21 of Algorithm 6.8, the update of [w] is used for SSPBF call
so that edge j can no longer be part of a shortest path if [c]j = [f ]j and
if no other shortest paths exist in regards of the initial graph.
The main differences between algorithm SMFCEK and the tradi-
tional Edmonds-Karp’s algorithm are as follows :
• Each iteration goes through all the edges but only those which
form the current path are updated.
• The SSPBF algorithm is used instead of the Breath-First-Search
(BFS) algorithm to find the smallest augmenting path because
there is a serious overhead in a straightforward secure implementa-
tion of the BFS. To run the SSPBF algorithm, SMFCEK main-
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Algorithm 6.8: SMFCEK secure maximum flow based on com-
plete Edmonds-Karp’s algorithm
Input: A graph G = (V,E) where V is the list of vertices and E
the list of edges, a source vertex so ∈ V , a sink vertex
si ∈ V . A list of positive capacities [c]i for each edge.
The first augmenting path p.
Output: The maximum flow value from so to si.
1 for i← 1 to |E| do
2 [f ]i ← [0]
3 [w]i ← [1]
4 end
5 for i← 1 to |E| do
6 for j ← 1 to |E| do
7 [c′]j ← (1− [p]j)>+ [c]j
8 /* [c′] is a copy of [c] where the capacity of an
edge not in [p] is set to ≥ [>] */
9 [f ′]j ← [p]j[f ]j
10 /* [f ′] is a copy of [f ] where the flow of an edge
not in [p] is set to [0] */
11 end
12 [m]← binaryminj∈{1,...,|E|}([c′]j − [f ′]j)
13 /* [m] is the minimum value that path [p] can be
augmented with */
14 [b1]← [m] > 0
15 [x]← [b1][m]
16 /* if [m] is positive, path [p] is augmented with [m]
*/
17 for j ← 1 to |E| do
18 [f ]j ← [f ]j + [p]j [x]
19 [f ]j¯ ← [f ]j¯ − [p]j [x]
20 [b2]← [c]j − [f ]j = 0
21 [w]j ← [b2]|V |+ (1− [b2])[w]j
22 end
23 [p]← SSPBF(G, [w], so, si)
24 /* find the next shortest augmenting path [p] in the
graph */
25 end
26 return
∑
e∈S
[f ]e where S = {e ∈ E|e’s origin is so}
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tains a list of shared weights [w] for the edges where the weight of
an edge is [1] when it remains in the residual graph and it is [|V |]
otherwise.
It is straightforward to see that the asymptotic complexity of the
algorithm is O(|V ||E|2) as the original algorithm. The number of com-
parisons is |V ||E|2 + |E|2 + |E| and the number of multiplications is
|V ||E|2 + 5|E|2 + |E|.
6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we proposed several algorithms for securely computing
combinatorial problems and particularly graph problems. First we pre-
sented two sorting algorithms that sort elements represented in unary
notation. Then, we proposed secure versions of the Bellman-Ford’s and
Dijkstra’s algorithm to determine the shortest path in a graph. And fi-
nally, we detailed a secure version and its variant of the Edmonds-Karp’s
algorithm used to find the maximum flow in a graph.
Besides the interest that these protocols have in the numerous con-
texts in which their insecure counterparts found applications in the past
(possibly relying on a trusted third party), our investigation raised inter-
esting complexity gaps between centralized algorithms and secure pro-
tocols, ranging from a constant to something growing like the number
of vertices in the graphs. It is then natural to wonder whether these
gaps, when they arise, can be decreased. Various avenues appear for
that purpose:
• Design efficient datastructures adapted to the investigated prob-
lems.
• Investigate whether secure comparisons, which are often a bot-
tleneck, can be traded for other, cheaper, arithmetic operations.
This raises unusual questions from a traditional algorithmic point
of view, as comparisons are usually considered as basic operations.
Considering other standard combinatorial problems could also pro-
vide new insights. The protocols and results presented in this chap-
ter are prototypes that validate the theoretical complexity evaluations.
While the running times given for the protocols look unpractical for large
graphs, this issue must be put in perspective. Indeed, an implementation
for concrete applications should definitively be improved by relying on
lower level programming languages and optimized underlying libraries.
Various optimization techniques (see, e.g., [BDOZ11, DPSZ12]) would
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lead to performance increases of several orders of magnitude, as has
been observed in the case of the AES during the last 3 years for instance
(see [DKL+12] and the references within). Promising new frameworks
as SPDZ [DKL+13] are bringing SMC closer and closer to much more
real-world applications.
This chapter, however, did not focus on the verifiability property
that this thesis studies. This property can be obtained at will in all
the protocols presented above by enabling the active security that the
SMC framework provides. For example, in VIFF, this active security
mode is optional while passive security is by default. We decided in our
implementations to test our algorithms only in the passive mode due
to two incentives: first, the active security mode of VIFF is provided
with no strong guarantee on behalf of the authors. Second and more
importantly, enabling active security would lead to a significant increase
of the execution times of our algorithms which, in some cases, would
prevent us from testing even the smallest cases. The choice we made
of disabling active security is not dramatic as the conclusions of this
chapter remain unchanged since they are mainly privacy related.
Part III
Conclusion

Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Directions
Secure multi-party computation is a growing branch of cryptography. It
aims at providing secure solutions for multi-party protocols that seek
specific security properties. These properties are mainly – but not only
– related to privacy and verifiability concerns. Among the many ways to
achieve these properties in multi-party protocols, we find that most of
today’s solutions are based on human trust assumptions. For example,
a group of voters delegate the elections process to a group of authorities
which is entrusted not to leak individual votes and to compute the result
honestly. As another example, a company confides its sensitive data to a
consultancy service for analysis, computations and advise. In this case,
the good reputation of the consultancy service serves as a guarantee for
the company to ensure that the data is not sold to competitors and that
some real work has been performed on the data. This situation presents
some drawbacks that we do not detail here but we can say that it works
to some extend. One of the strengths of the cryptographic approach
to meet these problems is that it offers solutions that get rid of the
human trust or the physical assumptions. This elimination of the trust
assumption opens a world of new multi-party applications, in particular
for applications where it was too risky for the parties to trust each other.
In this thesis, we present cryptography-based solutions to relevant
multi-party protocols. We focused on the verifiability property in such
protocols. This property is crucial to guarantee the correctness of the
protocol execution. Still, we managed to ensure the privacy property,
with some tints, for all our solutions. Our approach is against the stream
of current existing cryptography-based solutions that prefer to stress the
privacy before the verifiability. Among other things, this led us to pro-
pose solutions with interesting asymptotic complexities in the verifica-
tion process.
Our work targets secure multi-party applications and proposes so-
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lutions to real-world problems, as well as a generic way to build these
solutions for other multi-party problems. We endeavour to give de-
tailed context and proofs of security as well as a complexity analysis
and concrete implementations through our prototype for every problem
we tackled.
Contributions. Our first main contribution concerns the field of cryp-
tographic voting. We presented several voting schemes that solve an
open-problem in this area which is to conciliate the privacy of the vot-
ers’ ballots and the verifiability of the election in its whole. Our pro-
posal took into account efficiency and practicability concerns. This work
found its way to be part of an actual voting scheme called “STAR-
Vote” [BBB+13] which may be deployed for future U.S. elections in
Texas.
To support this new voting systems, we developed a new crypto-
graphic primitive called commitment consistent encryption which is of
independent interest. We show how this primitive can be used to obtain
a perfectly private audit trail for several multi-party applications. We
detailed and proved the security mechanisms playing at the core of this
perfectly private audit trail.
The concrete use of this primitive can be found in our proposal on
secure multi-party function evaluation. We tackled the problem of se-
curely evaluating a multi-party function on secret values by providing a
perfectly private audit trail of its computation. The solution proposed
is generic but we illustrate it with three unrelated problems, solving a
linear system of equations, electronic auctions and finding the shortest
path in a graph. We proposed secure algorithms to solve these problems
and we provided an online prototype that implements our solutions for
direct use.
Finally, we investigated other multi-party applications related to sim-
ple combinatorial problems. In this case the approach was more classic in
the sense that we used already deployed secure multi-party techniques.
However, the results obtained are highly relevant since they concern
general problems that arise when performing secure multi-party compu-
tations. We highlighted the differences in the efficiency metrics and the
complexity gaps that modify the way to design a secure algorithm. We
pointed out the privacy leakages that may happen in a naive translation
of classical algorithms to their secure counterpart. Note that we also
proposed new sorting algorithms based on the unary notation that may
prove to be useful outside the cryptographic field.
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7.1 Open problems
As it frequently happens in a thesis, some ideas were found to be un-
fruitful, some promising tracks could not be followed by lack of time
and most answers to our questions led to more interesting questions.
All good things must come to an end, and thus here are the directions
our research would hypothetically have followed.
During the last 4 years, we have acknowledged a steady progress in
the timing computations of basic operations in secure multi-party com-
putation. These progresses rest in part on a strong use of precomputa-
tions. For example, the “SPDZ” solution of Damg˚ard et al. [DKL+13]
relies on multiplication triplets which are precomputed and then used
online to speed up multiplications. These kinds of work are currently
a game-changer in the field and bring SMC closer and closer to large
scale real-world applications. It would be worth applying the results
and precomputations techniques to our protocols to benefit from this
speed-up.
One problem that could not find a solution in this thesis was the
idea of aggregating the proofs of knowledge in a generic verifiable func-
tion evaluation in order to reduce their length and their computational
cost. This technique is known as batching proofs of knowledge and was
introduced by Bellare et al. in [BGR98a, BGR98b] for fast verification
of multiple modular exponentiations. More recently, Bayer and Groth
[BG13] proposed a zero-knowledge argument for polynomial evaluation.
If applied to our secure multi-party function evaluation, this would mean
a drastic decrease in the complexity of the proof of correctness.
In Chapter 5, we applied our PPAT protocol to several applications.
The choice of those applications was partly based on the previously in-
vestigated combinatorial problems of Chapter 6 within the VIFF frame-
work. One of the motivations was to perform a qualitative comparison
between auctions and sorting and the shortest path problem in both
settings. Nevertheless, regarding the shortest path problem, we only
considered the secure solution based on the Bellman-Ford algorithm. In
this case, the verification of the correctness of the result (the shortest
path in the form of a predecessors list and a distances list) is obtained for
the clients by running the algorithm entirely. However, opposite of what
is done for the auctions and the linear system, the complexity for the
clients is exactly the complexity of the algorithm itself (Bellman-Ford)
whereas for the two other problems, the complexity is lower. It remains
an open problem to seek an algorithm that, given the shortest path in
a graph, checks that it is indeed the shortest path while running with a
smaller complexity than the shortest path algorithm itself. As far as we
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know, this algorithm is yet to be found. On the other hand, although it
was not investigated, it was suggested that verifying some properties of
a modified version of the dual graph accounting the shortest path might
give the expected result.
Finally, it would be interesting to adapt our setting to dynamic func-
tionalities. Indeed, our generic construction is based on a clients-worker
setting where we limit the number of interactions to its minimum. The
clients send their inputs to the worker and publishes their commitments
and proofs. Then, the worker performs the computations and publish
the result and proof of correctness. Here we miss a group of multi-party
applications where the clients can dynamically react to the outputs of
the worker or even interact with each other. This category of applica-
tions is possibly full of new challenges for cryptography-based solutions.
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Appendix A
Memento on number theory
A.1 Finite groups and fields
Definition A.1. A group G is a set S and a composition law ? :
S × S → S such that,
• ∀x, y, z ∈ S, (x ? y) ? z = x ? (y ? z) (associativity).
• ∃e ∈ S : ∀x ∈ S, x ? e = e ? x = x (neutral element).
• ∀x ∈ S, ∃w ∈ S : x ? w = w ? x = e (inverse).
By convenience, we say that x is an element of the group G := (S, ?)
and we write x ∈ G when x ∈ S. The law ? is commutative when
∀x, y ∈ G, x ? y = y ? x. In this case the group is said commutative or
abelian. One might use additive (⊕) or multiplicative (⊗) notation for
the group law. In each case we use the convenient notations for x ∈ G
and k ∈ Z :
kx := x⊕ · · · ⊕ x︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
and xk := x⊗ · · · ⊗ x︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
e⊕ = 0 and e⊗ = 1
The number of elements of S is called the order of G. When this
number is finite, the group is said finite. An example of finite group is
the set of integers modulo n ∈ Z0 with the classic addition operation
(+). For x, y ∈ Z, we say that the equivalence relation noted x ∼n y
or x ≡ y mod n is true if ∃k ∈ Z such that x = y + kn. We note the
equivalence class of x as [x]n := {y ∈ Z|x ≡ y mod n}. As a result we
define the group Zn := ({[x]n|x ∈ Z},⊕) where [x]n ⊕ [y]n := [x + y]n.
This group is finite and has order n.
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Definition A.2. A subgroup H of a group G := (S, ?) is a group (T, ?)
where T ⊆ S.
As a consequence, the neutral element e of G is the neutral element
of H. For an element x ∈ G, we build the generated subgroup 〈x〉 ⊆ G
as {y ∈ G|y = kx with k ∈ Z}. If there exists x ∈ G such that 〈x〉 = G,
we say that G is cyclic and that x is a generator of G. The group Zn is
cyclic and [1]n is a generator of Zn.
Theorem A.1 (Lagrange). Let H be a subgroup of G. The order of H
divides the order of G.
Definition A.3. A ring R is a set S equipped with two internal com-
position laws ? and  such that,
• (S, ?) is a commutative group. The neutral element is noted e?.
•  is associative.
• there exists a neutral element for  denoted e and different from
e?.
• ∀x, y, z ∈ S, x  (y ? z) = x  y ? x  z and (x ? y)  z = x  z ? y  z
(distributivity).
We say that the ring is commutative if the law  is. We call the
characteristic of the ring R := (S,⊕,⊗), the number k ∈ N such
that k ⊗ e⊗ = e⊕ (k.1 = 0). If this number does not exist, we say
by convention that the characteristic is 0. It is sometimes possible to
identify two rings with the same structure if one can find an application
between the two that respects the composition laws. This application is
called a ring homomorphism.
Definition A.4. A ring homomorphism ψ is an application from
ring R1 := (S1, ?, ) to ring R2 := (S2,⊕,⊗) such that ∀x, y ∈ R1,
• ψ(x ? y) = ψ(x)⊕ ψ(y)
• ψ(x  y) = ψ(x)⊗ ψ(y)
• ψ(e) = e⊗
We can extend the ring structure to an even richer structure called
field.
Definition A.5. A field F is a ring R = (S, ?, ) such that ∀x ∈
R \ {e?}, ∃w ∈ R : x w = e = w x. In other words, every non neutral
element is invertible.
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Definition A.6. A subfield H of a field F is a field such that every
operation including inversion between two elements in H produces an
element of H.
We define a field isomorphism in the same way as Definition A.4.
The order and characteristic of a field ensue from previous definitions.
One can naturally extend the group Zp, with the classic multiplication
law (.) to form a finite field whenever p is a prime number. In this
case, we use the notation Fp to mark out the prime field. In general, Fq
designates a finite field of order q.
Theorem A.2. The characteristic of a field is either 0 or a prime num-
ber p.
Theorem A.3. The order of a finite field is pd where p is prime and
d ∈ N.
For a field F and x ∈ F ∗ := F\{e⊕}, it is convenient to define o(x)
as the smallest integer t such that xt = e⊗. We call this integer the
order of x.
Theorem A.4. Let F be a field of order q, then F ∗ contains at most
one element of order q − 1 and ∀x ∈ F ∗, o(x) divides q − 1.
Following from Theorem A.4, we can see that ∀x ∈ F ∗, xq−1 = 1.
Moreover, F ∗ is a multiplicative group that is cyclic.
We can build large fields by adding elements to a base field. The
result is called an extension field. For example, we can see that C is
an extension field of R obtained by adding the imaginary number i to
R.
Definition A.7. The field L is an extension field of the field K if
there exists a field homomorphism from K to a subfield of L.
We denote a field extension by L : K to be read L “over” K.
Definition A.8. The degree of a field extension L : K is the dimension
of the vector space L over K. This number is denoted [L : K]. If this
number is finite, we say that the field extension L : K is finite.
Building extension field over each other results in a tower of exten-
sion fields.
Theorem A.5. Given the tower of extension fields M : L : K, we have
that [M : K] = [M : L][L : K].
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The classic way to define extension field is first, to choose a polyno-
mial which has no root in the base field and second, to define the field
that is the quotient of the base field by the polynomial.
Definition A.9. Given a field F , we define F [x] as {a0 + a1x+ a2x2 +
...+ anx
n|a0, ..., an ∈ F, n ∈ N}.
Definition A.10. Given a field F and a polynomial P ∈ F [x], we define
f + P.F [x] as {f + P.g|g ∈ F [x]}.
Definition A.11. Given a field F and a polynomial P ∈ F [x], we
define the quotient F [x]/P.F [x] as {f + P.F [x]|f ∈ F [x]}. In this case,
f1 + P.F [x] = f2 + P.F [x] iff f1 − f2 is a multiple of P .
Theorem A.6. Given a field F and a polynomial P ∈ F [x], F [x]/P.F [x]
is a field if and only if P is irreducible which means that there are
no polynomials Q1, Q2 ∈ F [x] with degQ1, degQ2 < degP such that
P = Q1Q2.
Definition A.12. Given a field F and an element r ∈ F , we define the
minimal polynomial of r as the monomial polynomial M ∈ F [x] such
that r is a root of M and M is of minimal degree.
Theorem A.7. Given a finite field F of characteristic p such that F ⊃
Fp. For r ∈ F , we note Fp[r] := {f(r)|f ∈ Fp[x]}. We have that Fp[r]
is a subfield of F and if P ∈ Fp[x] is the minimal polynomial of r, then
there exists an isomorphism from Fp[x]/P.Fp[x] to Fp[r].
It is now easy to see that Fp[x]/P.Fp[x] is an extension field of Fp[x]
by adding the roots of an irreducible polynomial P . The degree of this
extension is exactly d, the degree of P . We can show that this extension
is isomorphic to Fpd . Without entering in too many details, we present
an important automorphism of field.
Definition A.13. Given a finite field F of characteristic p. The au-
tomorphism φ defined by φ : F → F : x 7→ xp is called the Frobenius
automorphism. It is easy to see that φ(x + y) = xp + yp and that
φ(x.y) = xpyp.
In extension fields, the Frobenius automorphism can be used to com-
pute large exponentiation as what is done in Section 3.5.1.
A.2 Elliptic curves
Elliptic curves form a specific kind of groups that are widely used in
cryptography. Their main advantage is that they offer a fast group law
A.2. Elliptic curves 187
and that the discrete logarithm problem is hard to solve (see Section
2.1.2) in such groups. Moreover, the level of security they offer for a
reduced key size compares with cryptography based on the factorization
problem (see key length recommendations [BBJ+09, BCC+12, Gir15]).
We present here a condensed view of elliptic curves.
Definition A.14. Given a finite field F , an elliptic curve over F is
denoted EF := (E,⊕) where
E := {x, y ∈ F |y2 + a1xy + a3y = x3 + a2x2 + a4x+ a6} ∪ O∞
with fixed a1, ..., a6 ∈ F such that
• @(x0, y0) ∈ E : 2y0 + a1x0 = 0 and, 3x20 + 2a2x0 + a4 − a1y0 = 0
simultaneously. We say that the elliptic curve is non-singular.
This prevents us from using curves with isolated points or cusps
that are problematic for computations.
• O∞ is called the point at infinity. It is the neutral element for
the addition law ⊕ which means that ∀P ∈ E : P⊕O∞ = O∞⊕P =
P .
• for P,Q ∈ E\{O∞} where P = (Px, Py) and Q = (Qx, Qy), we
define P ⊕ Q = R := (Rx, Ry) as follows: at first, if P = −Q
which means that Px = Qx and Py = −Qy, then R = O∞. In the
general case,
Rx :=λ
2 + a1λ− a2 − Px −Qx
Ry :=λ(Px −Rx)− Py − a1Rx − a3
where the parameter λ is given by
λ :=

Py−Qy
Px−Qx if P 6= Q
3P 2x+2a2Px+a4−a1Py
2Py+a1Px+a3
if P = Q
The equation of the curve
Ewe ≡ y2 + a1xy + a3y = x3 + a2x2 + a4x+ a6
is called the Weirstraß equation. When the characteristic of F is > 3, it
is possible to find an isomorphism over F to represent the elliptic curve
in a short Weirstraß equation,
Eswe ≡ y2 = x3 + a4x+ a6.
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Proposition A.1. The elliptic curve EF := (E,⊕) of Definition A.14
is a group.
An elliptic curve E over an extension field F of degree k might take
up a non negligible part of the computational efforts when we want
to perform operations on EF . Fortunately, it is sometimes possible to
find an isomorphism between the curve EF and another curve E
′
F ′ on
an extension field F ′ with a lower degree k′ < k (compared to a base
field). The isomorphism means that every point on the curve EF can be
projected on a point on the curve E′ and vice-versa. This isomorphic
curve E′F ′ is called a twist of the curve EF , or the twisted curve of EF .
We say that this twist is, quadratic, cubic, sextic, etc. if the degree of
the field extension [F : F ′] is 2, 3, 6, etc.
To conclude this section on elliptic curves, we point out that the
Frobenius endomorphism φ : EF → EF : (x, y) 7→ (xp, yp) where p is
the characteristic of F , is, among other things, a powerful tool to per-
form large scalar multiplication of points over extension fields. Indeed,
we can often precompute values involved in exponentiations of multi-
ple of p which makes them almost free. A good, but rather tedious,
use of this method is given in Section 3.5 in the details of the pairing
implementation (which is adapted from [BGDM+10]).
A.3 Pairings
At the scale of the history of cryptography, pairings are young and
provoke enthusiasm among the research community as a useful tool in the
hands of cryptographers. This tool is used in the applications presented
in this thesis and we give here a condensed introduction.
At first, pairings were developed as a way to reduce the complexity
of the discrete logarithm problem on elliptic curve by transferring it to
a smaller group [MOV93]. However, when carefully choosing the elliptic
curve, one can avoid this attack by rendering the discrete logarithm
problem still infeasible in the smaller group. Nowadays, pairings are used
in various cryptographic schemes such as tripartite Diffie-Hellman key
exchange [Jou00], identity based encryption [BF01] or short signatures
[BLS01].
A pairing is a bilinear mapping from two groups to a third one, all
sharing the same order. We refer to the book of Cohen et al. [CFA+05]
for a more detailed mathematical presentation of pairings and we focus
on the essential.
Definition A.15. A pairing Pair is composed of three groups G1 :=
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(S1,+), G2 := (S2,+), G3 := (S3, .) of the same prime order q and a
map e : G1 ×G2 → G3 such that:
• ∀(P,Q) ∈ G1 × G2, ∀a, b ∈ Z we have that e(aP, bQ) = e(P,Q)ab
(bilinearity)
• ∀(P,Q) ∈ G1 ×G2, we have that e(P,Q) 6= 1G3 (non degeneracy)
• ∀(P,Q) ∈ G1 ×G2, e(P,Q) is efficiently computable (efficiency)
When G1 6= G2, we say that the pairing is asymmetric (Pairasym)
and in this case, there exists an isomorphism θ : G2 → G1. In the
specific case where G1 = G2, we call the pairing symmetric (Pairsym).
Pairings offer numerous possibilities with some restrictions concerning
the isomorphism θ and the possibility to hash arbitrary string into G2.
These constraints have been summarized by Galbraith et al. in [GPS08].
However, these restrictions do not concern our schemes.
Asymmetric pairings are usually instantiated on ordinary elliptic
curves, G1 is a cyclic subgroup of an elliptic curve EFp , G2 is a sub-
group of EF
pk
and G3 is a subgroup of F∗pk . More precisely, G1 and G2
are the set of q-torsion points (see Definition A.16) and G3 is the cyclic
group of the q-th roots of unity. The degree k of the extension field Fpk
is also called the embedding degree of the pairing.
Definition A.16 (Torsion points). Given an elliptic curve EF over
a field F , we define the set of q-torsion points denoted EF [q] as
{P ∈ EF |qP = O∞} which means that the order of P is either q or
a factor of q. Note that EF
pk
[q] contains exactly q2 points and we have
an isomorphism between EF
pk
[q] and Zq × Zq.
Several families of elliptic curves are studied and well suited for pair-
ing based cryptography. Following Ben Lynn’s classification [Lyn07,
Chapter 4], we point out type A, B and E for symmetric pairings and
type D, F and G for asymmetric pairings. For a complete description
of the families, see [FST10]. Note that type F curves (called Barreto-
Naehring or BN-curves [BN06]) are used for prototyping in this thesis
(see Chapters 3). These curves of equation E ≡ y2 = x3+b in Fp contain
a prime order n subgroup where p and n are primes determined through
the integer parameter u:
p = p(u) =36u4 + 36u3 + 24u2 + 6u+ 1
q = q(u) =36u4 + 36u3 + 18u2 + 6u+ 1
We chose to work with the BN-curves for several reasons. First,
they are nowadays well used which makes the reproduction of our re-
sult facilitated if one wants to use an implementation of the BN-curves
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different than ours. We recall that our code is available online [Cuv15].
There, we also provide a magma script that can be used to double check
the computations performed with our libraries. Second, and related to
the first point, many improvements of the pairings on BN-curves exist
and this brought a huge upswing in the timing results (about a hun-
dred times better than with our first naive implementation). Finally,
the generation of random curves generator is pretty simple and efficient
(there seems to be a good density of u such that p and q are primes
although no bound on such density have been proved yet). There is an
online curve generator provided on the University of Aachen website at
[Sch09, KZS+09].
As previously said, the computation of the bilinear mapping e : G1×
G2 → G3 must be efficient. In this view, we use bilinear mapping such
as the Weil pairing or the Tate pairing whose descriptions can be found
in [Sil95] for instance. Miller’s algorithm allows computing Weil and
Tate pairings in a straight way [Mil04]. We find many refinements of
this algorithm as well as variants of the Tate pairing such as the ate
pairing [HSV06].
